China’s Wolf-War DIP-LOW-MESSY! : By Annunthra Rangan

Over the past five years, Beijing’s external behaviour has moved between two striking modes: (a) aggressive, performative confrontation-  the “wolf-warrior” style of blunt threats, public shaming, trade punishments and menacing rhetoric and (b) targeted, transactional diplomacy when it serves Beijing’s material interests (trade deals, mediation and vaccine/aid outreach). The sharpest public evidence that China is behaving undiplomatically are recent highly visible incidents including repeated dangerous military air interactions with Australian aircraft and an inflammatory post by a Chinese diplomat that appeared to threaten Japan’s new prime minister. Below are the facts, documenting episodes, and analysis of what they reveal about Chinese diplomatic practice and strategic signalling.

Case Study I: A diplomat’s threatening language and a diplomatic row

In November 2025 an outspoken Chinese diplomatic official (widely reported as China’s consul/general in Osaka and other embassy accounts) posted or made comments that Japan’s government described as “extremely inappropriate” and tantamount to a threat against Japan’s leader after the new Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, made comments about Taiwan’s defence. Reuters and other outlets reported that Tokyo formally protested the remarks; Chinese embassy channels defended the comments as personal or political expression in some reports while Beijing denounced the Japanese leader’s Taiwan remarks. The language used widely paraphrased in international reporting as “cut off that dirty neck” / “cut off his head” crosses accepted diplomatic red lines. Diplomats are expected to convey state policy, not issue violent rhetoric about foreign leaders. Such public threats intensify bilateral hostilities, force reciprocal steps (protests, warnings, targeted trade measures) and make quiet back-channel resolution harder.

Case Study II : China’s Intimidatory Behaviour Toward Australia:  The 2022 Laser Incident & Coercive Diplomacy

China’s behaviour toward Australia in recent years provides a textbook demonstration of coercive diplomacy in its rawest form. The most striking episode occurred in February 2022, when a Chinese PLA-N warship deliberately illuminated a Royal Australian Air Force P-8 patrol aircraft with a military-grade laser during routine surveillance activity north of Australia. This was not a navigational misunderstanding; it was an intentional act of intimidation. Australia’s Defence Department stated unambiguously that the laser put the lives of the Australian aircrew at risk by potentially blinding pilots and disabling sensors,  a hostile act that sits far outside acceptable military conduct during peacetime.

Beijing refused accountability, instead blaming Australia for “provocations” and dismissing the incident as a “normal reaction.” Such rhetorical evasion reveals a deeper truth about China’s diplomatic posture: when confronted with its actions, it deflects, denies, and doubles down. This episode came at a time when China was already imposing coercive economic pressure on Australia, from barley and wine tariffs to coal import bans in retaliation for Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into COVID-19’s origins. The combination of economic punishment and dangerous military signalling demonstrates the structural nature of China’s approach: weaponise both market access and military tools to discipline sovereign states into political compliance. This is not diplomacy. It is power projection masquerading as statecraft.

Case Study IIO: The Chinese Diplomat Who Said Japan’s Prime Minister Should “Have His Head Cut Off”

The degradation of diplomatic standards becomes even more evident in the case involving a former Chinese ambassador-level official, who publicly declared that Japan’s Prime Minister should “have his head cut off.” The remark emerged in 2023 in a live broadcast, where the official was criticising Japan’s cooperation with the United States and its stance on Taiwan. His exact phrasing invoked medieval imagery of decapitation,  the kind of violent rhetoric one would expect from extremist propaganda, not from a senior representative of a major power.

While Beijing attempted to downplay the statement as a personal view, the official was neither reprimanded nor meaningfully censured, signalling tacit approval. The absence of consequences reveals a deeper rot within China’s diplomatic culture. Wolf-warrior diplomacy initially celebrated as nationalist bravado has morphed into open threats of physical violence against foreign leaders, eroding the very foundation of diplomatic decency. No respectable state tolerates its diplomats speaking the language of execution. Yet China’s official ecosystem rewarded, amplified, and nationalistically praised the remark on social media platforms tightly controlled by the government.

This episode not only humiliated Japan but also exposed China’s inability or unwillingness to maintain even the minimal rhetorical norms expected in interstate conduct. Threatening the life of a foreign democratic leader is not “tough diplomacy”; it is a moral and diplomatic abomination and it reinforces the global perception that China’s foreign policy machinery has embraced intimidation as a default idiom.

Case Study IV: Maritime Coercion and Legal Evasion in the South China Sea: China’s Systematic Use of Force Over Diplomacy

China’s behaviour in the South China Sea represents one of the clearest, most sustained examples of a major power abandoning diplomacy in favour of outright coercion, legal manipulation, and militarised intimidation. While maritime disputes are not unique in international politics, the manner and scale with which the PRC has pursued its territorial claims reveal a deeper structural hostility to international norms. Rather than resolving disagreements through the UNCLOS arbitration system, confidence-building measures, or bilateral diplomatic engagement, China has chosen a path of escalation, physical obstruction, and coercive operations designed to force regional states into acquiescence. The Scarborough Shoal confrontation, the Second Thomas Shoal laser incident, the ramming of Philippine vessels, and the weaponisation of the China Coast Guard Law together illustrate a consistent pattern: Beijing is willing to flout international law, endanger human life, and militarise civilian maritime zones in pursuit of strategic dominance.

A major turning point occurred in 2012 at Scarborough Shoal when China effectively seized control of a traditional fishing area long used by Filipinos. Instead of negotiating or respecting prior arrangements, China enforced a unilateral blockade, preventing local fishermen from accessing their own waters. This action set the precedent for a new era in Chinese maritime strategy,  one defined not by diplomacy, but by the deployment of coast guard ships, militia fleets, and naval escorts to forcibly alter the status quo. When the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 that China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claims lacked any legal basis, Beijing did not merely reject the ruling; it dismissed the entire concept of international adjudication, demonstrating an alarming disregard for institutions meant to stabilise disputes. A responsible global actor might have engaged in dialogue, sought compromise, or at least refrained from further escalation. China chose the opposite: accelerate construction of militarised artificial islands, deploy anti-ship missiles and radar systems, and intensify harassment of Southeast Asian vessels, all under the guise of “sovereignty protection.”

The 2023 laser-targeting incident near Second Thomas Shoal stands as a particularly egregious example of this conduct. The China Coast Guard’s use of a “military-grade” laser against a Philippine resupply vessel was not an accident, nor the action of a rogue commander. It was an intentional act of intimidation with potential to blind sailors, cripple navigation, and trigger a dangerous escalation. By employing non-lethal but injurious weaponry, China signaled that it is willing to inflict harm while maintaining plausible deniability. This is a hallmark of grey-zone warfare: operating below the threshold of traditional conflict while still coercing adversaries into submission. The incident also revealed China’s cynical approach to crisis communication — Beijing denied wrongdoing, framed the Philippines as the provocateur, and used state media to justify its actions. This behaviour erodes trust, inflames tensions, and exposes China’s fundamental disinterest in conflict prevention.

Even more alarming is China’s attempt to legitimise coercion through domestic law. Amendments to the China Coast Guard Law authorise Chinese officers to detain foreign nationals for up to 60 days in disputed waters:  waters that international law recognises as belonging to other states. This is not simply legal overreach; it is the codification of hostage diplomacy at sea. By granting itself the authority to arrest foreigners on waters that do not legally belong to it, China has empowered its coast guard to weaponise law enforcement as a geopolitical tool. The message is unmistakable: China’s domestic laws supersede international law whenever Beijing deems it convenient. Such legal nihilism threatens the entire maritime order, as it normalises unilateral reinterpretations of law by powerful states.

China’s physical harassment of Philippine vessels further illustrates its willingness to risk lives to assert dominance. Repeated water-cannon attacks have damaged boats, injured crew members, and endangered lives. In 2025, the collision involving a China Coast Guard vessel, a Chinese naval ship, and a Philippine patrol boat marked one of the most dangerous escalations yet, reportedly resulting in casualties. That China is prepared to stage multi-vessel confrontations, combining navy and coast guard in near-collision manoeuvres exposes a reckless disregard for human safety. Such actions cannot be excused as miscalculations; they reflect a deliberate policy of controlled aggression aimed at eroding Philippine resolve and normalising Chinese presence in contested waters.

China’s maritime behaviour is not diplomacy, not rule-following, not negotiation. It is slow-motion expansion through coercion, calculated risk, and legal manipulation,  a model fundamentally incompatible with peace and stability. The South China Sea, once merely disputed, has become a laboratory for China’s coercive statecraft. And unless confronted, this model may soon be exported to other maritime regions, further eroding the global rules-based order.

Case Study V: Hostage Diplomacy and the “Two Michaels”: China’s Weaponisation of Human Beings as State Leverage

China’s detention of Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from 2018 to 2021 is one of the most striking and widely condemned examples of modern hostage diplomacy, exposing the extent to which Beijing is willing to sacrifice legal integrity, human rights, and diplomatic norms to achieve narrow political objectives. The arrests occurred just days after Canada detained Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou at the request of the United States, in accordance with a bilateral extradition treaty. Beijing immediately framed Canada’s action as “political persecution” and responded with a retaliatory mechanism that no responsible state would ever employ: the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to force political concessions. Kovrig and Spavor were held incommunicado, denied access to lawyers, subjected to relentless interrogations, and placed under conditions that human rights experts have classified as psychological torture. Their trials lacked transparency, evidence was never meaningfully presented, and the legal proceedings were entirely disconnected from due process. These detentions were not about justice or national security; they were a calculated act of state coercion designed to give China bargaining power in the Meng Wanzhou case.

The nature of the detentions exposes a core feature of China’s diplomatic worldview: the belief that law is not an impartial institution but a strategic tool that can be weaponised to punish states that refuse to bend to Beijing’s demands. The “Two Michaels” case demonstrated China’s readiness to discard even the pretense of judicial independence. The men were charged with espionage, yet no credible evidence was ever presented; instead, the Chinese government maintained a narrative of secrecy, asserting that the details could not be released because they involved “national security.” This phrase, frequently invoked in Chinese legal and political discourse, has become a blanket justification for bypassing scrutiny and silencing criticism. In this instance, it functioned as a diplomatic shield to obscure the political nature of the detentions. Every aspect of the process, from the timing of the arrests to the opaque trial and their synchronized release the moment Meng Wanzhou secured her departure from Canada laid bare China’s instrumentalisation of human beings as bargaining chips. The cases were synchronised so precisely with the Meng negotiations that there is no plausible interpretation other than retaliation.

What makes this even more troubling is China’s use of public rhetoric to justify its behaviour. Chinese officials and state media repeatedly accused Canada of acting as an “accomplice to American imperialism,” attempting to reframe the detention of Meng as an assault on China’s national honour. By weaponising nationalism, Beijing cultivated domestic support for what was essentially the kidnapping of two innocent individuals. This nationalist framing allowed China to claim legitimacy internally while displaying to the world that it was willing to escalate diplomatic disputes into personal suffering. Such behaviour is the antithesis of diplomacy, which rests on predictability, legal certainty, and mutual restraint. Instead, China broadcast a message to all states: any government that cooperates with legal processes contrary to China’s interests risks the safety of its own citizens.

A further disturbing aspect is the psychological pressure exerted on the detainees. Reports reveal that Kovrig and Spavor were subjected to constant lighting, lack of access to sunlight, isolation, and coercive interrogations, all tactics known to induce psychological breakdown. These were not incidental conditions; they formed part of a systematic technique of coercion meant to break resistance and extract confessions that could be used to manufacture legitimacy for the detentions. China’s refusal to grant regular consular visits, a right guaranteed under the Vienna Convention, underscores its disregard for international obligations. By violating both the letter and the spirit of consular agreements, Beijing signalled that international law is subordinate to its political agenda.

The release of the Two Michaels the moment Meng boarded a flight back to China further revealed the transactional nature of the detentions. There was no legal resolution, no reconsideration of evidence, no judicial process, only a choreographed exchange that underscored Beijing’s contempt for international norms. The speed, timing, and political orchestration of the release effectively confirmed what the world already understood: this was not justice, but hostage diplomacy. In doing so, China permanently damaged its credibility as a state that respects legal procedures or can be expected to behave responsibly in international affairs.

If a major global power is willing to detain innocent people as leverage, then the principles that sustain global diplomacy, trust, predictability, and reciprocity begin to erode. The “Two Michaels” case has become a cautionary tale for governments worldwide: when interacting with China, the safety of their citizens may hinge on political decisions completely unrelated to those individuals. This is not the behaviour of a rising, confident global leader; it is the behaviour of a state that sees coercion as a primary diplomatic instrument. In choosing this path, China has revealed a fundamental incompatibility between its diplomatic conduct and the norms that underpin the international system.

Case Study VI: The Lithuania-Taiwan Office Dispute (2021-2022): When Overreaction Betrayed Insecurity

When Lithuania allowed a Taiwanese Representative Office to open under a name that deviated from the usual “Taipei Office”, Beijing responded with one of its harshest diplomatic and economic retaliations against a small state in recent memory. Chinese customs authorities reportedly refused to clear Lithuanian goods, blocked imports, disrupted supply chains, and pressured European companies using Lithuanian inputs to sever such links,  a cocktail of coercive tactics designed to punish a sovereign decision. 

In addition, China downgraded diplomatic ties, suspended visa issuance, and broadly signalled that cooperation with Lithuania (and by extension with Taiwan) would incur severe costs. The result, however, was not the capitulation Beijing sought; instead, Lithuania, backed by the European Union and transatlantic partners, resisted. The EU initiated a dispute at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2022, framing the Chinese action as a clear violation of global trade rules. 

Rather than isolating Lithuania, the crisis rallied EU solidarity and highlighted the risks of Chinese economic coercion. The overreaction revealed a deeper insecurity within Beijing: a fear that even small democratic states might challenge its diplomatic diktats. By choosing retaliation over reasoned negotiation, China exposed the fragility of its “One China” diplomatic posture when confronted with sovereign choices it dislikes. Instead of demonstrating power, it revealed coercion  and in doing so, strengthened transatlantic resolve to resist similar pressure. The episode became a cautionary tale, not just for Lithuania, but for any small or mid-sized state contemplating independent foreign policy choices. In short, China’s blackmail failed to bend Lithuania,  it helped forge alliances against Beijing’s heavy-handed tactics.

Beijing frequently opts for coercion whether through economics, military posturing, legal manipulation, or strict internal governance over diplomacy, negotiation, or long-term relationship building. These tactics may yield short-term leverage, but often at the cost of long-term strategic credibility, trust, and stability. In many cases, they backfire once the targeted parties respond not with submission but with resistance, unity, and alternative alliances.

China’s overreach, whether in trade, borders, or domestic policy undermines the foundational norms of international order: respect for sovereignty, adherence to rule-based institutions, equitable economic relations, and humane governance. By repeatedly choosing coercion over cooperation, Beijing signals that might makes right but in doing so, it invites alliances aimed at counter-balancing that might. What some analysts hail as “assertiveness” risks becoming outright self-sabotage.

If China continues down this path, it risks isolating itself not because other states dislike it, but because they cannot trust it. Countries will hedge, build alternate supply chains, diversify trade partners, and deepen strategic cooperation with each other to safeguard against future coercion. In the end, China may find that the aggressive instruments it once believed would guarantee dominance have become the very forces that limit its influence, shrink its options, and weaken its global position.

References: 

1. Brooks, D. (2025, January 30). Opinion | Trump and Stupidity. Nytimes.com; The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/30/opinion/trump-executive-orders.html

2. How strained China-Australia relations hit trade in coal, barley, beef and wine. (2023, January 6). Investing.com. https://www.investing.com/news/economic-indicators/explainerhow-strained-chinaaustralia-relations-hit-trade-in-coal-barley-beef-and-wine-2974524?utm_source=chatgpt.com

3. India. (2020, June 17). China suffered 35 casualties during Galwan clash: Sources citing US intelligence reports. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/galwan-valley-clash-ladakh-chinese-army-35-casualties-1689908-2020-06-17?utm_source=chatgpt.com

4. Roche, E. (2020, December 2). China orchestrated Galwan Valley clash, suggests US panel. Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/us-panel-report-suggests-china-planned-galwan-valley-clash-with-indian-troops-11606914556072.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

5. Tan, W. (2021, June 3). China restricted imports from Australia. Now Australia is selling elsewhere. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/03/australia-finds-new-markets-for-coal-barley-amid-china-trade-fight.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

6. The Tribune. (2025). The Tribune. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/taiwan-condemns-chinese-diplomats-behavior-at-danish-event-as-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/

7. Welle, D. (2022, January 27). EU launches WTO case against China over Lithuania. Dw.com; Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/eu-launches-wto-case-against-china-over-lithuania-mistreatment/a-60572038?utm_source=chatgpt.com

8. Yan, X., Song, C., Pei, T., Ge, E., Liu, L., Wang, X., & Jiang, L. (2023). Mobile phone data reveal spatiotemporal dynamics of Omicron infections in Beijing after relaxing zero-COVID policy. ArXiv.org. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05500?utm_source=chatgpt.com

9. Zhang, S. (2025, July 8). China’s new nationalistic diplomacy wins over Southeast Asia. East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/07/08/chinas-new-nationalistic-diplomacy-wins-over-southeast-asia/

(Annunthra Rangan is a Senior Research Officer at the Chennai Centre for China Studies. The views expressed here are that of the author's and do not reflect the views of C3S.)