Invisible Battlefields of Cyberspace: India’s Strategic Imperative Amid Chinese Ascendancy
- Chennai Centre for China Studies
- 2 hours ago
- 8 min read
By Harsh Sinha & Dr. Adityanjee, Council for Strategic Affairs
Image Courtesy: Universal Record
Introduction:
Cyber warfare has emerged as a defining domain of strategic competition in the 21st century, blurring the boundaries between war and peace, civilian and military, and physical and cognitive spaces. China has developed a deeply integrated cyber warfare architecture combining state, military, and civilian capabilities into a unified strategic instrument. India, while advancing steadily, continues to operate within a fragmented and largely defensive framework. This article examines the comparative cyber capabilities of China and India and argues that India must transition toward a doctrine-driven, intelligence-led, and society-wide all-encompassing cyber preparedness model. The future of national security will not merely depend on firewalls and encryption, but on the ability to anticipate, attribute, and act decisively across cyber and cognitive domains.
Chinese Cyberwar Doctrine:
The character of warfare is undergoing a profound transformation, with cyberspace emerging as a critical arena where power is projected, contested, and often concealed. China has recognized this shift early and embedded cyber warfare at the core of its strategic doctrine of “informationized warfare.” The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly through its Strategic Support Force (SSF), integrates cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations (psyops) into a unified framework aimed at achieving information dominance even before the onset of kinetic conflict [1]. This approach reflects a long-term strategic vision where cyberspace is not merely a support domain but a primary battlespace. It goes in consonance with the historic Sun Tsu’s doctrine memorialized in his book the Art of War of winning the war without fighting an actual battle.
China’s cyber capabilities are sustained by a robust ecosystem of state-sponsored actors, advanced technological infrastructure, and civil-military fusion. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT10 and APT41 have demonstrated the ability to conduct prolonged and sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns across the globe, targeting sensitive government and corporate networks [2]. These operations are complemented by China’s investments in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analytics, enabling predictive and automated cyber operations. The integration of Internet of Things (IoT) systems and wearable computing further enhances China’s capacity to collect and analyze behavioral data, thereby expanding the scope of cyber warfare into the cognitive domain.
China’s cyber warfare capabilities reflect a coherent integration of technology, doctrine, and strategic intent, enabling it to operate effectively across physical, digital, and cognitive domains.
China’s Vulnerabilities:
Despite China’s Cyber-strength, like any other country, it also remains open to hacking. Per social media reports, a hacker’s group by name FlamingChina recently breached into the brain of China's entire military industrial complex without being detected for six months. The National Supercomputing Center in Tianjin, the nerve center of China's weapons programs, aerospace simulations, and nuclear research has over 6,000 clients running through it, including China's top defense contractors and elite universities. A hacker got inside through a single compromised VPN and took control over China's most classified network. They deployed an automated botnet and spent six full months slowly draining the system dry, file by file, gigabyte by gigabyte, without a single alarm going off. Missile schematics, hypersonic weapons test data, fighter jet simulations, animated explosions simulations, structural integrity tests, renderings of J-20 stealth fighters, six-generation aircraft concepts, nuclear submarine schematics, bioinformatics research, fusion energy data, documents reportedly stamped secret in Chinese with animated 3D renderings of military hardware and targeted analyses for American Assets including HIMARS launchers and carrier strike groups. The total haul was 10 petabytes which is 10 million gigabytes and roughly equivalent to the entire US Library of Congress digitized multiple times over. This hacker group, Flaming China, is believed to be now selling it on dark web forums for Monero cryptocurrency, in batches, with a preview available for thousands of dollars and full access priced in the hundreds of thousands. Cybersecurity experts who reviewed the sample data say it appears genuine. The files tie directly to the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, and the National University of Defense Technology, the crown jewels of China's war machine. China has spent decades building the most ambitious military modernization program in modern history. Hypersonic missiles that the West has scrambled to counter, stealth jets designed to challenge American air dominance, advanced nuclear simulations and if this data is real, rivals may now hold the blueprints to all of it. China has neither confirmed the breach nor denied it. Chinese silence speaks for itself.
China-Pakistan Collusion:
Historically, China has colluded with Pakistan proliferating every modern technology with a view to containing India. In 2019, China and Pakistan held their first joint cybersecurity exercise, aimed at improving their ability to respond to cyber-attacks and other threats. Moreover, China and Pakistan have engaged in several capacity-building initiatives to improve the cybersecurity capabilities of their respective governments and private sectors. This includes training programs, technical assistance, and the exchange of best practices.
Both countries have also established mechanisms for sharing information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities, as well as for coordinating responses to cyber-attacks. Furthermore, China has provided technical assistance to Pakistan in a number of areas related to cybersecurity, including the development of cybersecurity regulations and the establishment of cyber incident response teams.
Indian Capacity:
India, in comparison, stands alone at a critical juncture. The establishment of the Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA) in 2019 which is an integrated tri-service agency of Indian Armed Forces working closely with NTRO and institutions such as CERT-In and NCIIPC reflects growing recognition of cyber threats [3]. However, India’s cyber posture remains largely defensive and reactive, with institutional fragmentation and the absence of a unified command structure limiting its effectiveness. Unlike China, India lacks systematized civil military fusion (MCF). More importantly, the lack of a clearly articulated National Cyber Warfare Doctrine constrains India’s ability to define deterrence, integrate cyber operations with military strategy, and respond proactively to emerging threats.
The evolving nature of cyber warfare further complicates this landscape. The rise of surveillance capitalism, driven by the extraction of behavioural surplus, has created new forms of power, what Shoshana Zuboff termed as instrumentarianism where human behavior is shaped and predicted through algorithmic systems [4]. In such a scenario, cyber warfare extends beyond networks into the realm of cognition, where influence, perception, and decision-making become targets. Social media platforms enable the aestheticization of politics, while algorithm-driven systems foster addictive behaviour programming and the commodification of human emotions. These developments underscore the growing importance of SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence) in national security. We are witnessing the role of these social media platforms in fomenting trouble in Asian countries like Nepal that led to toppling of a democratically elected government.
At the same time, the inherent features of cyberspace, anonymity and non-attributability pose serious challenges for deterrence. Cyber-attacks such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware campaigns, and transnational frauds like pig butchering scams often originate beyond national jurisdictions, exploiting legal and technical gaps. The cyber sabotage incident at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant serves as a reminder of the vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and the potential convergence of cyber and physical threats. The failure of PSLV launch in 2007, possibly owing to Stuxnet worm, was an important incident. Officially, this malware was launched by the US and Israel jointly in 2010 ostensibly to cripple the Iranian uranium enrichment program. Shutdown of electricity grid in Mumbai and cyberattacks on hospitals like AIIMS, New Delhi are other examples demonstrating lack of preparation for cyberattacks by India’s policy planners. The increasing fusion of cyberspace with terrorism has created a “lethal cocktail,” enabling lone-wolf actors as well as well-organized state-supported terror groups to leverage digital tools for radicalization and execution.
Looking ahead, the battlefield is likely to extend into even more complex domains. The emergence of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) raises the possibility of neuro-hacking, where cognitive processes themselves may be targeted. This has profound implications for the military OODA loop (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act), as interference in decision-making cycles could undermine operational effectiveness. The concept of chaoplexic warfare, characterized by the interplay of chaos and complexity, further highlights the need for adaptive, intelligence-driven strategies.
Policy Recommendations: Toward an Intelligence-Driven Cyber India
Considering these challenges, India must adopt a paradigm shift from a reactive cybersecurity posture to a proactive, intelligence-led cyber warfare strategy, capacity and capability. This transformation must begin with the formulation of a National Cyber Warfare Doctrine, which clearly defines India’s strategic objectives, offensive and defensive capabilities, and integration of cyber operations with national security architecture. Such a doctrine should be dynamic, evolving with technological advancements and threat landscapes. Such a doctrine need not be an open source document.
A key structural reform would be the creation of a dedicated Indian Cyberspace Service (ICS) on the lines of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), and Indian Foreign Service (IFS). Given that cyberspace now permeates governance, security, and daily life, a specialized cadre of cyber professionals is essential for policy formulation, threat analysis, and operational execution. This service would ensure continuity, expertise, and institutional memory in an otherwise rapidly evolving domain.
At the grassroots level, India must establish multi-agency cyber coordination centers at the district/block level, modeled on the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) for intelligence sharing {Currently Cyber Thanas (Cyber Police Stations are there in some districts integrated with CCTNS) but they are not sufficient} . Such decentralized structures would enable real-time information processing, faster response to cyber incidents, and better integration of local intelligence with national frameworks. Cyber threats are no longer confined to national borders; they manifest locally, affecting citizens directly, and therefore require localized responses.
Capacity building must begin at the civil societal level. Cybersecurity education should be integrated into school curricula as a mandatory subject, ensuring that citizens are equipped with basic cyber hygiene and awareness from an early age. In a diverse and digitally expanding country like India, this is not merely an educational reform but a national security imperative. At the higher education level, universities should introduce specialized courses in cyber forensics, ethical hacking, and cyber law, creating a skilled workforce capable of addressing complex cyber challenges.
India must also invest in advanced attribution technologies and indigenous cybersecurity tools to reduce dependence on foreign systems. Public-private partnerships should be strengthened to leverage India’s IT expertise, while startups in cybersecurity and deep-tech domains should be actively supported. Additionally, a National SOCMINT Grid should be developed to monitor and counter disinformation, influence operations, and psychological warfare.
Given the rise of ransomware and low-skill threats, nationwide programs to improve digital hygiene and resilience against “script kiddies” must be implemented. Simultaneously, India should enhance its capabilities in cyber forensics and financial tracking to combat transnational scams such as pig butchering networks.
On the international front, India must take a proactive role in shaping global cyber norms, building coalitions for intelligence sharing, and advocating for frameworks to address issues of attribution and accountability in cyberspace.
India, while possessing significant potential, must undertake a comprehensive transformation to remain competitive in this evolving landscape. The future of warfare will be decided not only by military strength but by the ability to anticipate threats, control information, and shape perceptions. For India, the path forward lies in building a resilient, intelligence-driven cyber ecosystem, where the state, society, and technology converge to secure national interests in an increasingly contested cyberspace.
Upgrading the Defense Cyber Agency into a full-fledged Cyber Command is needed with full integration to make an integrated quadrilateral service command structure. India must keep the threats of Chinese Cyber warfare capability in perspective but also from other nations whether friendly or inimical. The threat perception and risk assessment and counter capabilities must include the role of terrorist groups based in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Türkiye’ and other hostile nations.
Conclusions:
India has been a target of cyberattacks in the last a couple of decades at various levels. Time has come to take the cyber warfare domain seriously and take appropriate corrective institutional, budgetary, doctrinal and societal reforms to face the cyber warfare threats from multi-valent entities that are inimical to the nation.
References
[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment, 2021.
[2] U.S. Department of Justice, Chinese Military Hackers Charged in Global Cyber Espionage Campaigns (APT10/APT41), 2020–2022.
[3] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Creation of Defence Cyber Agency, 2019.
[4] Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, PublicAffairs, 2019.
[5] Carnegie India, India’s Cybersecurity Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities, 2020.
[6] National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), Government of India, Annual Reports, various years.
[7] Council on Foreign Relations, Cyber Operations and Chinese Strategy, 2021.
[8] Afaq Ahmad / Navigating Cybersecurity Cooperation Between China and Pakistan December 19, 2022
[9]Cherian Samuel and Rohit Kumar Sharma Digital War: Pakistan’s Cyber Activity Against India – Analysis, May 18th, 2025
[11]Soumya Awasthi, Pakistan and China’s Collusive Grey-Zone Warfare Aug 1, 2025
(The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of C3S.)
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