China’s Shielding of Pakistan-Based Terrorism and the Erosion of Global Counterterrorism Norms - By Annunthra Rangan

Article 15/25

The language of terrorism is always loud—it disrupts peace, provokes tensions, and poses grave threats not only to neighboring nations but to global stability. When a nation becomes a haven for terrorists and is armed with illicit weaponry that fuels such violence, its danger extends well beyond its borders. Pakistan is one such nation whose role in supporting terrorism has long been a concern for the international community. Islamabad has served as a base for numerous terrorist organisations—groups that self-identify as “freedom fighters” but whose actions tell a very different story. Countries like India, Afghanistan, and even nations outside Asia have experienced the devastating consequences of Pakistan-based terror operations.

On April 22, 2025, India suffered a horrific terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir. Armed assailants opened fire on civilians, mainly targeting tourists, resulting in the tragic loss of approximately 28 lives. This atrocity has significantly heightened tensions between India and Pakistan. Despite the global outcry, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), comprising five permanent members, has remained ineffective in curbing the reach of terrorism. A major roadblock is the consistent misuse of veto power by one permanent member: China. The People’s Republic of China has repeatedly shielded Pakistan-based terrorists from international sanctions. When proposals are brought forth at the UNSC to designate these individuals or groups as terrorists, China has routinely exercised its veto to block such measures. This pattern raises a pressing and uncomfortable question: Why does China continue to protect these terror elements?

China is not combating terrorism—it is enabling and strategically exploiting it. Rather than aligning with global efforts to curb extremism, Beijing has consistently used its diplomatic leverage to shield designated terrorists. A case in point is its repeated obstruction at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to block the listing of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Despite irrefutable evidence and the support of the other four permanent UNSC members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—China exercised its veto to stall Azhar’s designation on four occasions: in 2009, 2016, 2017, and 2019.

This pattern of behavior reveals not just China’s disregard for international consensus, but also its willingness to misuse its veto power for narrow geopolitical aims. For a country that positions itself as a rising global power, such actions undermine its credibility and international responsibility. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping—who holds the simultaneous positions of President of the People’s Republic of China, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission—China has steadily distanced itself from global norms, choosing instead a path of isolation and confrontation.

Beijing's strategic calculus appears focused on using Pakistan as a geopolitical tool to counter India. The ‘technical hold’ in the UNSC has become less a procedural mechanism and more a blunt instrument to extract diplomatic concessions. In doing so, China seeks to humiliate India, weaponize multilateral institutions, and fortify its strategic alliance with Pakistan—despite the reputational cost. Ultimately, however, this approach has yielded little for Beijing. Democracies like India are unlikely to bow to such pressure, especially when fundamental national security concerns are at stake.

India must therefore recalibrate its diplomatic posture. It needs to engage more proactively with key UNSC partners such as the US, UK, and France, building coalitions that can expose and counterbalance China's obstructive diplomacy. Russia, in this specific context, remains largely disengaged. China’s selective indignation over terrorism—condemning it when it threatens Chinese interests while enabling it elsewhere—undermines the credibility of its global commitments.

The China–Pakistan strategic alliance plays a pivotal role in reshaping Asia's geopolitical landscape. It intersects with major regional flashpoints: India’s regional aspirations, the future of Afghanistan post-US withdrawal, and emerging threats such as nuclear proliferation and cross-border militancy. Pakistan occupies a central position in China’s long-term vision, from maritime power projection to overland energy and trade corridors linking the Middle East and Europe to East Asia.

This vision is materialized most prominently in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with an estimated investment of $62 billion. Approximately 30,000 Chinese nationals are currently working on infrastructure and energy projects across Pakistan. However, these workers have increasingly become targets of violent attacks. In October 2025, two Chinese workers were killed in a bombing near Karachi airport. Just months earlier, in March, five more lost their lives in a suicide bombing. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group opposing Chinese encroachment in Balochistan, claimed responsibility for both incidents.

The Pakistani government responded swiftly. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the attacks as “heinous,” and reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to safeguarding Chinese nationals. A federal minister went a step further, suggesting that foreign actors—implicitly referring to a neighboring state—may be fueling unrest to disrupt Pakistan-China cooperation.

China, too, issued a strong statement. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that terrorism is the “common enemy of humanity,” and emphasized that such attacks would not derail the China–Pakistan partnership or CPEC. Beijing reaffirmed its support for Islamabad’s counterterrorism efforts and expressed willingness to work jointly to resist attempts to undermine bilateral ties.

However, behind these public affirmations lies a growing tension. Pakistan’s heavy reliance on Chinese financial assistance has created a complex and increasingly fragile dynamic. Islamabad reportedly owes around $26 billion to Beijing, with over $16 billion tied to energy sector projects. Mounting debt has pushed Pakistan to repeatedly request loan restructuring, and China's support has often been critical in averting economic collapse. Yet, the frequency of violent incidents and the failure to secure Chinese assets have led to growing frustration in Beijing. There are indications that China is now demanding stronger guarantees from Pakistan. While Islamabad has pledged increased funding for security, there are concerns that China may soon seek to deploy its own security personnel to safeguard CPEC interests—a move that would significantly infringe on Pakistan’s sovereignty and could trigger domestic backlash.

Moreover, the root of the unrest cannot be ignored. Groups like the BLA argue that the economic dividends of CPEC projects are not being equitably shared with the local population in Balochistan. Instead, they allege, the region’s resources are being exploited to benefit elites in Islamabad and foreign interests in Beijing. The lack of transparency, insufficient community engagement, and environmental degradation have only deepened local grievances.

While China continues to project solidarity with Pakistan in the face of terrorism, its actions reveal a more calculated approach—one that seeks to advance its strategic objectives even at the cost of undermining collective security frameworks. For India and like-minded nations, this presents both a challenge and an opportunity: to build stronger diplomatic coalitions, expose the contradictions in China’s global conduct, and uphold international norms against the selective legitimization of terrorism.

Recent reports indicate growing dissatisfaction in Beijing regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s armed forces in protecting Chinese interests. In response to repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, China is reportedly contemplating the deployment of its own security personnel within Pakistan. As a gesture to reassure its strategic partner, Islamabad has allocated an additional 45 billion Pakistani rupees for security enhancement. Nevertheless, China appears intent on formalizing its concerns through a proposed anti-terrorism agreement. If such attacks persist, Pakistan may be unable to resist the pressure for a Chinese security presence on its soil—an outcome that could undermine its already tenuous sovereignty.

These escalating security challenges come at a delicate time for Islamabad, which is preparing to host the Council of Heads of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on October 15 and 16. Chinese Premier Li Qiang is expected to attend the summit. However, the recent surge in violence against Chinese nationals raises serious questions about Pakistan’s ability to ensure the safety of foreign dignitaries and could cast doubt on its readiness to host high-profile multilateral events.

India, meanwhile, has maintained a firm position. Prior to the SCO summit, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar confirmed that India would not engage in bilateral discussions with Pakistan, citing terrorism as a fundamental barrier to improved relations. His recent address at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) further underscored this stance. In his speech, Jaishankar subtly referenced China’s repeated interventions in the UNSC to protect Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, emphasizing that counterterrorism efforts should not be obstructed for political convenience.

China’s actions at the UN Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee have once again come under scrutiny. In recent months, Beijing has placed procedural holds on two proposals jointly submitted by India and the United States to designate top Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders—Talha Saeed, the son of Hafiz Saeed, and Shahid Mehmood, a deputy chief of an LeT front group. These holds represent the fourth and fifth such interventions by China in a span of just four months, continuing a trend of shielding Pakistan-linked terror entities.

The 1267 Sanctions Committee, originally established in 1999 and updated in 2011 and 2015, allows any UN member state to propose the listing of individuals or organisations affiliated with Al-Qaeda or ISIS. India has historically played an active role in pushing for the designation of terrorist groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The committee operates under a “no-objections” rule, whereby any member state can block a listing proposal either temporarily (through a hold) or permanently. As a permanent UNSC member, China retains an indefinite veto, allowing it to obstruct such listings at will.

Technically, the Committee is required to resolve these holds within six months. However, extensions can be granted, and in practice, proposals often languish in limbo well beyond the stipulated period. China has used this mechanism frequently to shield Pakistan-based actors, citing lack of sufficient information, even in cases where the evidence was overwhelming.

One of the most prominent examples of this pattern is the case of Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed. Despite Azhar’s release from Indian custody during the 1999 Kandahar hijacking and his subsequent involvement in major terrorist attacks—including the Indian Parliament attack in 2001 and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks—China consistently blocked his designation at the UNSC. From 2009 to 2018, Beijing placed multiple holds on efforts to list Azhar, insisting there was “insufficient evidence” of his involvement in terrorism. It was only after the Pulwama attack in February 2019, which was directly linked to JeM, that China finally lifted its hold in May 2019, allowing for Azhar’s official designation.

This persistent pattern of obstruction reflects the depth of the China-Pakistan strategic alliance. While Beijing publicly condemns terrorism—especially when its own nationals are targeted—it continues to protect militant actors who serve its geopolitical interests. The duality of this approach undermines global counterterrorism frameworks and signals a troubling willingness to politicize international norms.

In the aftermath of the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir—which claimed the lives of 26 civilians and was later claimed by The Resistance Front, a known proxy of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba—China publicly reiterated its traditional support for Pakistan. Rather than aligning with global condemnation of terrorism originating from Pakistani soil, Beijing chose to focus on maintaining regional stability through a diplomatic lens that favors its ally.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a call with his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar, emphasized the importance of restraint on both sides, urging India and Pakistan to avoid escalating tensions. According to a statement from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang noted that Beijing is "closely monitoring the situation" and supports an "impartial investigation" into the incident. While seemingly neutral in tone, China’s response implicitly deflects responsibility from Pakistan and provides it with diplomatic cover amid growing international scrutiny.

Although China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Guo Jiakun, did issue a formal condemnation—stating, “We strongly condemn the attack. China firmly opposes all forms of terrorism... We mourn for the lives lost and express sincere sympathies to the bereaved families and the injured”—no concrete support or solidarity was extended to India. Instead, China’s gestures and communications have been directed primarily toward bolstering Pakistan’s international standing.

This approach is particularly ironic given that Pakistan has emerged as one of the most dangerous environments for Chinese nationals abroad. Over the past several years, 32 Chinese citizens have lost their lives in Pakistan in 14 separate incidents—the highest number of Chinese fatalities recorded in any foreign country due to terrorism. Many Chinese personnel in Pakistan now travel in armoured convoys for safety. In stark contrast, no such fatalities have occurred in India due to terrorism. Yet, despite these facts, China continues to privilege its strategic ties with Islamabad over objective assessments of security and counterterrorism.

Historically, Beijing has invoked its "three evils" doctrine—targeting terrorism, separatism, and extremism—to pressure neighboring states into cooperation, particularly in relation to Uighur and Tibetan dissidents. However, this posture of zero-tolerance towards threats to its own sovereignty is not extended universally. In Pakistan’s case, China has repeatedly used its position at the UN Security Council to block efforts to designate key terrorist figures—including Masood Azhar and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi—at the 1267 Al-Qaeda and ISIL Sanctions Committee. On multiple occasions, China has claimed that the evidence provided by India was insufficient, mirroring the current narrative surrounding the Pahalgam attack.

Wang Yi’s recent diplomatic outreach to Pakistan serves not only to reinforce China’s strategic alliance but also to counteract Pakistan’s deteriorating global reputation. Simultaneously, it acts as a geopolitical maneuver to shift India's focus back to South Asia, a strategy increasingly incongruent with India's evolving military priorities. Since 2009, India’s defence doctrine has gradually recalibrated from a Pakistan-centric approach to a China-centric one, particularly in light of repeated border confrontations, such as those at Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014), Barahoti (2016), Doklam (2017), and Galwan (2020).

China’s support for Pakistan in multilateral forums, including arms and nuclear technology transfers, reveals a deeper strategic calculus. More than 60% of Chinese arms exports are directed to Pakistan, and this military support is further bolstered by longstanding nuclear and missile cooperation between the two states. In the event of renewed India-Pakistan hostilities, this collaboration could serve as a deterrent to Indian escalation, despite the long-term regional risks it poses.

Ultimately, China’s continued defense of Pakistan-based terrorism—both diplomatically and materially—aims to challenge India’s strategic ascent, obstruct border normalisation, and reinforce Beijing’s influence in South Asia. While espousing a rhetoric of stability and anti-terrorism, China’s actions suggest a willingness to instrumentalize terrorism for geopolitical advantage, undermining collective global efforts to combat violent extremism.

(Ms. Annunthra Rangan is the senior research officer at C3S. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views of C3S.)