Indian PM Modi trip to Maldives increases New Delhi’s strategic antenna towards the atoll nation: By Balaji Chandramohan
- Chennai Centre for China Studies
- Aug 24
- 13 min read
Image Courtesy: NDTV
India has taken a leap forward in increasing it’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by forming the maritime alliance with Maldives which was sealed during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi state visit to the littoral strategy late July this year. (1)
As a part of strengthening the strategic relationship, India will also provide 72 heavy vehicles to the Maldivian Ministry of Defence as announced by the Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the Maldives conveys multiple strategic messages: a reset of bilateral relations, a counter to China’s rising influence, and a strong reaffirmation of India’s naval assertiveness in its backyard.(2)
India’s strategic interest in Maldives
It’s understood that Indian PM Modi’s visit to the Maldives is seen as a major turnaround in bilateral ties after a spell of strain and tension. It assumes significance as Muizzu, known to be close to China, came to power in the island nation in November 2023 on the back of an “India Out” campaign.
Muizzu’s policies in the first few months of his presidency resulted in severe strain in New Delhi – Male relations. Within hours of taking oath, he had demanded the withdrawal of Indian military personnel from his country. Arguably, New Delhi’s sustained efforts, including its assistance to the island nation to deal with economic woes, helped bring the relations back on track.
On the other hand, Narendra Modi held wide-ranging talks with Muizzu and announced a Rs 4,850 crore line of credit to the island nation, saying that India is proud to be the “most trusted” friend of the Maldives. India also announced the reduction of Maldives’ annual debt repayment obligations by 40 per cent (from $51 million to $29 million) and the launch of talks on a Free Trade Agreement.
The change in dynamics of the relationship could be attributed to the growing need for India as an economic partner to Maldives.
It’s noted that India is the only foreign power with a military presence in the Maldives. Around 70 Indian defence personnel maintain radar stations and surveillance aircraft in the archipelago. Indian warships also help patrol the Maldives’ exclusive economic zone. This collaboration is of strategic importance to New Delhi amid its geopolitical competition with China in the Indian Ocean region.(3)
On the other hand, for Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, who is considered to hold a favorable stance towards China, removing the Indian military from his country was a key election promise. After preliminary negotiations in October, Muizzu asked India to withdraw its troops from the country. In December, he claimed that India had agreed to withdraw its soldiers.
India’s strategic co-operation with Maldives with the Southern Naval Command based in Cochin and also the now developing strategic outpost in Lakshadweep.
Earlier, India considers the Maldives a strategically important country in its immediate periphery. In 1988, a group of Maldivians led by Abdullah Luthufi and assisted by about 80 armed mercenaries of a Sri Lankan secessionist organization, People Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), attempted to overthrow the government of the island republic. Back then, President Gayoom was saved from the coup by inviting Indian forces to intervene.(4)
The then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi immediately sent 1,600 troops by air to restore order in the Maldives through “Operation Cactus”; an act that helped seal Indo-Maldivian relations. Since then, a defense pact has been signed between the two countries. With Islamic militancy on the rise in the 1400 island atoll state the last thing India would like to see is the Maldives descending into chaos and potentially shifting more towards Pakistan. The country has therefore aimed to mediate between the conflicting parties to resolve the crisis.
On the other hand, in Beijing, the concern that India might soon rival its supremacy on the high seas is mounting. China has therefore adopted a “string of peals” strategy that prescribes the construction bases around the Indian Ocean, aimed at encircling India. Ports currently under construction include one situated on the southern tip of Sri Lanka, ten miles removed from what is one of the world’s busiest shipping lines, and another near Gwadar in Pakistan. China is also courting the littoral states of the Indian Ocean including the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles, hoping to settle naval stations there in the near future.
It’s understood that all Great Powers which wants to dominate in the Indian Ocean have set their eyes on Maldives historically. Traditionally, all powers that aspired to control the Indian Ocean have sought a base in the Maldives. The southernmost island, Gan Island in the Seenu Atoll, served as a base for the British Royal Navy during World War II. Gan met the requirements for safe, deep anchorage in a strategic area. In addition, Antsiranana on Madagascar, the Diego Garcia atoll as well as the Aldabra and Farquhar islands and the Desroches in the Seychelles are important strategic locations in the western part of the sea.
The base on Gan was set up by Britain in response to Japanese advances against Singapore and Indonesia during World War II. During the Cold War, in 1957, it was transferred to the British Royal Air Force which vacated it in 1971 after the Maldives had gained independence. Following the British departure, Iran, Libya and the Soviet Union all tried to secure the Gan Island base to counter the American military presence in Diego Garcia.
Meanwhile, in 2008, terrorist activity in the Maldives spiked with a bombing in Malé and the settlement of a jihadist community in Himandhoo, a previously uninhabited Maldivian atoll. India seeks to coordinate counterterrorism efforts with the Maldives to stamp out this presence.
Earlier, a 2009 security agreement between India and Maldives envisages that network across the atolls will be constructed and it will be linked to the coastal command in Cochin. The plan also involved that It regular surveys be constructed with the islands with military flights and plans to erect an air force station in the Maldives was also mooted.
The pact was signed in August 2009 during then Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit there. He was accompanied by an Indian military delegation which included top navy officials.
It’s noted that the plan to construct radar was mooted keeping in view of the fact that Idia will be installing in the Maldives is chiefly to benefit the island nation which does not have a Navy of its own. During discussions, the Maldivian authorities had expressed concerns over the “crucial tasks of safeguarding and protecting their vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Maldives, while expressing its need to develop and enhance maritime surveillance and aerial mobility capabilities.(5)
Earlier in April 2006, as a good will gesture India had gifted the fast attack craft, INS Tilanchang to the Maldives.
Mauritius plays a crucial role in India’s Neighborhood First Policy and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiatives in the IOR. Agalega’s remote and strategic location and proximity to Seychelles, Madagascar, and Diego Garcia would help India closely monitor the entire region. The inauguration of the airstrip and jetty is expected to boost security cooperation between the two nations through joint maritime patrolling, monitoring of Exclusive Economic Zones, hydrography, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief programs. (6)
Furthermore, the new airstrip will accommodate Mauritius and India’s air and naval equipment, including the Indian Navy’s Dornier and P8-I maritime aircraft for the surveillance and reconnaissance of the regional waters.
While jointly inaugurating the airstrip and jetty at Agalega, Mauritian Prime Minister PravindJugnauth discredited rumors aired since 2018 about India establishing a military base at Agalega, assuring Mauritius’s sovereignty. However, Indian military could maintain its presence through man and material at Agalega for maritime patrol missions and the security of development projects. Furthermore, India is a key defense partner that has exported several helicopters, aircraft, ships, fast patrol boats, and other naval equipment to the Mauritian military forces.
Geo strategic importance of Maldives
Geographically, the Maldives lies between Lakshadweep and Diego Garcia, an important U.S. military base in the IOR. With the backing of Indian naval bases in Lakshadweep and Agalega, Diego Garcia would provide a more effective counterbalance against China’s rising footprint in the region, now further strengthened by the recent Male-Beijing defense pact. The two naval facilities would help India keep a close eye on the entire region while also facilitating India’s joint recce of the blue waters with the United States and other island nations. (7)
Lastly, India’s increased Indian Ocean presence will also enable closer ties with other strategically significant island nations, such as Madagascar and Seychelles. While New Delhi already enjoys a strong defense partnership with these countries, these bases will extend security, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation between India and island nations in the IOR. If the Agalega project brings India success, it would further motivate New Delhi to establish its presence in the Seychelles Assumption Island, which has been in negotiation between the two governments since 2015.
In recent years, India has also made a series of attempts to counter Chinese influence in the IOR, including SAGAR and Necklace of Diamonds. The tug-of-war between China and India has resulted in both countries establishing naval bases and other military facilities. China’s building of port infrastructure in Gwadar, Hambantota, Coco, and Djibouti has given Beijing greater access to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and East Africa respectively, inciting India to initiate dialogue with several other IOR partners. These have included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Iran, Oman, and most recently, Agalega in Mauritius.
China’s strategic interest in Maldives
Despite Male’s recent warmth signal to New Delhi as a part of Indian PM Modi’s visit it’s true that Maldives has got closer to China in recent times. (7)
Maldives President Muizzu on his first state visit as a President was welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, during the talks at the Great Hall of the People, referred to President Muizzu as an “old friend,”.
Further , it’s true that China and Maldives were moving closer strategically in last decade. One of the new developments was represented by the September 16 2014 visit of Chinese President XiJinping, who along with 200 representatives of China’s top corporations, met withMaldivian officials to discuss infrastructure projects.
Topping the list was a proposed planto build a much needed bridge connecting the island capital city of Malé to the airport. Itseems that for the moment China wants a strategic partnership with the Maldives beforemoving forward with its ‘New Silk Road’ trade initiative.
The above initiative will involve support to include newshipping lanes connecting China to Africa’s East Coast which pass through waters justsouth of the Maldives. The current regime welcomes Chinese investment but most of alldesires secure access to more tourism dollars.
While Chinese investments contribute significantly to the Maldives’ economic success, concerns have been raised by the World Bank. A development report from October warned of a potential build-up of sovereign exposure during the pandemic, coupled with a lack of domestic investment opportunities. The Maldives, according to the report, should carefully navigate its economic policies to avoid over-reliance on external partners.
President Xi expressed support for increasing direct flights between China and the Maldives, a move that could significantly benefit the Maldives’ tourism sector. With tourism contributing 79% to economic growth in 2022, the country seeks to leverage Chinese connectivity to boost its travel industry. Additionally, China’s commitment to infrastructure development aligns with the Maldives’ aspirations for economic diversification.
The strategic partnership between China and the Maldives represents a geopolitical shift with far-reaching consequences. As the Maldives reorients its diplomatic and economic ties, the regional balance of power undergoes subtle transformations. The Maldives-China axis adds complexity to an already intricate geopolitical puzzle in the Indian Ocean, demanding close attention from international observers. The future trajectory of this partnership will likely shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region in the years to come.
China seems to be copying this strategy in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. In the former, it is seeking to contain India by forging alliances with island nations including the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles and building a “string of pearls” of military bases from East Africa to Pakistan.
The strategy is designed to curtail Indian influence in the region so China, with the Americans distracted in the Middle East, can have a free run in other parts of Asia and across the Pacific Ocean but also to encroach upon African countries that welcome its yuan diplomacy — developmental and industrial support with no strings attached.
China has never announced this strategy publicly. A recent statement from the Chinese military that it’s considering an offer from the Seychelles to host a Chinese naval base confirms that the strategy exists however.
Furthermore, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated that it isn’t interested in building military bases in other places.
The Chinese “island hopping” strategy defies historical precedent and differs from the strategies of other and past great powers in that they were usually explicit about their intentions. China apparently believes that concealing its motives best serves its interests.
An increased Chinese presence across the Indian Ocean poses a challenge to India as it is trying to project itself as a great power beyond South Asia. The two Asian giants are vying for economic opportunities and international recognition. Renewed American engagement, which is likely to follow military withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, could prove an obstacle to China’s designs and cause it to intensify its efforts now.
However, Muizzu’s attendance at PM Modi’s third-term swearing-in ceremony in June 2024 and Modi’s recent visit signal a potential thaw. Diplomats see this as New Delhi regaining influence in Male, even as Beijing watches nervously from the sidelines.
The diplomatic landscape in the Indian Ocean region witnessed a significant development as China and the Maldives solidified their relationship through a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. President Mohamed Muizzu’s state visit to Beijing marked a turning point in the geopolitical dynamics of the region, with the two nations signaling a commitment to enhanced collaboration across various sectors. This report delves into the implications, motivations, and potential consequences of this evolving partnership.
India’s strategic expansion in the Lakshadweep and it’s impact in the Maldives
It’s true that in continuation of PM Modi’s visit to atoll nation, India has started to improve it’s strategic infrastructure to the Eastern Indian Ocean.
India has started to operate a new naval base INS Jatayu which will be about 258 kms closer to the Maldives than the Indian Navy’s existing base – INS Dweeprakshak – on the Lakhshadweep island .
The new base will augment India’s “operational surveillance” of the region, according to a statement issued by the Indian Navy.
A temporary base of the Indian Navy, known as Naval Detachment Minicoy, already exists at Minicoy near the 9 Degree Channel, a busy global shipping route.
The Indian Navy’s surveillance missions received a shot in the arm with the opening of a Naval Detachment (NAVDET) at Androth Island, situated in the Lakshadweep archipelago. The NAVDET would extend the Indian Navy’s presence at Androth by providing a communication network to connect with the mainland.’ It is noted that India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives already have a trilateral maritime security co-operation. From Lakshadweep, India will work closely with the network of 26 radar emplacements deployed across the atolls of the Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian Southern Command.
INS Jatayu, therefore, is more than just a naval facility. It’s a message to Beijing: India is prepared and positioned to counterbalance Chinese expansionism across multiple fronts.
Key capabilities planned or under development at INS Jatayuinclude a 2.5 km airstrip capable of accommodating military transport aircraft.Deployment of a BrahMos land-based missile battery, strengthening deterrence capabilities.
A fully functional coastal radar station to monitor surface and submarine activity across a wide swathe of the Arabian Sea INSJatayu: A Game-Changer in Maritime Strategy in the Western Indian Ocean.
Indian Navy officials have described INS Jatayu as a “maritime equaliser,” particularly as China’s commercial and naval vessels increase their presence in the Indian Ocean.
Beyond its symbolic importance, the base will play a critical role in:Surveillance and monitoring of traffic in and around the Nine Degree Channel.Serving as a forward-operating base for naval and aerial missions.Acting as a logistics hub for anti-piracy and humanitarian operations.
As China doubles down on its investments in the Maldives, including building ports, airports, and bridges, India’s moves remain firm but focused on regional stability. The timing of Modi’s visit, coupled with the strategic build-up at INS Jatayu, serves as both an olive branch to the Maldives and a firm hand to China.
With China expanding its economic and military influence in the region, India is responding with calculated strategic moves. The most significant of which is the recent operationalization of the Indian Navy’s INS Jatayu naval base on Minicoy Island, Lakshadweep.
Located just 250 kilometres from the Maldives, INS Jatayu is emerging as a key outpost in India’s naval strategy to monitor and, if required, choke Chinese maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean. It is a corridor through which over 80% of China’s energy supplies and global shipping transit.
INS Jatayu is positioned north of the Nine Degree Channel, one of the busiest and most strategic shipping lanes in the world. Every day, more than 15,000 merchant vessels — roughly 10 to 12 every minute — pass through this route, which links the Middle East, Africa, and Russia to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim.
This channel is not just a global shipping lifeline — it’s also a strategic vulnerability for China, which depends heavily on these waters for its oil and trade imports. Until recently, India’s main point was the Andaman & Nicobar Command, guarding the Malacca Strait choke point. With the establishment of INS Jatayu, India has a second lever, which is located even closer to China’s logistical lifelines.
It’s understood that gographically, the Maldives lies between Lakshadweep and Diego Garcia, an important U.S. military base in the IOR. With the backing of Indian naval bases in Lakshadweep and Agalega, Diego Garcia would provide a more effective counterbalance against China’s rising footprint in the region, now further strengthened by the recent Male-Beijing defense pact. The two naval facilities would help India keep a close eye on the entire region while also facilitating India’s joint recce of the blue waters with the United States and other island nations.
Lastly, India’s increased Indian Ocean presence will also enable closer ties with other strategically significant island nations, such as Madagascar and Seychelles. While New Delhi already enjoys a strong defense partnership with these countries, these bases will extend security, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation between India and island nations in the IOR. If the Agalega project brings India success, it would further motivate New Delhi to establish its presence in the Seychelles Assumption Island, which has been in negotiation between the two governments since 2015.
In recent years, India has also made a series of attempts to counter Chinese influence in the IOR, including SAGAR and Necklace of Diamonds. The tug-of-war between China and India has resulted in both countries establishing naval bases and other military facilities. China’s building of port infrastructure in Gwadar, Hambantota, Coco, and Djibouti has given Beijing greater access to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and East Africa respectively, inciting India to initiate dialogue with several other IOR partners. These have included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Iran, Oman, and most recently, Agalega in Mauritius. (8)
A temporary base of the Indian Navy, known as Naval Detachment Minicoy, already exists at Minicoy near the 9 Degree Channel, a busy global shipping route.
In conclusion, it’s expected that India and Maldives will continue their strategic partnership in the years to come with India providing necessary military assistance to the littoral state.(9)
Notes
Indian PM Modi’s Trip to Maldives Increases New Delhi’s Strategic Antenna Towards the Atoll Nation ( Diplomatist, July 28,2025)
India-Maldives Reset spells a strategic depth in the Indian Ocean ( Indian Newslink, August 5, 2025 )
Mohan Balaji To counter China, India needs to do naval diplomacy (IANS, August, 26,2011)
Rumel Dahiya, Maldives Needs Help Now and India Alone Can Provide it (MP- IDSA,February 09, 2018)
Balaji Chandramohan, India, Maldives and the Indian Ocean (IDSA, October 13,2009)
Abhijit Singh, Maldives, India and Hydrograph Pact, ( ORF, January 5, 2024)
Maldives seeks scaling back of Indian presence as it woos China ( Reuters, August 10,2018)
NSA level meeting on trilateral Maritime Security Co-operation between India, Sri Lanka and
Maldives’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 6 March 2014
INS Jatayu Positioned to Counter China as PM Modi Plans Strategic Visit to Maldives ( Bharat Shakti, July 21, 2025)
(Mr Balaji Chandramohan is a foreign policy expert. The views express are of his own and does not reflect the views of C3S.)
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