US strategic interest in Baghram base and it’s geopolitical significance: By Balaji Chandramohan
- Chennai Centre for China Studies
- 6 hours ago
- 15 min read
Image Courtesy: Mint
As the United States seeks to establish it’s strategic pivot in the Eurasia, it wishes to get back the strategically located Bagram Airfield located in Afghanistan. 1
Bagram Airfield is located in Afghanistan's Parwan Province, approximately 11 kilometres southeast of the city of Charikar and 47 kilometres north of Kabul. The airfield has an 11,800-foot runway capable of serving bomber and large cargo aircraft.
During his first term, Donald Trump negotiated an agreement with the Taliban that laid the foundation for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the final pullout occurred under former President Joe Biden and was widely seen as chaotic and mismanaged.
Trump has consistently argued that the US should regain control of the Bagram air base, nearly five years after signing a 2020 agreement that led to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its position and infrastructure reportedly made it a central operational hub during the US-led "war on terror" after 2001.
Trump hinted that his administration is working to regain control of the base, which lies an hour north of Kabul. The Taliban took it over following the collapse of the Afghan government and the US military withdrawal in 2021.
It’s true that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are at loggerheads about the base and the recent conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an offshoot of that. 2
India’s stance on Baghram Base
Meanwhile, India has joined the Taliban, Pakistan, China and Russia to oppose US President Donald Trump’s bid to take over the Bagram air base in Afghanistan.
India watched with interest the seventh meeting of the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan was held in Moscow at the level of special representatives and senior officials of Afghanistan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. A delegation from Belarus also attended the meeting as guests. These countries opposed US retake of Bagram Base.
From India’s point of view there are other posturing from Washington which worries New Delhi. First, Washington revoked the sanctions waiver that had allowed India to operate and invest in Iran’s Chabahar Port.
On the other hand, Trump signalled his intention to reclaim Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base, a key military facility abandoned during the chaotic 2021 US withdrawal.3
These decisions have raised questions about whether the Trump administration is recalibrating its regional priorities to align more closely with Pakistan at India’s expense.
Trump has demanded that Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban hand over the country’s Bagram air base to Washington, five years after he signed a deal with the group that paved the way for the US withdrawal from Kabul.
Trump has renewed his push to regain the sprawling military facility. Despite lacking formal international recognition, the Taliban has established diplomatic ties with nations like China and Russia, and continues to call for broader global engagement.
Earlier last year, the Taliban celebrated the third anniversary of their takeover at Bagram with a grand military display of abandoned US hardware, catching the eye of the White House.
Trump has repeatedly criticised his predecessor, Joe Biden, for his “gross incompetence” during the withdrawal of US forces after the country's longest war.4
It was under Trump that the US brokered a deal with the Taliban in Doha in 2020 that would have seen the US withdraw all its troops by May 2021 in exchange for various security guarantees from the militants.
Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, including India, have voiced a rare unified front by opposing foreign attempts to deploy “military infrastructure” in the country, as United States President Donald Trump presses to regain control of the Bagram airbase.
Afghanistan is crucial for the success of the western powers in Asia as it connects South Asia to the Middle East and serves as a buffer between the two regions. It is rich in minerals and has been contentious between Pakistan and Iran for their sphere of influence.
It’s understood that India will be left out of the great game to be played in Afghanistan. Its investment in the extraction of minerals, especially in the coal rich Hajigak region and elsewhere in Afghanistan and other industries, will come under the scanner.
Further, India will be cut from Central Asia and will not be a part of the development of strategically important Chabahar and much of investment involving the Delaram-Zaranj Highway which was built by India may be benefitting India’s strategic ambitions. 5
To a larger extent, the present situation in Afghanistan could be attributed to India’s inability to send troops to Kabul when the situation warranted. The government in New Delhi had earlier given military equipment as well as assured greater cooperation in building a battle-capable Afghan force.
Despite the failure of its Afghanistan policy, India will reconsider deploying a squadron of Su-30MKIs at the Farkhor base in Ayni, Tajikistan to counter increased Chinese military assertiveness in its western borders. From India’s point of view, the region north of Afghanistan will soon prove to be pivotal to the energy security of continental Asian powers.
So far, India’s “Look West” policy hasn’t been as coordinated and successful as its “Look East” policy because New Delhi is restrained from pursuing relations across Central Asia and the Middle East by Pakistan. Similarly, its relations with the United States, though positive, haven’t developed significantly because the Americans need Pakistan’s support in their War on Terror.
Meanwhile, as Pakistan’s influence is eroding, there is a chance for India to jump into the vacuum that is Afghanistan and facilitate a comprehensive reconstruction effort, one that is supported by the neighboring states that have most at stake in the country, including Iran, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The longer term aim for India could be to deny other great powers, notably China, a leadership position in Central Asia. Here, again, it finds itself at odds with Pakistan which is a Chinese client state.
The region north of Afghanistan will prove to be pivotal to the energy security of continental Asian powers soon. India can’t afford to slumber as usual but must design a strategy now.
But all of those objectives would require a US military presence, one of the sources said. And a deal that Trump stuck with the Taliban in 2020, during his first term, mandated a full withdrawal of US troops from the country.
It’s not clear whether or how the Taliban has been engaging with the US on relinquishing control of the key airfield. But US seems to have leverage on acquiring base. 6
Trump has previously indicated that if the US withdrawal in 2021 had happened under his administration, he’d have kept control of Bagram, citing its strategic importance near the border between Afghanistan and China. Earlier this month he said that the Biden administration was “so stupid” for withdrawing US troops from the base in 2021.
Though the statement echoes last year’s forum language, it suggests broad regional opposition to Trump’s push to return to Bagram, which he handed over to Afghanistan’s Taliban five years ago as part of a deal paving the way for the US withdrawal from Kabul.
Afghanistan geo politics can’t be understood without passing a note that Pakistan helped the US to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in the 1980s and has been a partner in the War on Terror, positioning itself as a reliable and fairly secular Sunni partner in the struggle against radical Islam and Shia Iran.
It’s noted that after nearly two decades of balancing relations with India and Pakistan, traditional rivals in South Asia, Kabul opted for a strategic partnership with New Delhi. The choice and its timing were largely inspired by the imminent withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.7
India has shown itself a partner for regional stability by investing $1.2 billion in development projects in Afghanistan and facilitating the necessary nation building in the war torn country. India paid a price for its help. Diplomats and aid personnel were killed in Afghanistan in attacks for which New Delhi has held Pakistan’s spy agency responsible. Pakistani intelligence is known to entertain relations with Afghan insurgents and wary of an Indian presence on both of its borders.
Despite the unpredictability and violence, India maintained its presence because it has a stake in a stable, democratic Afghanistan, unlike Islamabad. Pakistan would rather have a divided country, ruled by Islamists, to achieve “strategic depth” there. Other regional actors, including Central Asian states and Iran, as well as the United States want to keep the Taliban out of power. This convergence of interests has served India well. Its relationships with Iran and the United States are both stable if not improving. The question now is what role New Delhi sees for itself in a post-war.
The answer may be found in its “Look West” policy which aims to improve cooperation with countries across West Asia. Afghanistan could be a launch pad from which to boost India’s diplomatic and commercial relations with the Central Asian republics.
As Pakistan’s influence is eroding in Central Asia, there is a chance for India to jump into the vacuum that is Afghanistan and facilitate a comprehensive reconstruction effort, one that is supported by the neighbouring states that have most at stake in the country, including Iran, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The longer term aim for India could be to deny other great powers, notably China, a leadership position in Central Asia. Here, again, it finds itself at odds with Pakistan which is a Chinese client state.
The region north of Afghanistan will prove to be pivotal to the energy security of continental Asian powers soon. India can’t afford to slumber as usual but must design a strategy now. NATO and Afghanistan.
On the other hand, NATO Allies will be monitoring the rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan where there might a requirement for it use force.
From the outset when International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2001 set its foot in Afghanistan, NATO has been working to maintain operations at Kabul international airport, providing key functions under very challenging circumstances. The Alliance has also maintained its diplomatic presence through the Senior Civilian Representative.
Earlier, it’s understood that NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, to ensure that the country does not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack our homelands. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan.8
From August 2003, NATO led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Its mission, which aimed to create the conditions whereby the Afghan government could exercise its authority throughout the country and build the capacity of the Afghan national security forces, including in the fight against international terrorism, was completed in December 2014 when the Afghan National Defence and Security assumed full responsibility for security across their country.
NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advice and assist Afghan security forces and institutions to fight terrorism and secure their country. The focus was on Special Operations Forces and the Afghan Air Force. Further, at the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, the Allies and their operational partners committed to extending financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces through 2024. This funding is currently frozen.
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan by May 2021.
In April 2021, after several rounds of consultations, allied foreign and defence ministers decided to start the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021 and complete it within a few months. They also decided to continue supporting Afghanistan in other ways. This was confirmed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Brussels Summit on 14 June 2021.
It is unlikely that developments in Afghanistan will alter Iran’s level of support for proxies in Syria and particularly Iraq; backing proxies is already a strategic priority. But if the sectarian divide between Iran and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan sharpens, Iran could further rely on the Shiite proxies that it has trained and armed. The new Iranian government has pledged to prioritize relations in the immediate neighbourhood more than its predecessor, which spent much of its time trying to draw Western investors and dealing with the nuclear issue.
During his first term, Donald Trump negotiated an agreement with the Taliban that laid the foundation for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the final pullout occurred under former President Joe Biden and was widely seen as chaotic and mismanaged.
On the other hand, India’s long-term regional trade and connectivity strategy suffered a serious blow last week, when Washington announced that it would end the sanctions exemption for the Chabahar Port project.
The waiver, which had been in place since 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), allowed Indian companies to work on the port without facing punitive measures under US sanctions.
A US State Department statement confirmed the decision, saying that individuals and entities “operating the Chabahar Port and engaging in other related activities will face sanctions under the IFCA” starting from the end of September.
Chabahar Port, located in energy-rich Sistan-Balochistan province of southeastern Iran near the China-controlled Gwadar Port, stands out due to its strategic and logistical advantages. It includes two main terminals, Shahid Kalantari and ShahidBeheshti, each equipped with five berths, facilitating significant cargo handling capabilities.
Often called the Golden Gate, the port let India bypass Pakistan and establish alternative trade and transit routes to landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is also the closest Iranian port to India, and is being developed by New Delhi and Tehran to boost connectivity and trade ties.
Located on Iran’s south eastern coast along the Gulf of Oman, Chabahar is India’s primary maritime gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Unlike other Iranian ports, it offers direct sea access to routes that avoid Pakistani territory.
Over the past several years, India has made substantial financial commitments to the project. Its initial pledge included $85 million for equipment at the ShahidBeheshti terminal, of which roughly $24 million worth of machinery has already been supplied.
The post came into being in the 1970s, and India has long shown interest in its development. Experts believe that a fully developed Chabahar port could also be used to counter Chinese presence in the Oman Sea and Gwadar Port.
In 2001, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Iran, New Delhi signed an agreement with Tehran over the development of Chabahar port. But the project was affected after the United States, under President George W Bush, declared Iran as one of the "axis of evil", forcing New Delhi to abandon its strategic relationship with Tehran.
Over the subsequent years, India again looked to the Iranian port, seeking to deepen its commitment to Chabahar. In May 2024, India and Iran signed a long-term bilateral contract on port operation, enabling the operation of Shahid-Beheshti in the Chabahar Port Development Project for a period of 10 years.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also allocated Rs 100 crore for Chabahar Port for 2024-25, underlining India's focus on connectivity projects with Iran.
The US said its sanctions will target entities that facilitate Iranian oil sales, financing Iran's military and proxy groups in the region, directly impacting Iran's shadow banking infrastructure.
With the revocation of waivers, Indian operations at the port could now come under the risk of US sanctions, complicating India's ambitions and threatening the significant investments New Delhi has already made, amounting to over $120 million in infrastructure and credit lines for development.
China strategic interest in Baghram Base and it’s strategic connotation in Central Asia
China’s focus on and presence in Afghanistan has grown significantly over the past decade. However, the original emphasis on economic relations has been eclipsed by China’s security agenda in Afghanistan, as China seeks to ensure that anti-Chinese militancy does not leak out from Afghanistan and that Uighur militants do not receive support from the Taliban.
While China does seek a stable Afghanistan and would prefer a government not dominated by the Taliban, it has made its peace with the group under the assumptions that the United States and the Afghan government will not be able to resolutely defeat it and that the Taliban will either control substantial Afghan territory or formally come to power. Much to the disappointment of the Afghan government, China has not chosen to pressure Pakistan to sever its long-standing support for the Taliban.
China’s economic investments in Afghanistan also remain significantly below potential due to intensifying insecurity and persisting corruption in the country and the diminishment of China’s economic focus.
Increasingly, China also views Afghanistan through a geopolitical competition perspective, particularly with respect to India. As the United States reduces its role in Afghanistan, possibly down to zero U.S. military forces, China’s role in the country may raise — a development which is unlikely to advance U.S. interests.
While China cannot easily negate U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan and the region, it also cannot be relied upon to help the U.S. to prosecute them. Moreover, China may hamper some of the other U.S. interests in Afghanistan — specifically, pluralistic political and economic processes, and human rights and women’s rights.
Afghanistan will once again occupy important mental space for the global leaders based in Washington, Brussels, London, Delhi and Beijing. Though it is landlocked Afghanistan has important mineral rich resources warranting rich competition among both the immediate neighbours and distant geopolitical players.
Geopolitically, Afghanistan has been crucial for the overall strategic impact that the western powers have in Asia. Afghanistan connects the South Asia to Middle East and serves as a buffer between the two regions. It’s rich in minerals and has been contentious between Pakistan and Iran for Sphere of Influence.
On the other hand, India one of the important players in Afghanistan’s geo political games of chess will be left out of the great game in the extraction of minerals. Indian investment in the extraction of minerals, especially in the coal-rich Hajigak region and elsewhere in Afghanistan, and in other industries, will come under scanner.
Further, India will cut from Central Asia and will not be a part of the development of strategically important of Chabahar and much of investment involving the Delaram-Zaranj Highway which was built by India may be benefitting India’s strategic ambitions. To a larger extent, the present situation in Afghanistan could be attributed to India’s in ability to send the troops to Kabul when the situation warranted. It’s to be noted that India earlier given military equipment as well as sought greater co-operation in building a battle-capable Afghan National forces.
Despite the failure of its Afghanistan policy, India will reconsider deploying a squadron of Su-30MKIs at the Farkhor base in Ainee, Tajikistan, to counter increased Chinese military assertiveness in its western borders. From India’s point of view, the region north f Afghanistan will soon prove to be pivotal to the energy security of continental Asian powers.
On the other hand, from the United States point of view, Afghanistan’s regime change will prove that the concept of nation building as developed by the United States after the end of the Cold War has proved futile despite change of political stance in Washington.
Further, it’s true that the Afghanistan has been off the radar of the United States after Obama exited the White House office with the world and the Washington distracted by Donald Trump’s eccentric occupancy as President providing perfect futile for Taliban to reclaim its spot in Kabul. However as mentioned above Trump policy of non-intervening in other countries affairs and failure to sustain the nation building could be contributed to the present fiasco in Afghanistan.9
As New Delhi wishes to expand its strategic expansion in Central Asia, Beijing also wants to expand its strategic horizon as a part of its Eurasian strategy. It has intensified its outreach in recent times.
Earlier, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the leaders of Central Asia — Kazakh President Kassym-JomartTokayev, Kyrgyz President SadyrJaparov, Tajik President EmomaliRahmon, Turkmen President SerdarBerdymuhamedov, and Uzbek President ShavkatMirziyoyev —gathered for the first time in person (although it is the third China-Central Asia summit since the format was kicked off in 2020) in Xi’an, a city in Shaanxi Province known historically as Chang’an in May 2023.
Further, in 2022, when Xi and the Central Asian presidents marked 30 years of relations they announced the building of a “China-Central Asian community with a shared future,” regional twist on the Chinese diplomatic catchphrase of creating a “community with shared future for mankind.” Xi outlined four core principles in that effort during his keynote speech at the summit.
There is much more to unpack from the China-Central Asia Summit, especially stemming from the various bilateral visits that occurred on the sidelines.
The Pamir Mountain base also operational for the past two years, will also be upgraded to a permanent facility.
The Pamir base is situated near the Wakhjir Pass and connects through to China’sTaxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang. The immediate region is only accessible to military personnel. An access road has been built for use by border guards, leading on the Chinese side to the Karakoram Highway 80 kilometers to the east.
The daily flagged the expert opinion that “a new ‘5+2’ axis is being formed (Central Asia plus China and Russia)”. Evidently, although Putin was not present at the event in Xi’an, Russia’s interests have been taken into account.
To be sure, China’s decision in the context of the Ukraine crisis to assume a leadership role in Central Asia as provider of security is a paradigm shift that profoundly undercuts the very essence of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy to isolate and contain China. Look at the map to comprehend why the West’s talk of encirclement of Russia and China will remain a pipedream so long as Inner Asia remains out of bounds.
In such a volatile setting aimed at surrounding China with a ring of unstable states, Central Asia assumes critical importance for both Russian and Chinese strategies as a region that is beyond the reach of US influence.
On the other hand, Central Asia is considered China’s western periphery, and Beijing has strategically developed oil and gas pipelines connecting to the region, including routes to Kazakhstan and the Moscow is aware of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian republics, particularly through the SCO and bilateral agreements in the energy sector.
In conclusion,
As US increases its strategic interest in Afghanistan and Iran, India may welcome such move on a case by case basis as it understands it’s strategic interest are intertwined with Washington and at time it can act independent. Precisely, the reason why New Delhi wishes to have a strategic partnership and strategic autonomy rather forming strategic alliance which gives more flexibility.
Notes
Are Trump’s Chabahar and Bagram moves about helping Pakistan? ( First Post, September 23.2025)
Opinion | Bagram Blues: All About The Air Base That Triggered A War Between Pak And Afghanistan ( NDTV, October 24, 2025)
Bagram base key to US strategy for China & Eurasia ( Economic Times, September 22, 2025)
Syed Ata Hasnain A US return to Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase could reshape region’s strategic calculus ( Indianexpress, October 13, 2025)
India joins Russia, China, Pakistan, others in opposing US bid to regain control of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan ( Deccan Herald, October 7, 2025)
'Delusions': Taliban crushes Trump’s Plan to Retake Bagram Airbase; Nips 'China Nukes' Plan ( Times of India, September 24,2025)
The War Room newsletter: Why Trump wants a Taliban air base back ( Economist, September 22, 2025)
Pakistan’s Role in the Afghanistan War’s Outcome ( Brookings, May 10,2010)
Pakistan, Taliban and the Afghan Quagmire ( Brookings Institute, April 24,2013)
