G2 déjà vu? Nixon’s 1972 opening to China and the Trump–Xi reset, read from India : By Arul Braighta Arulnadham

Image Courtesy: The Guardian

When Donald Trump announced that the G2 would convene shortly, it seemed as though the Thucydides Trap that had defined Sino-American relations for decades had suddenly loosened its grip, challenging decades of scholarship predicting inevitable confrontation between a rising power and an established hegemon. Amid years of escalating rivalry, trade wars, technological decoupling, and accusations of authoritarianism versus democratic decline, the notion that Washington and Beijing might suddenly seek rapprochement does seem fictional. But looking back at history, this pattern is anything but new. The very term "G2" itself carries historical weight, first proposed by economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005 during the Bush era to advocate for dialogue between what he predicted would become the world's two economic superpowers. The concept gained traction during the early Obama administration before fading as US-China relations deteriorated after the financial crisis. Trump's revival of this term in 2025 thus represents a return to an idea that has periodically surfaced whenever pragmatism temporarily overrides confrontation, allowing us to trace a lineage of attempted accommodation that reaches back through decades to the original normalization of 1972.

In 1972, Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai orchestrated one of the twentieth century's most consequential diplomatic pivots, normalizing relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China at the height of the Cold War. The Cold War's entire ideological foundation rested on the binary confrontation between capitalism and communism, yet the United States chose to embrace China, the world's most populous communist nation after the Soviet Union. This paradox demands explanation. The United States has always operated with what Graham Allison might call a "rational actor" framework, calculating costs and benefits with cold precision. We speak of American isolationism and American universalism, but beneath these ideas lies a consistent bargaining mentality. Whether the outcomes truly represent win-win situations or merely sophisticated political manipulation dressed in cooperative language remains debatable, but the 1972 rapprochement undeniably reshaped the global order. Ironically, today's US-China tensions were arguably seeded by that very normalization, as China's subsequent access to the World Trade Organization and integration into global markets transformed it into the world's factory and, eventually, a peer competitor challenging Western norms and hegemony.

The 1972 Calculus: Triangular Diplomacy and Strategic Necessity

To understand why Nixon pursued normalization with China, we must reconstruct the geopolitical chessboard of the early 1970s. The Vietnam War had become an American quagmire, draining resources and political capital. The Soviet Union appeared ascendant, expanding its influence across the Third World. Within this context, the Sino-Soviet split offered Washington an extraordinary opportunity. By the late 1960s, China and the Soviet Union had transformed from communist allies into bitter rivals, with border clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969 bringing them to the brink of war. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor and the architect of realpolitik statecraft, recognized that this rupture created a strategic opening.

By normalizing relations with China, the United States could create a triangular dynamic where Washington held better relations with both Beijing and Moscow than they held with each other. This geometric reconfiguration of power politics would pressure the Soviet Union from two directions, potentially moderating its behavior and providing leverage in arms control negotiations. As Kissinger himself articulated in his memoirs, the goal was not to forge a formal alliance with China but to create strategic ambiguity that would complicate Soviet calculations and constrain Soviet expansionism.

But what did China gain? For Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, rapprochement with the United States offered multiple advantages. China faced genuine security threats from the Soviet Union, with Moscow deploying substantial military forces along their shared border. American engagement provided an implicit security guarantee against Soviet aggression. More importantly, normalization opened pathways to economic modernization and technological advancement. China's Cultural Revolution had devastated its economy and isolated it internationally. Access to American markets, technology, and investment promised a route out of economic stagnation. Zhou Enlai understood that China's revolutionary diction could coexist with pragmatic engagement with capitalist powers if it served China's national interests.

Yet the economic dimension, while significant, does not fully explain the rapprochement's logic. Geopolitics drove the decision as much as economics. Nixon and Kissinger were not primarily motivated by visions of Chinese markets but by the immediate strategic imperative of countering Soviet power. The economic integration that followed, transforming China into a manufacturing powerhouse, was an unintended consequence that would later create the very challenges the United States now confronts.

India's Dilemma: Encirclement and Strategic Recalibration

For India, the US-China rapprochement created a complex strategic landscape fraught with uncertainty. India had suffered a devastating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which shattered Nehruvian illusions about Asian solidarity and exposed India's military vulnerabilities. Throughout the 1960s, India maintained its non-aligned stance, refusing to formally align with either superpower bloc. However, the convergence of American and Chinese interests raised uncomfortable questions in New Delhi about India's strategic position.

The timing was particularly sensitive. Pakistan, India's primary adversary, enjoyed close relations with both the United States and China. The prospect of deepening US-China cooperation, potentially with Pakistan as a facilitating intermediary, created what Indian strategists perceived as a strategic encirclement. During the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, the Nixon administration had tilted decisively toward Pakistan, with the infamous incident of the USS Enterprise being deployed to the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to intimidate India. China, too, had supported Pakistan, though it refrained from direct military intervention.

It was within this context that India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. While it would be simplistic to characterize this as a direct response to US-China normalization, the broader pattern of Sino-American convergence certainly influenced Indian strategic thinking. The treaty provided India with implicit security guarantees from the Soviet Union, balancing against the emerging alignment between Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad. The broader Asian security architecture underwent significant reconfiguration during this period. The US-China rapprochement effectively marginalized India in great power calculations. 

The 2025 Rapprochement: Different Context, Familiar Patterns

Fast forward to 2025, and the geopolitical landscape has transformed almost beyond recognition. China is no longer a struggling developing nation seeking access to global markets but a technological and military powerhouse with the world's second-largest economy. The United States, while still the preeminent global power, faces challenges to its dominance that would have seemed inconceivable in 1972. The rise of China has generated extensive debate about power transitions, the Thucydides Trap, and whether the liberal international order can survive the emergence of a revisionist great power.

Given this context, Trump's pursuit of rapprochement with Xi Jinping appears incongruous. Trump himself has characterized China as the greatest threat to American interests, imposing tariffs, restricting technology transfers, and framing the relationship as strategic competition. His administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly identified China as a revisionist power seeking to reshape the regional order. Yet the same president who championed decoupling now seeks accommodation.

What explains this apparent contradiction? Several factors converge to create incentives for rapprochement. First, economic interdependence between the United States and China remains profound despite disengagements. American businesses have invested heavily in Chinese markets and supply chains. Trade wars have imposed costs on American consumers and industries. There may be recognition that complete economic separation is neither feasible nor desirable, creating space for a tactical détente that allows economic normalization while maintaining strategic competition.

Second, rare earth minerals and critical supply chains have become central to great power competition. China dominates the production and processing of rare earth elements essential for advanced technologies, from semiconductors to electric vehicles to military systems. The United States faces genuine vulnerabilities in this domain, and some form of accommodation may be necessary to ensure access to these critical materials while domestic supply chains are developed.

Third, the meeting did not occur in either Beijing or Washington but in a third location, suggesting both sides sought neutral ground for exploratory talks. This choice echoes the careful staging of the 1972 rapprochement and indicates that both powers recognize the need for face-saving mechanisms and political cover for domestic audiences skeptical of engagement.

Trump's subsequent comments about wishing he had a cabinet like Xi's, where ministers were "scared" and deferential, while simultaneously criticizing China's authoritarianism, reveal the internal contradictions in American approaches to China. There is simultaneous admiration for China's capacity for decisive action and criticism of its political system, a cognitive dissonance that reflects broader American anxieties about declining relative power and governmental effectiveness.

The statement by the US Secretary of Defense that US-China relations "can never be better" adds another layer of complexity. This suggests that even as diplomatic engagement occurs, fundamental strategic competition continues. The rapprochement may represent a tactical pause rather than a genuine transformation of relations.

Red Flags Painted White: The Question of Reliability

History suggests caution in interpreting these versets. American partnerships have consistently come with implicit expectations of deference and alignment with Washington's strategic priorities. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the carefully constructed détente of the 1970s collapsed almost overnight. So if the next crisis emerges over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or any other flashpoint, will this attempted rapprochement survive?

From a game-theoretical perspective, both the United States and China face a classic prisoner's dilemma. Cooperation could yield mutual benefits, but each side has incentives to defect if it believes defection will provide greater relative gains. The absence of trust, the presence of profound ideological differences, and the structural pressures of power competition all militate against sustained cooperation. 

The reliability question cuts both ways. Is the United States a reliable partner for China? Beijing remembers that American engagement facilitated China's economic rise, but it also observes that the United States has become the primary obstacle to China's continued ascent. From Beijing's perspective, American partnership is tactical rather than strategic, useful when it serves American interests but dispensable when China's growing power threatens American primacy. Similarly, from Washington's perspective, China has violated the implicit bargain of the post-1972 era by challenging rather than integrating into the liberal international order. Each side views the other as fundamentally unreliable.

Yet a critical asymmetry exists in how both powers approach rapprochement. Scholars such as Degang Sun describe China's approach as a "zero-enemy policy" rooted in multipolar strategic thinking. Beijing articulates this approach explicitly in regions like the Middle East, where it maintains balanced relations with rival powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, Sunni and Shia factions, republics, and monarchies simultaneously. This reflects a calculated grand strategy. China thus seeks multi-alignment rather than a hegemonic or zero-sum approach, positioning itself as a mediator while expanding diplomatic influence. When India approached China after facing American tariffs, Beijing responded positively, probably from strategic calculation. China, therefore, applies "hub state diplomacy," maintaining good relations with regional rivals simultaneously, including India and Pakistan in South Asia, to use engagement to reduce tensions while maximizing its own leverage. 

This diplomatic flexibility, rooted in what Chinese scholars call "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics," gives Beijing structural advantages in a fragmenting international order where rigid alliance systems become liabilities rather than assets. The charm of Chinese diplomacy today can be seen as strategic patience. It rarely closes doors. It rarely commits to absolute positions except on sovereignty issues. This should not be mistaken for multilateral idealism. It is rather a calculation that a fragmented, fluid world is good for China’s rise. 

Beijing, as I would like to describe, is a chess player who will shake your hand warmly and then calmly sacrifice a pawn to trap your queen.

India's Strategic Calculus: Threat or Opportunity?

For India, the implications of the US-China rapprochement are profound and varied. If the United States and China achieve a stable modus vivendi, India could find itself strategically marginalized once again. The Quad, which has been central to India's strategy of balancing against China, could lose momentum. The economic dimensions of this strategic dilemma are equally stark. India's trade deficit with China reached a staggering $99.2 billion in fiscal year 2024-25, the highest ever recorded. This represents not merely an imbalanced trading relationship but a structural vulnerability where India imports nearly six times what it exports to China. When the United States imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian exports in August 2025, India faced an impossible choice: accept economic isolation from both major powers or move towards engagement with China despite security concerns. New Delhi chose the latter, resuming visa issuances for Chinese citizens, reopening border trade routes, and considering allowing Chinese firms to hold 20-25 percent stakes in manufacturing, renewable energy, and auto parts sectors. This economic dependency creates leverage for Beijing that extends far beyond commerce. China could weaponize India's reliance on rare earths, active pharmaceutical ingredients, electronic components, and manufacturing machinery during border disputes or other geopolitical confrontations. The structural nature of this imbalance, where India exports primarily raw materials like iron ore while importing high-value electronics, machinery, and technology, makes rapid diversification nearly impossible. Should US-China relations normalize, Washington would have little incentive to challenge Beijing's economic leverage over India, leaving New Delhi simultaneously dependent on Chinese imports for critical sectors while confronting coordinated security pressures from the China-Pakistan axis.

Operation Sindoor in May 2025 revealed the depth of this strategic challenge: India faced what its Deputy Chief of Army Staff described as "one border and two adversaries, actually three," with Pakistan in front, China providing comprehensive support, including live intelligence updates on Indian military assets, and Turkey supplying drones. Chinese military hardware constitutes 81 percent of Pakistan's military inventory, and China essentially used the conflict as a "live weapons lab" to test its systems against Indian capabilities. If US-China relations normalize, Washington's willingness to pressure Beijing on its support for Pakistan would evaporate, leaving India facing this coordinated threat structure without its most powerful potential balancer.

The strategic encirclement India faces is concrete. If the focus of the Indo-Pacific competition reduces by this “New-rapproachment,” India would lose grip in managing this coordinated pressure. If Quad becomes less relevant and American willingness to provide advanced military technology diminishes, India's room for diplomatic maneuvering would contract significantly.

1972 taught India to insure against other people’s triangles. 2025 offers something rarer - to shape the geometry. The prudent course is multi-alignment with muscular capacity: lock in the U.S. defense-tech track as we reopen limited economic channels with China where interests align, deepen Southeast Asian partnerships, and accelerate indigenous capabilities so that any future G-2 is obliged to become a G-3 on issues that matter to India.

If Busan becomes a real thaw, India should bank the stability dividend and bargain harder on tech, trade, and standards. If it’s a pause before the next squall, India’s bets on deterrence, infrastructure, and trusted supply chains will look prescient. Either way, New Delhi’s best strategy is to behave like what it already is: the pivotal player other players must triangulate with.

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(Arul Braighta is a research officer at C3S. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views of C3S.)