China's Civil Military fusion and its strategic connotation and its lessons for India: By Mr. Balaji Chandramohan
- Chennai Centre for China Studies
- Oct 10
- 13 min read
Military-Civil Fusion is a national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to develop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world class military” by 2049. 1
It’s understood that under MCF, the CCP is acquiring the intellectual property, key research, and technological advances of the world’s citizens, researchers, scholars, and private industry in order to advance the CCP’s military aims for political ends.
With, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken technology-seeking to unprecedented levels and Beijing is doing this so aggressively that MCF now constitutes a major national security challenge for us, its neighbors, and any country with a stake in the open international order historically underpinned by US leadership.2
Chinese President Xi elevated MCF to a national strategy in 2014, and in 2017, he put himself in charge of the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development. MCF is backed by the full force of national law and the coercive powers of the state, leaving no one within Beijing’s reach any choice but to comply with its dictates.
Further, the CCP regime certainly has been quite open about its desire to demolish foreign competition and dominate the technological heights of the global economy.
The goal of MCF is to give the CCP the most advanced military in the world by 2049, the centennial of its takeover in China. MCF aims to make any technology accessible to anyone under the PRC’s jurisdiction available to support the regime’s ambitions. Yes, this is in part about economic power, but it is also, quite centrally, about augmenting Beijing’s military power.
Revolution in Military Affairs and MCF in China
As envisaged by China , technological innovation is a key to global military power, which is central to a state’s position in the geopolitical pecking order. In this concept, moreover, the state at the top of the totem pole is the one around which the world-system organizes itself.3
In the regime’s self-conception, it was China that once occupied that position at the center of the civilized world, holding that seat for centuries and making that sense of centrality into a crucial part of Chinese self-identity.
Accordingly, as modern Chinese strategists see it, military technology has always been the key to global primacy, with successive “revolutions in military affairs” (RMA) having helped drive and enforce geopolitical shifts.
The objective of MCF is to ensure that it will be the PRC that rides the wave to geopolitical centrality for the next RMA. Xi has decreed that China must develop military capabilities superior to any other military in the world by 2049.
MCF envisages the ruthless acquisition and systematic diversion to military purposes of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, aviation and aerospace, Big Data applications, and civil nuclear power — is a central piece of that plan. If there is to be a mid-21st Century analogue to Britain’s imperialist gunboats, the CCP intends them to be Chinese assets.
These technology issues are critical to the great power competitive dynamics of the modern world.
The CCP is developing and acquiring key technologies through licit and illicit means. These include investment in private industries, talent recruitment programs, directing academic and research collaboration to military gain, forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and outright theft. The CCP’s MCF strategy allows a growing number of civilian enterprises and entities to undertake classified military R&D and weapons production. The CCP also exploits the open and transparent nature of the global research enterprise to bolster its own military capabilities through bodies like the China Scholarship Council, which requires academic scholarship recipients to report on their overseas research to PRC diplomats.
The CCP is systematically reorganising the Chinese science and technology enterprise to ensure that new innovations simultaneously advance economic and military development. It’s understood that Xi Jinping personally oversees the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development.4
Even if the Chinese Communist Party gives assurances about your technology being confined to peaceful uses, you should know there is enormous risk to America’s national security. The goal is to enable the PRC to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world. As the name suggests, a key part of MCF is the elimination of barriers between China’s civilian research and commercial sectors, and its military and defense industrial sectors. The CCP is implementing this strategy, not just through its own research and development efforts, but also by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies – including through theft – in order to achieve military dominance.
Civil Military Integration to Civil Military Fusion in China
China began integrating civilian and military products in the late 1990s by promoting their joint development under the framework of Civil-Military Integration (CMI), with a focus on modernizing defence capabilities.
China views MCF as a core strategy that must be integrated with other national initiatives to drive economic growth and transformation, aiming to establish a cohesive, robust, and comprehensive strategic framework. While CMI focused on the civilian sector supporting the military in areas such as logistics and technological development, MCF seeks to harness emerging and advanced civilian technologies to augment military capabilities.
After 2017, MCF diverged from past CMI endeavors in a number of respects. Its first goal was to integrate the civilian industrial sector into the PLA’s supply chain in its entirety. Non-defence corporations were urged to sell directly to the military for the first time. Second, China’s military is explicitly using MCF to gain access to vital Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies such as AI and Machine Learning, Quantum Computing and Communications, 5/6G Telecommunications, and Robotics and Automation.
In 2015, the CCP elevated Military-Civil Fusion Development (MCFD) to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between China’s national development strategy and its national security strategy. Its drive for defence self-reliance and global military influence through MCF has raised geopolitical concerns.
MCF has drawn global concern and scrutiny, leading to sanctions, particularly from the US, on Chinese companies alleged to be advancing the PLA’s military objectives under the guise of civilian research programmes.
China’s shift away from unambiguous references to MCF appears to be a strategic attempt to obscure its military objectives and minimize international backlash. Recognizing that some of its initiatives, including MCF and the BRI, have ignited concerns about Beijing’s intentions, China has adopted lower-profile rhetoric when promoting them, albeit without changing their core strategic objectives. 5
MCF has been incorporated into almost every strategic programme since Xi came to power in 2013, including the Made in China 2025 initiative and the 2017 Next Generation AI Plan. MCF is a Chinese national strategy to transform the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049 by exploiting dual-use technologies for military applications and promoting innovation in critical industries. To further China’s military objectives, the MCF strategy has enabled the CCP to acquire intellectual property, research, and technological innovation from global citizens, academics, and private industry.
China seeks and obtains foreign technology through various means, including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign Research and Development (R&D) centres, joint ventures, academic partnerships, talent recruitment, theft, and industrial and cyber espionage.
Although the Chinese MCF strategy aims to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defence Science and Technology (S&T) industries, its broader purpose is to strengthen all instruments of national power by incorporating these technologies into its economic, military, and social governance models. 6
MCF strives to establish an infrastructure that connects the military and civilian sectors in a manner that catalyses innovation and economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in advancing dual-use technologies, especially those suited for “intelligentised” warfare, and facilitates effective industrial mobilisation during wartime.
It’s understood that Washington’s concerns can be grouped into five broad categories. First, China’s theft of foreign technology, its demands for technology transfer from companies as a price for their entry into the country, and its strategic acquisitions of foreign firms to gain technological know-how. Second, the use of technologies acquired for civilian purposes being diverted for military applications.
The overall management and implementation of the MCF strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition to signifying its importance, the elevation of the MCF to a national-level strategy was intended to overcome obstacles to implementation across the party-state.
This elevation led to the establishment of the CCMCFD in 2017, chaired by President Xi. The stated objective of the CCMCFD is to build China’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” The elevation of the MCF strategy and the creation of the CCMCFD signal the importance that CCP attaches to MCF, given the scope and scale of the strategy’s ambitions.7
China’s MCF system integrates a vast network of government bodies, military institutions, research centres, and private enterprises to accelerate technological and military advancements. It involves ministry-level organisations under the State Council, key organs of the CMC, leading military universities and academies, state-sponsored research institutions, and private firms specialising in AI, robotics, unmanned systems, cyber security, and Big Data. MCF initiatives foster collaboration between central, provincial, and municipal governments, PLA units, academic entities, and industries, with over 35 national-level MCF industrial zones established across China.
MCF can be defined as a strategy that strives to reinforce the PRC’s ability to build the country into an economic, technological, and military superpower by fusing the country’s military and civilian industrial and S&T resources. The strategy is aimed at promoting the sharing of resources and collaboration in research and applications, which ensures the mutually beneficial coordination of economic and national defense construction. MCF evolved from the former, more limited approach of CMI, which emphasized combining the military and civilian sectors. What distinguishes MCF from CMI is an increased level of coordination of military and civilian relations, a more balanced emphasis between military and civilian developments, and an institutional upgrade from simple combination to comprehensive integration.
The MCF strategy intends to break down the obstacles between the PLA, academia, technology and private sectors. This would facilitate the PLA to employ dual-use industries and technologies for military advancements and capabilities development for employment at peace and civil time.
The Central Military–Civil Fusion Development Commission, led by Xi Jinping, has made the Cyberspace Security Military–Civil Fusion Innovation Centre, Qihoo-360, a leading Chinese cybersecurity company.
On the other hand, Xi Jinping has continuously emphasised the dynamism and potential of MCF to 'grasp the historical opportunity of the current information technology transformation and new transformation of military affairs'.
In April 2018, in a speech delivered at the National Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference, Xi Jinping highlighted the inherent relationships between the market and the battlefield while 'promoting the creation of a full-factor, multi-domain and highly efficient development structure for MCF'.
The PLA's Strategic Security Force (PLASSF) will keep pace with the rapid, disruptive technological changes, often driven by research and development in the private sector. These technological changes make SSF pursue civil-military integration fusion as an integral aspect of its mission. This involves taking advantage of dual-use technological advances and leveraging civilian talent. The PLASSF recruits a large number of civilian personnel as specialist professionals in cyber defence, aerospace and artificial intelligence. Individual PLASSF units are conducting research projects with universities.
Military Civil Fusion in India lessons from China
India as a nation has already achieved a high degree of Civil-Military integration which is evident during the handling of disasters in the country. Prior to formulating Development of disruptive technologies has emerged as a major area of investment at the Intl level. Since Military Civil fusion entails integration of the nation’s militaryand civilian technological R&D resources and enhancing the military-civil coordinated innovation capability development,
MCF strategy for India is likely to further enhance the technological prowess of India wherein the Armed Forces are likely to becomethe harbingers of the technological developments in the country.
The implementation of MCF strategy is likely to enable creation of a Civil-Military integrate governing system across sectors, government bodies, and domains resulting in optimum utilization of National resources and availability of a platform at various levels. Enhanced Military Capability. Faced with internal and external challenges to development and security, MCF strategy is likely to ensure enhancement of the overall military capability by ensuring that any security challenge to the country is addressed by a Whole of the Nation approach. Effective Implementation of Military Civil Fusion in India.
A suggested model of the Organisational structure for Military Civil fusion at the apex level along with recom composition of various sub- structures is depicted at Figure III. The indicative lines of efforts of the various sub-structures are enumerated at.
The strategic rationale behind MCF is multi faceted as it answers China’s need for technological self-reliance amid rising barriers to foreign innovation ecosystems. Internationally, it is a play for parity: China is aware that its primary rival, the US, possesses a deeply entrenched military-industrial base where defence and private sector collaboration is institutionalised. MCF was designed to create a Chinese equivalent.
The payoff is evident in platforms like the Type 076 amphibious assault ship, a hybrid carrier equipped with electromagnetic launch capabilities. This innovation — once thought the exclusive domain of US supercarriers — allows the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to launch heavier, more capable drones and manned aircraft at greater speed and frequency. Or take the HQ-19 missile defence system and the recent full-range test of the DF-31AG ICBM: both signal an increasingly sophisticated and credible deterrence posture against it’s perceived adversaries such as the United States.
Beyond hardware, MCF has reshaped China’s institutional landscape. Civilian universities now train military personnel. Private firms compete in defence R&D. Local governments have established regional MCF funds and innovation zones. Financially, major state-owned conglomerates have poured investment into dual-use technologies through national integration funds. What we are witnessing is not just a defence strategy — but a national mobilisation of scientific and economic resources for long-term strategic gain.
The West’s own innovation ecosystems are no less dual-use; the difference lies in degrees of state coordination, not intent.
Yet MCF’s success is not without its limits. Bureaucratic fragmentation and resistance from entrenched interests still impede full policy coherence. Legal frameworks remain underdeveloped, and while Xi’s centralisation drive has improved vertical coordination, cross-sector integration remains a work in progress. Moreover, the more successful MCF becomes, the more it invites scrutiny and countermeasures from abroad — chiefly the US.
The US has already moved to restrict the flow of advanced technologies to Chinese institutions linked to MCF, including through visa bans and investment blacklists. Western universities are tightening research collaborations. Export controls have targeted semiconductors, AI chips and aerospace components. In this context, China’s drive for indigenous innovation under MCF is not merely strategic it’s exential at the operational level.
Some might argue that MCF is leading China toward a militarised innovation state. But that conclusion overlooks the dual-use nature of most emerging technologies today. Artificial intelligence, satellite communication, quantum computing — these are as vital for civilian progress as they are for military dominance. The West’s own innovation ecosystems are no less dual-use; the difference lies in degrees of state coordination, not intent.
MCF will likely continue to evolve — potentially expanding into new domains such as biotech, space technologies and quantum defence.
A decade into its formalization, MCF has delivered mixed but maturing results. It has transformed China’s defense-industrial base, boosted the pace of military modernisation, and made it increasingly difficult for the international community to ignore the strategic coherence behind Beijing’s high-tech rise. Whether it is sixth-generation fighters or swarm-capable UAVs, these systems are not anomalies — they are the outputs of a strategy pursued with quiet intensity for ten years.
As China looks toward 2035 and its goal of completing military modernisation, MCF will likely continue to evolve — potentially expanding into new domains such as biotech, space technologies and quantum defence. Its trajectory will be shaped not only by domestic capacity but also by the contours of external resistance. But one thing is clear: it is not just about what China has built — it is about how it built it, and what that means for the next decade of global competition.
It’s indeed worth that the strategic capabilities that cover the both military and civilian sectors. This entails incorporating the many elements of the MCF Strategy with other important national strategic initiatives, to create a cohesive, robust, and all-encompassing national system of strategies. In contrast, China has chosen the route of integration, indicating its distinctive strategy for advancing strategically. 7
Although different Chinese leaderships have had different political and economic priorities, they have all acknowledged the significance of the MCF as a crucial tool that helps improve not only the country’s military might but also its scientific and economic capabilities The MCF strategy has been advanced under Xi’s administration by massive changes to the defence industrial base that his predecessors were unable to accomplish. With the help of MCF, Xi aims to bolster China’s strength by using the assistance of MCF, particularly in strengthening the PLA. This approach is closely tied to China’s geopolitical goals of safeguarding and advancing its national interests. Ultimately, the MCF strategy was seen as a crucial component of the PRC’s objective 8
to transform into a “great modern socialist country.” This objective encompasses the advancement of a “World-Class Military” and the aspiration to become a global leader in science and technology. This has been the case even though these leaders have recognised the worth of the MCF in different ways. China’s emphasis on MCF highlights its intentions to be a powerful global player by the year 2049, which is set against the backdrop of shifting global dynamics, most notably the intensifying competition with the United States.
The progression from Mao to Xi demonstrates a nation that, despite the changes that have occurred within its borders and the pressures that have come from beyond, has remained steadfast in its goal of maximising the potential of its combined military and civilian strengths for the sake of national renown.
With China, we must understand that civil and military are indeed two different limbs: the ‘civil’ belongs to the State Council while the ‘military’ belongs to the Central Military Commission, and both belong to the torso that is the Communist Party of China. For a political system that controls the two, a civil-military integration or a civil-military fusion makes sense. However, does it work well for a democratic India? India’s military does not serve a political party, in or outside the government, and neither is India a one-party nation-state.
In conclusion,
It’s understood that China’s Civil Military fusion will provide impetus to the synergy in Beijing’s fusion of civil technology for the military purposes and whether India can achieve impetus is yet to be seen. 9
Notes
Richard A. Bitzinger China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion asia policy, volume 16, number 1 (january 2021), 5–24
An allied approach to countering Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion ( Atlantic Council, September 27, 2023)
3) Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion, (2019) (statement of Elsa B. Kania, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Technology and National Security Program, Center for a New American Security)
4) Daniel Alderman, “An Introduction to China’s Strategic Military-Civilian Fusion,” in China's Evolving Military Strategy, ed. McReynolds, Joe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016).
5) Mercy A. Kuo Military-Civil Fusion: China, the US, and Beyond
Insights from Yoram Evron ( The Diplomat, August 21, 2023)
6) Richard Bitzinger, “China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021): 24
7) Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy ( Centre for New American Society, January 28,2021)
8) Larry Sussman How the U.S. Targets China's Military-Civil Fusion Efforts ( Wirescreen, March 20, 2024)
9) Lt Gen PR Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd civil military fusion: a model for india (cenjows journal, synergy- February 2023 (Pages 52-67)
(The views expressed above are of the author's and does not reflect the views of C3S)
