The 14th Dalai Lama and the Geopolitical Battle for Reincarnation: By Abia Fathima
- Chennai Centre for China Studies
- 2 hours ago
- 7 min read
Image Courtesy: Free Press Journal
The religious destiny of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation has now become a focal arena of conflict in a broader geopolitical battle for Tibet’s future. For over four centuries, the Dalai Lama has been the preeminent spiritual figure of Tibetan Buddhism and a commanding emblem of Tibetan cultural identity. Now that the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is entering his 90s, the issue of his reincarnation is no longer a strictly religious concern but a hot-button issue in the conflict between China and the world. Whereas the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile maintain they have sole discretion to choose a successor according to time-honoured Buddhist traditions, China’s Communist leadership invokes its national sovereignty rights to nominate the next Dalai Lama, perceiving the controversy as one involving national sovereignty and a key instrument of manipulating Tibet. This article will discuss the intricate political, historical, and diplomatic aspects of this drama in progress.
Political Visions of Reincarnation: A Conflict of Authority
The political interests in the Dalai Lama’s succession are astronomical. The Tibetan government-in-exile, based in Dharamshala, India, finds the process intrinsic to their religious and cultural independence. The Dalai Lama has already publicly said that his reincarnation will be located beyond Chinese-occupied Tibet so that the spiritual lineage is not subject to the interference of an atheist government. He has charged the Gaden Phodrang Trust, a charity, with responsibility for finding and identifying his next incarnation, and has even hinted at the possibility of a female or non-Tibetan successor.
China’s government, on the other hand, considers the succession an "internal affair" to be handled under its domestic laws. This is a systematic and persistent policy; the Chinese Communist Party has long experience of co-opting and manipulating religious organisations to achieve its political objectives. In 2007, Beijing enacted the "Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism," which legalised its grip on the process, turning it into a political and legal arena. This action is an exact recap of a much earlier, more violent intervention. In 1995, when the Dalai Lama identified a little boy, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, as the 11th Panchen Lama, the boy was promptly arrested by the Chinese and has not been heard from since. Beijing then went ahead and appointed its own Panchen Lama, a decision that was opposed by the majority of Tibetans, an ominous portent of what lies ahead for the 15th Dalai Lama.
This conflict of authority is not a new phenomenon. China’s assertion of a historical right to ratify the reincarnation is a contemporary reactivation of a political device that has been available for centuries, the Golden Urn ceremony.
The Golden Urn Ceremony and the Manchu Connection
The Chinese government often cites the “Golden Urn” ritual as a precedent in history for its involvement in the Dalai Lama’s succession. This ceremony, which was introduced by the Qianlong Emperor of the Qing dynasty under Manchu rule in 1793, was supposedly established to eliminate corruption in the election of senior lamas. The names of candidates were put on slivers of ivory and selected from a golden urn.
But a closer scrutiny of history shows that the ritual was used as a political means to exert influence, rather than an auspicious Tibetan ritual. It was used irregularly, and, more importantly, the 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas were not selected by the Golden Urn. The present Dalai Lama was selected by traditional Tibetan means, and his choice was subsequently ratified by the then-nationalist Chinese administration. The Chinese Communist Party’s insistence on the revival of this selective practice of history is a method of creating a veneer of legitimacy for the Party’s claim of control over Tibetan Buddhism.
The Ancient Chronology of Tibet-China Relations
The present controversy regarding Tibet’s status and the reincarnation process stems from a long and intricate history that denies China’s account of unbroken sovereignty. The following timeline will help us break down the ancient chronology of Tibet-China relations.
Early Imperial Era (7th-9th centuries): The earliest recorded exchanges between China and Tibet were between two quite separate and sometimes competitive empires. The Tibetan Empire was a powerful military force that, at some point, occupied the Chinese capital city of Chang’an (present-day Xi’an) in 763 CE. Treaties were agreed upon between the two powers as equals, and one such treaty stone from 821 CE remains standing in Lhasa, clearly stating that ‘Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and Chinese shall be happy in China”. No such narrative of Tibet as a vassal area is supported during this time.
The Mongol Yuan Dynasty (13th-14th centuries): This changed with the emergence of the Mongol Empire, which conquered Tibet as well as China. The Mongols began a distinctive "priest-patron" relationship with Tibetan Buddhist lamas, wherein the lamas offered spiritual guidance and the Mongol emperors political and military backing. While Tibet was under the Mongol-rule Yuan dynasty, it was not administered as a Chinese province but as an independent political and religious entity under a shared Mongol sovereign.
The Manchu Qing Dynasty (17th-20th centuries): Following the Mongol-led dynasty’s collapse, Tibet was restored to its independence. It was only when the Manchu-led Qing dynasty came that China reasserted itself. The Qing emperors, being supporters of Tibetan Buddhism, appointed officials (ambans) in Lhasa and meddled in internal Tibetan affairs. Still, this tended to be suzerainty, where Tibet had de facto internal autonomy.
1911-1950: When the Qing dynasty collapsed, Tibet drove out the last Chinese officials and existed as a “de facto” independent state for almost four decades. It possessed its own currency, military, and foreign relations, one of the main pillars of the Tibetan case for independence.
1950 onwards: The People’s Republic of China, which was formed in 1949, invaded Tibet in 1950, claiming its “reunification” with the mainland. This put an end to Tibet’s independence and its integration as an “autonomous region” into the PRC, an extremely controversial status.
India’s Relations and China’s Warnings
With this complicated past and the Dalai Lama’s visit, the task of India is especially delicate. With its hosting of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile since 1959, New Delhi has danced along the edge, carefully balancing its devotion to the Dalai Lama as a venerated religious figure against its desire to have a stable relationship with its dominant neighbour. India’s official position has been one of non-intervention in religion.
But China has repeatedly charged India with interfering in its internal affairs, especially whenever officials in the Indian government have been supportive of the Dalai Lama or the cause of Tibet. Beijing’s advisories to India to “be careful” and to “not interfere” are a clear effort to forestall any Indian initiative to officially endorse the successor of the Dalai Lama. The threats are directly pointed, since Beijing is also cognizant of the profound respect for the Dalai Lama in India and the possibility of New Delhi playing the “Tibet card” as a bargaining chip in its own border disputes and China rivalries. For India, diplomacy on this matter will be a key test of its diplomacy and negotiation skills as well as its capacity to handle a sensitive relationship.
Case Comparison with Uyghur Muslims: Analysis of human rights
The situation of the Tibetans has usually been compared with that of the Uyghur Muslims of China’s Xinjiang province, pointing toward a similar pattern of state oppression. Both are non-Han Chinese ethnic minorities with different cultures, religions, and languages. Both are considered a threat to Chinese national cohesion by the government of China and have policies of forced assimilation implemented against them.
Despite this, the extent and character of the repression are quite different. That of Xinjiang has been extensively reported to be a human rights disaster of enormous proportions. Accounts by international bodies and governments speak of the mass detention of one million or more Uyghurs in “re-education” centres, where they are politically indoctrinated, subjected to forced labour, and efforts are made to destroy their religious and cultural identity. Surveillance is widespread, and the area has been labelled a police state.
Tibetans themselves have also suffered severe repression, including limitations on religious practice, cultural expression, and speech, but the enormity of the “re-education” camps and the extent of state control that exist in Xinjiang are not typically duplicated in Tibet. However, the underlying policy of China remains the same: to have absolute control over the lives of ethnic minorities and to crack down on every mode of dissent or cultural expression that goes against the authority of the Chinese Communist Party.
The United States Government’s Tibet Policy
Against this background, the United States has also been a loud and consistent supporter of the Tibetan cause. US policy is predicated on a preference for human rights, religious liberty, and the preservation of Tibetan culture. This has been enshrined in recent legislation that contradicts China’s point of view directly.
One of the key milestones was the ‘Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020’. This act declared it official US policy that the choice of the Dalai Lama is an exclusively religious issue to be decided by the Tibetan Buddhist people. It further stated that any Chinese authorities who meddle in the process will be sanctioned, such as being barred from entry into the US and having their assets frozen. This act is a fundamental challenge to China’s power and a strong expression of the US commitment to Tibetan self-determination.
That was followed by the ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act’ in 2024, or the ‘Resolve Tibet Act’. This bill further strengthens US policy by openly defying Beijing’s long-perpetuated misrepresentations regarding Tibet and calling for an open-ended discussion between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama. The legislation also instructs US diplomats to actively rebut Chinese misinformation on the history and culture of Tibet. These pieces of legislation reflect a steady US policy of employing diplomatic and economic pressure to defend the Tibetan people’s right to their distinctive cultural and religious identity from interference by the Chinese government.
Conclusion
The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation question is far more than a matter of spiritual succession; it is an encapsulation of the broader geopolitical and human rights battle for Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s insistence on preserving the spiritual integrity of his lineage against the political designs of China has made the question central to international diplomacy. The rivalling versions of history, the delicate dance of diplomacy between India and China, the jarring contrast with the Xinjiang crackdown, and the overt, consistent endorsement from the US government all highlight the high stakes at play. The result of this religious succession will not only decide the destiny of Tibetan Buddhism but also be a key measure of whether the international community is prepared to uphold human rights and religious liberty in the face of an increasingly aggressive and authoritarian China.
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(Abia Fathima is a Research officer at C3S. The Views expressed here are of the author and do not reflect the views of C3S.)
