The Fall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli

By Rahul Karan Reddy

Image Courtesy: SCMP

The investigation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli for “serious disciplinary and legal violations” (严重违纪违法) is a reminder that Xi Jinping’s struggle for primacy can shock and surprise even the most keen-eyed observers of Chinese politics. The plethora of rumors and propaganda swirling about the circumstances of the investigation into Zhang Youxia in particular has spawned a variety of interpretations on the balance of power in the Communist Party of China (CPC). More significantly, turbulence at the highest levels of the Party and military has introduced a certain unease about what comes next, and the stability of institutions in China. 

With less than 2 years to go for the 21^st National Party Congress where Xi Jinping is widely expected to stay on as General Secretary for a fourth term, the latest episode feels part of a long storyline building up to the much-anticipated gathering. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli join the already-long and still-growing list of military officials removed by Xi Jinping. The timing, context and substance of the churn in Chinese politics forces us to think harder about the motivations for Xi Jinping’s actions, the turnover of key personnel in the Party and China’s readiness to engage in armed conflict.

Timing, Context and Backdrop

The news of an investigation into Zhang and Liu followed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s (CCDI) 5^th Plenum and the key gatherings at the Central Party School. Zhang and Liu were absent from the Party School gathering on 20 January, and on January 24, China’s Ministry of Defense announced that both Zhang and Liu were placed under investigation, ending months of speculation that Zhang was being scrutinized. First, unlike with previous investigations of high-ranking PLA officers, whose disappearances remained unexplained for long periods of time (2 months for Li Shangfu and 6 months for He Weidong), the announcement of charges against Zhang and Liu was uncharacteristically swift. It reveals an urgency to publicize damning charges, suggestive of a purge at the end of a power struggle. As Ma Zhenkun points out, it could be a case of “better to deal with it sooner than later”. 

Second, the language used to present the case against Zhang and Liu in the announcement is unique and strong. The announcement states that the decision was made based on research by the Party Centre (经党中央研究), which ties the action directly to the Party core and Xi Jinping. It differs meaningfully from the announcements made in October last year in the case of Miao Hua, He Weidong and others, where it was attributed to the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) disciplinary and inspection body. The Party’s discipline inspection agencies appear to be sidelined in the case of Zhang and Liu. Moreover, the PLA Daily Editorial published after the official announcement accuses Zhang and Liu of having “gravely trampled upon and undermined the Chairman responsibility system of the CMC”, a strong denunciation of defiance. The strong language employed is attempting to present that Zhang’s actions presented a relatively more serious challenge to Xi Jinping’s power and authority in the CMC. 

Third, corruption, which has been a common reasoning or pretext for investigating military leaders, is mentioned by the PLA Editorial. However, it only states that Zhang and Liu fostered political and corruption problems, and in the midst of more serious charges like “challenged the foundation of the party’s control of the military” (嚴重助長影響黨對軍隊絕對領導), corruption appears unlikely to be a primary driver of the outcome. As Jon Czin points out, most PLA officials have been involved in some kind of corruption during their service, and departments like Equipment Development Department (EDD) which Zhang previously headed, have been hotbeds of corruption. However, based on the political messaging around the case, the fall of Zhang and Liu appears to stem more from political factors than economic ones, unlike previous cases of officials from the EDD and PLA Rocket Force. 

Institutions and Leadership

Zhang Youxia was second-in-command in the CMC, and its first-ranking Vice-Chair, and Liu Zhenli was a CMC member too, and head of its Joint Staff Department. Their departure from the CMC leaves it in disarray, with only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin left on the originally 7-member Commission. As a key, formal institutional linkage between the Party leadership and military, the CMC’s condition reflects a tenuous relationship between Xi Jinping and the PLA. The degree of churn not just at the CMC level, but also at the theater command and below levels, indicates major changes in the generational composition of military leadership and factional networks of the PLA.

The departure of Zhang and Liu represents the ouster of an older generation of military leaders. It heralds the arrival of new blood at various levels of the command hierarchy, lacking the same experience of the older generation. As a result, younger military leaders with the right credentials at the theater command level could be more willing to signal their loyalty to Xi, in the hopes of securing CMC positions, furthering the centralization of power. As Ying Yu-Lin argues, this situation may even incentivize officers to signal loyalty to Xi through more assertive tactical behavior along China’s borders. 

Zhang and Liu were the only remaining members of the CMC with real-world operational command and combat experience, lending valuable inputs to decision-making. It would seem that is less important to Xi Jinping in the near-term than expected. This forces us to think critically about the reported causes of Zhang and Liu’s downfall. Reports that Zhang leaked nuclear secrets to the US are difficult to square with the fact that he was a battle-hardened veteran who committed his life to China’s defense. The accusation of leaking nuclear secrets and committing treason aligns more with a narrative strategy accompanying the purge of political rivals, to make them traitorous and thus, indefensible. It has also been reported that Zhang was investigated for failing to rein his associates and family members. This explanation could mean Zhang’s factional network was construed as a threat, or seen as undermining Xi’s expectation of absolute loyalty. It would signify a power struggle during which Xi decided to purge Zhang to ensure no potential alternative to Xi’s authority. Although Zhang and Xi were both princelings and Xi did oversee Zhang’s rise to the CMC by bypassing retirement-age norms, the removal of Zhang may have been expedient now, more than before.

Implications

The fall of Zhang and Liu impacts several aspects of the PLA’s operations relating to warfighting, modernization and decision-making. The purge of several high-ranking officers over the last few years undoubtedly impacts morale, creating a culture of fear and paralysis. It is also likely to impact the PLA’s modernization efforts. The recurring pattern of leadership change could disrupt progress and implementation of reforms to achieve intelligentized warfare capabilities, enhance joint operations and build a world-class fighting force. Moreover, without officers like Liu Zhenli who have managed joint operations command and coordination across armed forces, the prospect of engaging in armed conflict over Taiwan is made difficult. On the other hand, it could also result in the arrival of younger officers, keen to establish their credentials and loyalty to Xi by undertaking aggressive and provocative actions in contested regions like Taiwan, the South China Sea and along the Himalayas. Like Drew Thompson states, without experienced officers like Zhang, the risk of miscalculation goes up. Moreover, if there is nobody to give Xi objective advise, he may be surrounded by loyalists too afraid to disagree.

(Rahul Karan Reddy is the Senior Research Associate at ORCA. The views expressed here are of the author's and do not reflect the views of C3S.)