Parade as Power Projection: Evaluating China's 2025 Victory Day Demonstration :By Col Raja Sherpa

Introduction

China’s 80^th anniversary Victory Day parade held on 3 Sep 2025 at Beijing showcased a mature integrated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) built around long range precision strike, layered air/ missile defence, maritime denial and “intelligentised” (AI enabled) swarming. The most consequential reveal was the debut of DF-5C road-mobile launchers (silo based ICBM variant) advertised with intercontinental reach and MIRV potential underscoring a larger and more survivable nuclear force. New sea drones, hypersonic missiles, directed energy/ laser systems and conspicuous robotic ground systems like robotic dogs highlighted PLA’s accelerating move towards autonomy and anti access/ area denial (A2/AD). Diplomatically, the optics of Xi-Putin-Kim together signalled an anti-Western alignment and resolve. For the Indian Armed Forces and broader Indo-Pacific, the takeaways include denser anti-access bubbles from the Western Pacific into the IOR via long range maritime strike, faster kill chains leveraging ISR to fires and rising pressure on regional nuclear deterrence stability.

Strategic Messaging and Diplomacy

Occasion and Setting

The parade marked the 80^th anniversary of WWII’s end and China’s “War of Resistance” victory. It was framed as a solemn commemoration and a pledge of “peaceful development,” while visibly demonstrating modernised forces.  

Prominent Leaders Present

Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un were front row guests, state and independent outlets widely covered their presence and interactions, emphasising deepening ties. The symbolism supports Beijing’s narrative of a non-Western security pole.  

Internal Narrative

Official messaging paired remembrance with confidence in technological self reliance and stability, attempting to re-assure domestic audiences while deterring perceived adversaries.  

Force Composition and Capability Display

Joint Representation. March past groupings highlighted Ground, Navy, Air, Rocket and newly restructured information and cyber elements. This aligns with PLA reforms that emphasise networked C4ISR and information dominance. (Parade order as collated from various sources.)  

Themes. Compared with 2015 to 2019, the Parade of 2025 emphasised range and precision, autonomy and swarms, and counter ISR/air defence showcasing a full spectrum denial posture.

Key Capability Highlights

Nuclear and Strategic Strike. DF-5C ICBM appeared on transporters during the parade. It is reported that it has a range of almost 20,000 km reach and MIRV potential, part of China’s ongoing quantitative/ qualitative nuclear expansion. The optics reinforce the fact of assured retaliation and complicate US/ allied missile defence planning.  In broader context, 2025 Parade featured new hypersonic and ballistic systems, while detailed performance data wasn’t disclosed on site, however, the mix underscores continued emphasis on prompt, survivable and diversified strategic strike.  

 Maritime Denial and Naval Strike. New naval missiles and drones including Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) point to layered sea denial, reconnaissance strike capability and attritable options against surface groups. This supports an expanding perimeter from the First/ Second Island Chains toward key IOR nodes.  This show of strength indicates maturation of PLA Navy in sea based strike and unmanned maritime systems.  

Air and Missile Defence/ Counter ISR. Displays included directed energy and laser systems consistent with counter UAS/ ISR roles and point defence for critical nodes. While the parade reveals are not exhaustive, inclusions suggest operationalising of Directed Energy weapons as part of layered air defence.  

Intelligentised Warfare and Robotics. Robotic dogs and other unmanned ground systems were paraded symbolising investment in AI enabled teaming (MUM-T), urban ISR and assault support. Practical battlefield utility will depend on networking, endurance and resilience to EW, however, the signalling is clear. Reports also referenced AI driven swarm drones and “smart” munitions consistent with Chinese doctrine of algorithmic decision support, thus compressing the sensor-to-shooter timelines.  

Doctrinal and Operational Assessment

Kill Chain Acceleration. The appearance of information/ cyber formations and autonomous platforms indicates an emphasis on ISR-strike integration to detect, decide, deliver across all domains. We could expect broader use of passive sensing, multi-static radars and space based inputs feeding long range fires.  

Denser A2/AD Bubbles.   Combined with naval missiles, sea drones and air defences tighten PLA denial zones. This complicates carrier operations, P-8/ JSTARS like ISR and high value tanker lifelines in the Western Pacific and the chokepoints leading into the IOR.  

Nuclear Signalling. The DF-5C’s high profile debut advances deterrence credibility and bargaining power. Even if operational basing concepts were not detailed, the public reveal supports the narrative of expanded and modernised strategic forces. 

Limits and Caveats. However, caution must be exercised against taking this display at face value since the scale of fielding, crew proficiency and joint integration under fire are not proven on a parade ground. However, the trajectory, especially of autonomous systems should not be underestimated.  

Implications for India and the Indo Pacific

Strategic Factors

Nuclear Stability.  Expanded Chinese ICBM force posture narrows crisis decision windows and raises two front deterrence complexities for India. India should continue SSBN survivability, canisterised Agni readiness and BMD discrimination enhancements.  

Coalitions.  The Xi-Putin-Kim optics reinforce coordination among Beijing’s partners. New Delhi should deepen tri-service interoperability with like minded navies in the IOR while preserving strategic autonomy, emphasising information sharing and combined MDA.  

Operational Factors

Maritime. We can expect more capable PLA Navy task groups and unmanned pickets in the northern Indian Ocean Region. India’s Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW) will require expanded Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) with integration of satellite, seabed sensors and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/ Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) patrols with long range maritime strike integration like the Brahmos variants of air launched with stand-off capability to contest USV/ UUV screens and keep the SLOCs open.  

Air Defence.   Increased availability of DE/C-UAS suggests denser airspace control by drones. Indian Armed Forces must scale counter swarm EW, hard kill Short Range Air Defence (SHORADs) with redundant communication for UAV autonomy scenarios. 

Kill Web Resilience. PLA’s focus on information dominance implies early EW/ cyber shaping. Hardened SATCOM with diversification of Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) and mission command networks for degraded networks require duplicity and redundancy.

Indicators to Watch in Future

Maritime Drones. Serial fielding of maritime drones to fleet units, procurement documents or imagery from South/ East Sea Fleets needs to be monitored.  

Directed Energy Weapons. Exercises which injects pairing of DE systems with layered SAMs for C-UAS.  

Nuclear. Nuclear posture updates to include silo construction, training cycles associated with DF-5C/ other ICBMs.  

ISR and Joint Fires. C4ISR integration milestones to include joint fire control demos and space based ISR capabilities.  

Conclusion

This parade mattered!!  Beyond theatrics, it communicated credible advances in long range strike, maritime denial and intelligentised warfare of PLA. Even allowing for pageantry, the trendlines point towards PLA being able to find-fix-finish across domains under a protective umbrella of drones, lasers and integrated air defences. India and regional forces must assume these capabilities are entering the operational mainstream, if not today, however in the near future, and adapt their concepts, training and inventories accordingly.  

(The views expressed here are of the author and does not reflect the views of C3S.)