Amidst Institutional Gridlock: The ‘China Alternative’ and the ‘Indian Way’ in Informal Groupings

By Mr. Cris Fernando Anand Perez, C3S Research Intern

Introduction

The contemporary international system is undergoing a fundamental reconstruction, where rigid structures of formal institutions of multilateralism are being challenged by the “Bypassing the Bureaucracy” of social relations. For decades, the international system was defined by the legalistic, proceduralized interactions with institutions. However, the system is increasingly finding these formal institutions with significant limitations due to its rigid governance structure, and failing to build consensus within the member states. This phenomenon is often described as institutional gridlock, where institutions remain operational, and hold legitimacy but face increasing constraints due to competing interest, bureaucratic inertia, and structural imbalances. This very nature of formal institutions has led to the alternative governance framework, such as G20, BRICS, QUAD, I2U2, G7, SCO, and various ad hoc diplomatic coalitions have  become central to contemporary international politics. These arrangements lack formal treaty structure, permanent secretaries, or legally binding obligations. Within this changing landscape, China and India have emerged as two major actors advancing this very distinct vision of global order. Both countries advocated a more representative and multipolar international system. Both seek greater influence in the global governance structures.

China has increasingly pursued influence through the construction of parallel institutions, alternative governance frameworks, and new international  initiatives. India, by contrast, has emphasized reforming existing institutions while simultaneously  engaging in flexible coalitions and strategic partnerships. These two approaches can broadly be understood as the “China Alternative” and “ The Indian Way.”

The Institutional Gridlock

Multilateralism has long been considered one of the defining features of modern international relations. Following the devastation of the Second World War, policy makers concluded that international stability required institutionalized cooperation, and organizations such as UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO were established, these institutions facilitate actions, laws and norms that were built to prevent another catastrophe. For decades this system performed relatively effectively. The Bretton Woods Institution, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and many more. These governance institutions continue to reflect on the geopolitical realities of 1945, rather than those of the twenty-first century. Emerging Powers such as India, China, Brazil, Japan, Germany, South Africa, etc have their ability to create economic and political influence have remained underrepresented within these institutions . The UNSC provides the clearest example, its permanent membership remains unchanged, reforms have been proposed, and yet no intention of expansion or reformation within the body. Apart from representation, the UNSC has repeatedly struggled to address major conflicts and disputes including and not limited to Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Congo, Palestine, Yemen, Iran, and Afghanistan, these struggles have demonstrated how strategic rivalries can paralyze decision making processes. Likewise, WTO with the task of expanding global trade and economic interdependency, today struggles to adapt to the trade realities such as trade weaponization, dispute settlement mechanism, trade imbalances and economic security.

On the other hand, the rise of populist nationalism has further complicated international cooperation. The ongoing Donald Trump’s presidency, the United States has adopted a more skeptical attitude towards international institutions. Trump’s “America First” agenda prioritizes what benefits America’s political, economic and social interest over the others. This multipolarity has led to more stakeholders possessing the capacity and willingness to shape international outcomes, without having to align with traditional thought. 

The rise of Informal Groupings and Minilateralism.

Unlike traditional institutions, informal groupings operate through consultation, coordination and flexible participation. This allows states to cooperate without being constrained by rigid institutional procedures. Minilateralism refers to cooperation among a relatively small number of states possessing the capacity and willingness to address specific issues, rather than pursuing universal participation, transaction cost or  foreign intervention. Some argue that informal rules and practices are deeply embedded within global governance structures and shape international outcomes more effectively. Much of the diplomacy occurs through unofficial channels, informal consultations and behind the scenes negotiations. While others argue that informal groupings sustain multilateralism itself, by providing venues for coordination, information sharing, learning, and consensus building, they enable larger institutions to function effectively. Informal therefore complements rather than replacing multilateralism. 

The China Alternative; Parallel Institutions and Strategic Networks

The “China Alternative” has emerged as a response to institutional gridlock, which transformed as a strategy of the preferred partner. Beijing sought to construct a parallel global architecture that gradually reduces  dependency on western-led institutions, and simultaneously expanding China’s own political, economic and security influence to build networks centered around Beijing.

During the 1990s  and early 2000s China’s participation in multilateral institutions was largely driven by pragmatism and economic integration. However, following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the acceleration of China’s economic rise, Beijing increasingly viewed existing institutions insufficient of representing emerging powers and overly influenced by western interests. Rather than abandoning these institutions, China adopted a dual-track strategy; remaining  engaged within the existing order while simultaneously constructing alternative governance mechanisms that better reflect Chinese priorities. China's White Paper on the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) represents one of the clearest articulations of this vision. The document formally presents Beijing as revisionist architect seeking to reshape global governance through what is described as “true multilateralism", sovereign equality, mutual respect, and opposition to western led ideologies. Chinese policy makers have argued that international institutions have moved from prioritizing development, non-interference and state sovereignty to ideological divisions and self interest. In practice, this strategy is implemented through a growing network of flexible institutional arrangements that complement rather than directly replacing. Beijing has expanded Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), strengthened Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which was founded in 2015, now counts about 111 approved members and has approved over 8.4 billion dollars which financed across 51 projects in 2024 alone and 60 billion since it was established. The New Development Bank (NDB)  under BRICS, has been seen as an alternative to Western-dominated development finance, this institution has approved of about 40 billion dollars across 122 initiatives, and since then its membership has been expanding including UAE, Bangladesh, Egypt, Algeria, Colombia and Uzbekistan. What makes this more favourable is that, The New Development Bank (NDB) operates without political conditionalities and positions itself as a governance-neutral alternative to IMF and World Bank, and yet an important but often overlooked China’s Minilateral Defence Cooperation (MDC) framework. Particularly across Southeast Asia, Beijing has established streamlined security dialogues focusing on maritime safety, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-piracy operations, cyber governance and transnational crimes. This flexibility lowers political barriers and allows participation and coordination, which eventually increases China’s long-term strategic influence.

The Indian Way: Reform, Represent and Multi-Alignment 

India’s approach differs significantly from China's. Since independence, India has consistently emphasized multilateralism, strategic autonomy, and south-south cooperation. Leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru viewed international institutions as an essential mechanism through which developing countries could come together and advance their interests. Contemporary Indian diplomacy continues this tradition while adapting to new realities. Unlike China, India focused on reforming existing institutions rather than necessarily constructing large scale alternatives. Its long-standing campaign for the UN- Security Council reform reflects this idea. India is a member of the G4 comprising India, Brazil, Germany and Japan, which have collectively advocated for the expanding of the UNSC permanent membership. At the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) held in April 2026, India’s Representative P. Harish reaffirmed the G4’s core reform model; expanding the Council from 15 to 26 , comprising 11 permanent and  14-15 non permanent seats. The six new permanent seats proposed as of two for Africa, two for Asia-Pacific, one for Latin America and Caribbean and one for Western Europe. 

India argues that contemporary institutions must become more representative and inclusive, at the same time, India has embraced flexible coalition and issue -based partnership. Strategic autonomy remains central to India’s foreign policy. However, modern strategic autonomy differs from the  traditional non - alignment, rather than avoiding partnership, India actively engages multiple states on various issues. Its Active membership in BRICS,SCO, QUAD, I2U2 and G20 simultaneously pursuing strategic partnership with the United States, Russia, France, Japan, Australia, and the Gulf has been a success towards the image and formation of the ‘Indian Way’.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has expanded India’s engagement with international institutions and forums. India’s G20 presidency demonstrated this approach, with the Civilization narratives becoming prominent “Vasudhaiva Kudumbakam - The World is one Family”. Also at the 76th UN General Assembly Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated  “ We cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures.” While, QUAD provides the Indian Way of informal governance, QUAD lacks legal binding commitments and mutual defence obligations, Nevertheless, it has become a significant strategic platform within the Indo-Pacific Region, primarily speculated to be a counter strategy towards the expanding role of China. Its agenda expands well beyond security concerns, it includes technology, climate change, healthcare, critical minerals,  and disaster management. The September 2014 Leaders Summit in Wilmington, Delaware, produced some of the most diverse and unique partnerships, the QUAD Cancer Moonshot Initiative, the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific, the QUAD Vaccine Partnership and Maritime Domain Awareness , to name a few. While many claim it to have been stagnant, the potential for India and others could absolutely be seen as a successful informal grouping.

China Alternative Vs Indian Way

Although China and India support for a multipolarity and a representation of the greater south -south cooperation stands strong within their diplomacy and tactics, their approaches and intent have significant variations.

China could be understood as a state that seeks influence primarily through institutions building and construction of alternative governance mechanisms. The main pillars of the ‘China Alternative’ are sovereignty, non interference and resistance to Western conditionality. China’s strategy operates on the logic of being an alternative that is faster, less conditional, less intrusive and a governance architecture that serves Chinese interests without having to be explicitly aligned.

India, by contrast, seeks influence primarily through institutional reform and consensus building mechanisms. The main pillar of the ‘Indian Way’ is inclusivity, reform campaigns, strategic autonomy, and south-south engagement. India frames itself around shared development outcomes rather than bilateral dependencies. Where China offers Infrastructure without conditions, India offers partnership without dominance. 

Conclusion 

China is successfully building an alternative architecture and India is pioneering in leveraging its civilizational heritage and multi-alignment strategy. These diplomatic moves and strategic thinking shows how the practice of today's modern complex pluralistic discourse can be seen. The complexity of global government does not function in isolation or hold the “absolute truth”. The “China Alternative” and “The Indian Way” does not exist in vacuum, it's a web of alliances, narratives, geopolitical leverage, asymmetrical influence  and its ability to influence others make these two unique. For the stability, we must ensure that these two rising tigers don't lapse into “clash of civilizations”. As the US turns inward and the EU seeks its own identity, the international system will be in a structural chaos over legitimacy, power and influence.

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(Mr. Cris Fernando is a Research Intern at C3S and a First-year Master’s student in Geopolitics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education(MAHE). The views expressed here are of the author's own and do not reflect the views of C3S.)