C3S Book Review: China's Assertive Posturing in the Indo-Pacific& Prospects of Indo-ASEAN Collaboration: By Abia Fathima

Image Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies

Article 24/2025

This book offers insightful analyses into China's geopolitical and geo-economic strategies in the Indo-Pacific, particularly their implications for ASEAN countries. The compilation appears to be structured into distinct chapters, each delving into a specific facet of this complex regional dynamic.

Chapter 1: East Asia & China's (Geo-economic) Footprint in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Centrality?

Authored by Dharish David and Abhisek Kumar Pandey, this chapter examines the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on the challenges posed by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and China's assertive regional policies for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The core argument is that ASEAN's centrality could be jeopardized if the Quad or China unilaterally shape regional dynamics without considering ASEAN's strategic interests, potentially increasing economic and security vulnerabilities within the bloc.

The authors employ a comprehensive methodology, analyzing investment, trade, infrastructure investment, and security relations between ASEAN, the US, and China, alongside international frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Quad, and the Indo-Pacific strategy. The findings underscore the importance of continuous engagement and nuanced diplomacy by ASEAN in this increasingly complex and contested arena. The chapter emphasizes an ASEAN-centric perspective, moving beyond great power rivalries to analyze ASEAN's economic relations and investment patterns with data.

It also highlights the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as a potential buffer between the Quad and China, aiming to avert direct confrontation and alleviate security and economic concerns for ASEAN member states. Despite its potential, the AOIP is noted to require more precise articulation to remain pertinent. Internal challenges, such as the political crisis in Myanmar, are identified as threats to ASEAN's unity and its ability to maintain a central position. The chapter concludes by stressing the critical role of ASEAN's economic prowess and cooperation, particularly through initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in preserving its influence amidst geopolitical shifts.

The chapter also delves into foreign direct investment (FDI) trends, indicating that while China has a substantial economic presence, the United States has consistently led in FDI contributions to ASEAN from 2019 to 2022, with intra-ASEAN FDI ranking as the second-highest source. China's significant investment presence in countries like Brunei, Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia is highlighted.

Chapter 2: Chinese Maritime Strategy and its Impact on Southeast Asia & Beyond: A Philippine Perspective

Authored by RAdm Rommel Jude G Ong AFP (Retd), this chapter analyzes China's maritime strategy, driven by its aim to secure access to global resources and markets and protect its east coast. China's expansion of maritime forces northward, eastward, and southward is explored, with a particular focus on the South China Sea and its effects on the Philippines' energy, food, and territorial security.

The paper details the Philippine response, which includes asserting its sovereign rights, enhancing defense and maritime capacity, and engaging in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Initiatives such as reviving the PH-US alliance, exploring trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, and developing bilateral defense agreements with Australia, Japan, and France are discussed. The author also suggests India as a potential strategic partner for the Philippines and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific. The chapter advocates for a comprehensive and coherent Philippine maritime strategy that balances national interests and regional obligations, leveraging diplomatic, defense, and economic tools to manage the South China Sea dispute.

China's maritime strategy involves modernizing the PLA-Navy (PLA-N), expanding the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), and mobilizing its Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This strategy aligns with Admiral Liu Huaqing's vision of asserting effective control within the "First Island Chain" and "Second Island Chain". China's objectives include sea control over its 'nine-dash line,' sustained presence in key features, ensuring access to vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and influencing key countries along the 'nine-dash line'. The paper highlights China's use of "hard power" through its maritime forces and "sharp power" through manipulative policies to influence and undermine political systems in Southeast Asia, aiming to prevent alliances against its interests and limit US presence.

The impact on Philippine maritime interests is further illustrated by China's excessive territorial claims and coercive actions within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. Examples include the harassment of survey vessels and the blockade of Scarborough Shoal, which traditionally serves Filipino artisanal fishing. These actions pose significant challenges to the Philippines' energy and food security.

Chapter 3: China's Maritime Militia in the South China Sea: Implications to ASEAN Countries' Food and Territorial Security

Written by Nguyen Hoang Anh Thu, this chapter focuses specifically on the Chinese maritime militia, a subset of the national militia, and its pivotal role in coastal defense, fishery production, intelligence gathering, supporting naval operations, and enforcing maritime territorial claims. The author states that the militia's presence and activities in the South China Sea have become a significant concern for several ASEAN countries.

The paper examines the impacts of these activities on the food and territorial security of ASEAN countries, particularly claimant states in the South China Sea. Historically, China has used its maritime militia to advance national interests since the 1950s, with the force growing substantially due to government subsidies and support. Operations by Chinese militia vessels are shown to contribute to fish stock depletion and interfere with the fishing rights of other regional vessels. ASEAN member states have accused Chinese vessels of intruding into disputed waters, engaging in intimidation and harassment, which fosters distrust and jeopardizes regional stability.

The militia is defined as an "armed organization of the masses not divorced from production" and an "assisting and reserve force for the Chinese People's Liberation Army". It operates separately from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) but often engages in drills with them. Under President Xi Jinping, the frequency and scope of militia operations have increased, with significant resources allocated to training and equipping the force. The maritime militia, often regarded as an "irregular force" or "little blue men," is largely built from the fishing industry, with vessels purpose-built or renovated for military activities. China's central and local governments provide various subsidies to support this force. Although specific statistics are scarce, China is believed to possess the world's largest maritime militia.

The chapter details the twofold impact on food security: the militia's involvement in fishing activities depletes resources, and their interference with fishing rights forces Southeast Asian fishermen out of traditional grounds. China's annual fishing ban policy and the harassment of other countries' fishing vessels further exacerbate food security concerns. Regarding territorial security, the maritime militia, along with other forces, conducts "grey zone activities" like shadowing and swarming, threatening ASEAN countries' territorial integrity.

Chapter 4: The US FONOP Exercises & China's Submarine Patrols in the South China Sea Region: Challenges to ASEAN States' EEZ Rights

By Jeslyn Tan, this chapter highlights the South China Sea's evolution into a theater for strategic rivalry and an arms race between the US and China, moving beyond its role as a critical sea lane with overlapping claims. It specifically examines how US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and China's submarine patrols challenge ASEAN states' sovereign rights and jurisdictions within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

China's nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) conduct "near-constant" patrols in the South China Sea as part of a larger strategy to control the contested waters through monitoring and surveillance. Conversely, the US has increased its military presence through operations and FONOPs to counter China's excessive maritime claims, though some Southeast Asian countries have reservations about US FONOPs due to varying interpretations of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The US FONOPs in the South China Sea peaked in 2020 with nine operations under President Donald Trump's administration, decreasing to an average of five per year since President Joe Biden took office in January 2021. Despite the decrease in FONOPs, US military activities with allies and partners have become more politicized and high-profile, with an increase in the scale and number of military exercises. The Philippines is particularly supportive of US military activities, hosting various large-scale maritime drills. China views the US as the main peace disruptor due to its increased strategic involvement.

China is committed to strengthening its littoral warfare capabilities, with submarines forming an integral part of its naval defense. The PLAN operates 59 submarines, with projections to increase to 65 by 2025 and 80 by 2035. China's Southern Theatre Command, based in Hainan Island, is forming a nuclear and conventional maritime deterrent force. The Jin-class SSBNs can be equipped with JL-2 or JL-3 intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), allowing China to target the US from Chinese coastal waters with the newer JL-3 SLBMs. Despite the Jin-class SSBNs being noisier, China is developing a quieter new-generation Type 096 SSBN. Military outposts on artificial islands in the South China Sea support submarine, CCG, and maritime militia operations, gathering intelligence in other claimant states' EEZs.

The chapter also highlights that US FONOPs are directed not only at China's claims but also at the "excessive" maritime claims of other states like Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, leading to mixed receptions among ASEAN claimants. There's a significant difference in interpretation of freedom of navigation in EEZs between major powers (like the US, viewing them as extensions of high seas) and littoral states (viewing them as extensions of territorial seas). Malaysia, for example, prohibits foreign military activities in its EEZs without consent, asserting that UNCLOS does not specifically grant foreign states the right to conduct military exercises in littoral states' EEZs.

Similarly, China's submarine patrols pose threats to ASEAN states' EEZ rights, as these submerged vessels can conduct intelligence-gathering and surveillance against the peaceful uses of the sea, potentially prejudicing coastal state security. The ambiguity in UNCLOS regarding intelligence collection during freedom of navigation in EEZs creates a "grey area". The increasing use of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed submarines by the US and China also heightens the arms race in the region, raising concerns among Southeast Asian nations about potential arms racing and escalating tensions.

Chapter 5: Viet Nam—India Defence and Security Cooperation: Any New Impetus to Bolster?

Authored by Nguyen Thi Lan Huong, this chapter examines the long-standing diplomatic and strategic relationship between Vietnam and India, which has evolved from bilateral relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership". The relationship is underpinned by four pillars: diplomatic-political, strategic dimensions, economic, defense, and people-to-people ties. The paper aims to analyze challenges and opportunities for intensifying bilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.

The chapter underscores the significant growth in strategic trust and political will demonstrated by both nations to implement their comprehensive strategic partnership. This long-standing friendship is rooted in cultural and historical links, with India viewing Vietnam as an important pillar of its Act East Policy. The four pillars of their traditional relationship include diplomatic-political, economic, people-to-people, and defense and security cooperation.

Over the past two years, Vietnam and India have deepened their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership and then to a comprehensive strategic partnership, driven by mutual interests and concerns at bilateral, regional, and international levels. Given the current strategic dynamics and emerging hybrid challenges, the increasing major power rivalry and "might is right" policies with grey-zone activities affect regional peace and stability. Chinese coercive behavior in the South China Sea, in particular, has prompted India to shift its stance.

The chapter suggests several recommendations to bolster cooperation: Vietnam and India should remain aligned in the Indo-Pacific, and from a broader perspective, India and ASEAN, including Vietnam, should synchronize or synergize key elements in the IPOI and AOIP to promote maritime cooperation and connectivity while emphasizing ASEAN Centrality. Furthermore, initiatives by the QUAD could contribute to transparency in the Indo-Pacific, and India could be a focal point for ASEAN and QUAD countries in fields like Maritime Domain Awareness and submarine cable security.

The conclusion reiterates the long-term relationship between Vietnam and India, highlighting their shared strategic trust and high-level engagement. The comprehensive strategic partnership covers diplomatic, defense, economic, and people-to-people aspects, with maritime cooperation being a key component. The analysis of this partnership within a broader strategic context, intertwined with Indo-Pacific perspectives, sheds light on various geopolitical tensions and flashpoints, such as the Taiwan Strait, the Red Sea/Hormuz Strait, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The paper underscores the importance of upholding the rule of law to ensure unimpeded supply chains and promote peace, stability, and prosperity. It also emphasizes that Vietnam and India should enhance their relationship through regional platforms, affirming and supporting ASEAN Centrality.

(Abia Fathima is a research officer at C3S. The views expressed here are of the author's and do not reflect the views of C3S.)