top of page

Colombo Security Conclave: Guarding the Ocean

By Shubhi Malhotra & Dr. Adityanjee


Image Courtesy: The Print


Introduction

The Indian Ocean is no longer merely a highway for commerce. It has become the principal arena of twenty-first-century geopolitical competition in the maritime domain, a theatre where great powers jostle for influence, non-state actors exploit ungoverned maritime spaces, and climate-induced disasters test the resilience of small island nations. Against this backdrop, the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) has emerged as one of the most consequential, and yet somewhat understated, regional security architectures in the Indian Ocean region.


It began as a modest trilateral dialogue in 2011 among India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, but the CSC has quietly added members, deepened its institutional underpinnings and broadened its strategic scope and vision. Today it is a six-member grouping with a permanent secretariat in Colombo, a formal charter and an agenda that includes maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. With the upgradation of the CSC in 2026, it has written a charter and an ambitious agenda and possibly a new secretary general. But as the Indian Ocean region fractures along the lines of great-power competition and domestic political turmoil, the question arises: is the CSC doing enough to protect the maritime domain in India’ near abroad? 

 

From Trilateral Talks to Regional Maritime Architecture

The seeds of the CSC were planted in 2011, when the National Security Advisors (NSAs) of India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives began meeting under the framework then known as the NSA Trilateral on Maritime Security. The initiative was Sri Lanka's brainchild, conceived primarily to address the shared maritime vulnerabilities of three nations bound by the waters of the Indian Ocean.


The group, however, lost momentum after 2014, when political turbulence, particularly strained relations between New Delhi and successive regimes in Colombo and Malé, drained it of diplomatic energy. For nearly six years, the mechanism lay dormant, a casualty of the domestic political upheavals leading to volatile bilateral diplomacy that often cut regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.Its revival came in 2020, when the grouping was relaunched and rebranded as the Colombo Security Conclave. The rechristening was more than cosmetic. It signalled an intent to transform what had been an informal trilateral exchange into a structured, expansive platform for regional maritime security governance. Since then, the CSC has gathered considerable momentum, expanding both in membership and institutional depth.

 

Expanding Membership

One of the most impressive elements of the CSC in the last few years has been a gradual, consensus-oriented expansion. The club now has a total of six full nations. Mauritius was admitted as a full member in 2022. Bangladesh’s entry to full membership in 2024 added a strategically crucial voice to the CSC’s activity in the Bay of Bengal. Notably, Dhaka was not there when the Charter was signed that year, reflecting the changing domestic political scene in Bangladesh.


The latest milestone was in November 2025, when Seychelles formally became a full member at the 7th NSA-level meeting in New Delhi. The number of member states increased to six. Significantly, Malaysia was a guest state at the 2025 conference, showing rising interest from Southeast Asian countries in the CSC framework, and perhaps suggesting future growth.The addition of Seychelles is much more significant. Located in the western reaches of the Indian Ocean, Seychelles sits astride some of the ocean's most critical transit corridors. India has long described Seychelles' participation as a key expansion of its regional maritime security architecture, and the island nation's formal membership extends the CSC's geographic reach from the Bay of Bengal to the western Indian Ocean.


The Five Pillars of Security Agenda

In addition to boosting its membership rolls, the CSC has also engaged in institutional consolidation. In August 2024, the CSC's founding documents - a Charter and a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a permanent secretariat - were formally signed in Sri Lanka. The secretariat in Colombo provides an operational hub to the grouping and there is already an interim secretariat at the NSA level.


In April 2026, CSC took another major stride forward with the introduction of a formal update to its institutional framework. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri acknowledged that the first Secretary General of the CSC is likely to be an Indian national, but the headquarters arrangement is yet to be finalised. Reports claim a former Vice Chief of the Indian Navy is being considered for the job. This institutionalisation is an indication of the CSC's development from an informal consultative forum to a treaty-based regional security body.


The CSC differs from strictly maritime-focused regional entities in the scope of its objective. The Conclave works through five strategic pillars of collaboration:


1. Maritime Safety and Security 

This continues to be the major preoccupation of the CSC. The Indian Ocean carries around 80 per cent of the world’s commercial oil and a significant chunk of global container traffic. Piracy, illegal fishing and the growing presence of Chinese naval forces - warships, submarines and research vessels – in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) are chronic threats. The CSC has established an Ocean Information Services portal to allow the sharing of oceanographic data among member states, a step toward developing a shared maritime domain awareness image.


2. Against Terrorism and Radicalisation

The rise of terrorism and violent extremism is not foreign to the Indian Ocean coastal states. The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack sponsored by Pakistan is still fresh in the memory of India’s strategic establishment.  The 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka highlighted the vulnerability of porous maritime borders and poor intelligence sharing procedures to transnational terror networks. The CSC has been trying to promote well-structured channels of counterterrorism cooperation among its members, harmonising approaches to surveillance, deradicalisation and border management.


3. Fighting Trafficking and Transnational Organised Crime

Indian Ocean marine channels are plagued by human trafficking, narcotics smuggling and weaponry trafficking. Small island republics such as the Maldives and Seychelles are particularly vulnerable. Limited coastguard capabilities combined with large exclusive economic zones make comprehensive policing almost impossible without regional collaboration. CSC provides a coordinating platform for combined patrols, intelligence exchange and capacity building.


4. Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Security

Delegates from all member and observer states attended the second edition of the CSC symposium on cyber security, held by India in July 2024 at the National Forensic Sciences University in Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Discussions included cybercrime, digital forensics, incident response and threat intelligence exchange. Cyber Security, Protection of Critical Infrastructure, and emerging technologies are one of the fastest evolving pillars of the CSC – a reflection of the region’s growing digital interconnectedness and the increased threat of state-sponsored assaults.


5. HADR

The Indian Ocean is one of the most disaster-prone locations in the world. Cyclones, tsunamis and floods are regular visitors to destroy coastal and island towns. The CSC’s HADR pillar aims to develop pre-positioned response systems, enable information sharing during crises, and coordinate asset deployment among member nations to shorten reaction periods and reduce the human impact of natural disasters.


Against Whom Are We Protecting?

Any genuine analysis of the CSC must confront the question of strategic purpose. In one sense, the Conclave is a real international forum on common threats that go beyond bilateral relations. More broadly, it is largely seen as part of India’s larger drive to cement its role as the first responder nation and a major security provider in the Indian Ocean region and to challenge China’s growing maritime footprint in the region.China’s String of Pearls policy – the development of port facilities and strategic relations in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong) , Myanmar (Coco Island, Kyaukphyu) and beyond – has been a longstanding concern in New Delhi. These fears have been stoked by an increasing number of visits by Chinese military vessels and submarines to ports in the Indian Ocean. As the largest and most capable member of the CSC, India provides an institutional mechanism for aligning the security preferences of smaller regional governments with India’s larger strategic goals.


This is not to suggest that the CSC is solely a tool of Indian maritime hegemony. The smaller members, especially Sri Lanka, Maldives and Seychelles, have complex multi-vector foreign strategies being careful not to be viewed as exclusively in the camp of any one country. One of the CSC’s benefits is that it provides these governments a multilateral forum for true security cooperation and dialogue without having them make difficult geopolitical choices.


This complexity is exemplified by recent developments. By 2024, the new government in Bangladesh was absent from the charter signing, but by 2025 it was back in action – a reminder that internal political shifts can disrupt regional commitments.


Challenges and Difficulties

The CSC, however, suffers from serious structural problems that limit its potential.


Capacity Asymmetries: India dwarfs its peers in naval power, economic resources, and institutional capacity. This asymmetry might foster dependence rather than true partnership – smaller governments may become receivers of Indian generosity rather than co-architects of regional security.


Political Uncertainty: South Asian politics is well known for being unpredictable; The tensions between the two sides after 2014 nearly destroyed the CSC. Any future change of leadership in a member state could again impact the grouping’s momentum.


Overlap of Architectures: CSC is one of the several regional maritime security institutions – IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association), IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium), BIMSTEC, SAARC, ASEAN, MGC and various bilateral frameworks. For all practical purposes, SAARC is now in prolonged stay in ICU, unlikely to be revived. It is still a work in progress to identify the CSC’s distinct value proposition and avoid jurisdictional overlap especially with the ASEAN.


China’s Shadow: Although China is not mentioned explicitly, the grouping is aimed at curtailing its influence. This would create diplomatic headaches for countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that have close economic connections with Beijing. China is a major culprit in illegal mechanized fishing in the regional waters causing economic losses to the livelihood of local fishermen. China has been sending its spy ships in the region under the garb of maritime research. CSC nations must address these serious security challenges without fear of bilateral economic retribution from China. 


US Maritime Dominance: The US has been conducting FONOPS (Freedom of Navigation Operations) in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) contrary to the spirit of the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea). The US has not ratified the UNCLOS and is not likely to do so ever. The recent sinking of Iranian frigate IRIS Dena by a US submarine in Sri Lankan waters killing 87 sailors is a stern message to the relevance of SCS in the current unpredictable and fluid security environment. The US manipulated the interim government of Bangladesh to provide it a naval base in St. Martin’s Island after toppling a democratically elected government of Sheikh Hasina Wazed who had gone on record about US demands for naval bases. 


Enforcement Gaps: While the CSC has an ambitious objective, it is more of a forum for discourse and collaboration than for enforcement. It is not a standing force; it has limited financial resources and is dependent on voluntary compliance by member states.


The Road Ahead

The CSC's upgrade in 2026, with plans for a formal secretariat, a Secretary General, and a growing membership, represents a maturation that would have seemed ambitious a decade ago. The grouping has demonstrated resilience, recovering from dormancy, expanding purposefully, and deepening institutionally. Possible new candidates for full membership in near future should include Singapore, Myanmar and Madagascar.  In the zeal to increase the membership, sight must not be lost about regional disrupters. The CSC will lose its strategic coherence if disruptive countries like Pakistan, Malaysia and South Africa are included in any capacity. CSC must not fall prey to mindless expansion.


Yet the threats it confronts are growing faster than its capacity to address them. Chinese naval presence in the IOR continues to deepen. Climate change is intensifying the frequency and severity of natural disasters. Transnational crime networks grow more sophisticated. And the fragility of democratic governance in several member states remains a wild card.


The Colombo Security Conclave is, at its best, a framework for building habits of cooperation among nations that share a maritime common and face common vulnerabilities. It cannot replace the bilateral relationships, national capacities, and broader international arrangements that ultimately determine the Indian Ocean's security architecture. But as a platform for aligning interests, sharing intelligence, and coordinating responses, it represents something valuable and, in a fractured region, increasingly rare: a functioning multilateral institution with real stakes and genuine momentum.


Guarding the holy sea of the Indian Ocean is a generational task for all the littoral nations. The CSC has, at least, made a serious beginning.



References



(Shubhi Malhotra is a Training Fellow in Strategic Studies at CSA, and Dr. Adityanjee serves as the President of CSA. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of C3S.)

LATEST
bottom of page