China’s Arctic Strategy: Policy, Practice, and Implications: By Aparna A Nair

Image Courtesy: ABC News

The Arctic is a polar region located at the northernmost point of Earth. What was once a frozen wasteland is now a geopolitical hotspot. The 2009 US Geological Survey report raised global interest in the region. It estimated that the region holds 13 per cent of untapped oil and 30 per cent of the world’s natural gas. The report raised global interest in the region. Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China released its Arctic policy document in 2018. It articulated the country’s interest in the High North and identified itself as a “near Arctic state.” It also outlined its vision for the Polar Silk Road. From then on, China’s footprint increased in the region via infrastructure, scientific research and commercial investments in Russia and Nordic countries. Even though the nature of China’s approach is displayed as peaceful, cooperative and science-based, many Arctic countries have raised concerns because of the dual-use potential of its assets, the opacity of its intentions, and the implications for sovereignty, governance, and resource competition.  

China’s 2018 Arctic Policy: Goals and Vision

The People’s Republic of China's State Council Information Office released its first official Arctic policy white paper in January 2018. The document stated that China’s Arctic policy goals are “to understand, protect, develop, and participate in the governance of the Arctic to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic and promote the sustainable development of the Arctic." It further stated its aspiration to expand scientific research in the regions to improve its capacity and capability. To protect it, China will respond to climate change and safeguard its unique natural environment and ecological systems. China aims to improve the capacity and capability in applied Arctic technology, technological innovation, environmental protection, resource utilisation, and development of shipping to develop the Arctic. In the policy document, China expressed its commitment to and participation in the governance of the Arctic within the existing framework of international law. Furthermore, the policy affirms that China’s collaboration will allow countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind in the Arctic region. The document further reinstates that the basic principles of China’s Arctic participation will be “respect, cooperation, win-win result, and sustainability.” 

In the Arctic policy document, China expressed its plan to build a “Polar Silk Road.” As an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing aims to work with Arctic states to develop these routes through joint infrastructure projects and technological cooperation. The shipping company ‘COSCO Shipping’ have sent cargo vessels through the NSR, and China’s enterprises are involved in the port development proposal in countries such as Russia, Iceland, and Norway. The vision is to reduce shipping time and cost between Asia and Europe via new logistical pathways to surpass geopolitical limits. The white policy paper places emphasis on the importance of collaborative research on climate change, ecological preservation, and the sustainable use of Arctic resources. Apart from that, China’s scientific institutions, such as the Polar Research Institute of China conducted several Arctic expeditions and maintain the Yellow River Station in Norway.

Dimensions of China’s Arctic Presence

China’s goals in the area are multifaceted. It’s a combination of geopolitical motives, economic interests, and scientific research interests.

Geopolitical Leverage

The term “Near-Arctic State” is the most controversial element of the policy. China is situated 932 miles away from the Arctic. While the term holds no credibility in international law, it expresses Beijing’s aspiration to legitimise its participation in Arctic affairs (Chinarctic). Furthermore, China uses its observer status in the Arctic Council to engage in scientific diplomacy, promote multilateralism, and increase its visibility in the region. According to a RAND Corporation report, this approach will allow China to integrate itself into the Arctic governance mechanism without challenging the current legal structure.

Economic Interest

One of the primary reasons for China’s interest in the Arctic is access to its natural resources. As the ice melts, the Arctic is the hotspot for energy and mineral exploration. Most of the resource development is in partnership with the Russia. China’s companies, such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Silk Road Fund, have invested billions in the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects led by Russia’s Novatek. Apart from this, China explores opportunities in rare earth minerals, fishing, and Arctic tourism. All these activities are correlated with the Beijing effort to develop the Polar Silk Road and establish logistical infrastructure that connects China to key Arctic markets and zones.

Environmental and Scientific Interests

China claims that the climate changes in the Arctic affect global weather patterns, sea level rise, and ecosystem sustainability, which makes the country susceptible to climate change. For this reason, China heavily invested in Arctic research and monitoring. The Xue Long I and II icebreakers are used for scientific expeditions and logistical support. Moreover, it has announced plans to build a nuclear-powered icebreaker to enhance its polar capabilities. These initiatives support China with climate data, navigation route assessments, and scientific leadership in Arctic forums. China’s research focuses on climate knowledge, which contributes to strategic mapping, resource assessment and logistical planning.

China’s Arctic Engagements: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Influence

China’s Arctic affairs are under the supervision of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and the Ministry of Land and Resources. SOA have a ‘Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration body’ to focus on Arctic engagement. China has two permanent research stations in the region, which conduct research on marine ecology and atmospheric physics. They are the Arctic Yellow River Earth System National Observation in Norway and the Research Station and China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in Iceland. Apart from that, a vast amount of oceanographic surveys and acoustic modelling are being done to understand the region’s water for operational efficiency. The country’s strategy is not limited to scientific research and the community alone. In the 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy, China’s National Defence University argues that military-civilian mixing is the main way for great powers to achieve a polar military presence, and China should give full play to the role of military forces in supporting polar scientific research and other operations. 

Moreover, the institutional engagement expands from the Arctic Council, Asian Forum for Polar Sciences( AFoPS) and think tanks such as Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Centre. Apart from that, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have the position of Special Representative for Arctic Affairs since 2016. Furthermore, China engages in Track II diplomacy and also sponsors Arctic-themed academic programs and international conferences to shape discourse on Arctic governance. However, scholars and policy analysts note that the narrative of being a cooperative actor underpins China's real motive. As Pezard and Tingstad (RAND, 2025) state, there is a disconnect between the pacifist, multilateral rhetoric and the economic and geopolitical realities of China’s Arctic actions. China’s infrastructure projects, such as fibre-optic cables, port development, and energy terminals, have dual-use potential. It is capable of serving both civilian and military functions. The blurred lines between commercial and strategic objectives prompted several Arctic states to tighten foreign investment screening and reassess the national security implications of Chinese involvement.

Legal Aspect of China in the Arctic

In 2013, the Arctic Council granted observer status to China to participate in Council meetings and contribute to working groups, but not to vote on decisions. As a non-Arctic state, China does not have sovereign rights in the Arctic region but can engage through the international legal framework. The international framework that primarily governs the region is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is a multilateral treaty concluded under the auspices of the United Nations which defines and codifies the standards and principles of international maritime law. It governs the right to navigation, economic zones (EEZs), and continental shelves. Under UNCLOS, freedom of navigation applies to the Arctic high seas, which is discussed in China’s Arctic policy. The major legal concerns revolve around the question of sovereignty and the idea of the ‘high sea’ as the global commons. The seven countries in the arctic region exercise sovereign rights over their territories and maritime zones. It includes Canada, Russia, Denmark (Greenland), Sweden, Iceland, Norway, and the United States. For instance, Russia requires foreign vessels to comply with Russian regulations and has submitted claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to expand its continental shelf.

Similarly, Canada has also taken up claims to the Northwest Passage as internal waters under its sovereign jurisdiction. Despite not being a signatory to UNCLOS, the United States also defends its right through the Alaskan Exclusive Economic Zone. In contrast, China views this region as a part of the global commons. As a “near-arctic state,” it does not claim sovereignty. China respects national jurisdiction when advantageous, as seen in its joint ventures with Russia and Iceland. This dual approach of assertion over sovereignty by Arctic states often clashes with China’s global commons narrative. Secondly, the melting ice made the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route more navigable. China recognise the national regulations imposed by Canada and Russia over these routes but simultaneously emphasises the importance of freedom of navigation under international law. This stance often conflicts with China’s interests and the sovereignty claims of Arctic states. Thirdly, China have joint ventures with Arctic states such as Russia and Iceland to access natural resources. The Yamal LNG project in Russia’s Arctic Region is one such example. However, the deep-seabed mining in international areas of the Arctic seabed presents a legal grey zone in deep-seabed mining in international arena of the Arctic. This dispute led to disputes over resource rights and environmental concerns. The Arctic High Seas are an international area outside the jurisdiction of any single country. It makes it a focal point for resource extraction and territorial claims.

Conclusion

China’s presence in the Arctic is a calculated blend of scientific engagement, economic ambitions and geopolitical manoeuvring, and it presents its approach as peaceful, cooperative, and science-based. However, many Arctic states remain cautious about the dual-use nature of their investments. The idea of China as a near-Arctic state is also debated in legal and political terms. Its joint ventures with Russia and interest in new shipping routes show clear commercial motives. China’s role will likely expand as the Arctic opens due to climate change, as it opens doors to connectivity and resources. However, the effectiveness of China’s approach rests on the resilience of international legal frameworks and the cohesion of regional governance mechanisms.

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(Aparna A Nair is an intern at C3S. The views are reflected are that of the author and does not reflect the views of C3S.)