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China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy in Asia

By Dr. Adityanjee and Guncha Shandilya


Image Courtesy: DRaS


Introduction:

China’s contemporary diplomatic posture can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping’s strategic counsel in the 1990s to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): “Hide your strength and bide your time.” Although Deng articulated this philosophy, it was his successor, the 3rd generation CCP/PLA Leader Jiang Zemin, who formalized this phrase in its widely recognized form. For over two decades, this pragmatic doctrine served as the guiding principle for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


During this period, Beijing consistently projected itself as a “poor, developing country,” focused on modernization of the nation and development of infrastructure. It deflected any criticism on its lack of human rights and lack of democratic freedoms by asserting that any criticism of China would “hurt the feelings of millions of Chinese people.” This cautious and defensive diplomatic style remained the broiler-plate response of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs until global economic and geopolitical shifts altered China’s comprehensive national power, China’s self-perception and external conduct.


Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy Posture:

A notable shift in China’s attitude and foreign policy postures occurred during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 when China got an upper hand in Southeast Asia. While the United States was totally consumed by domestic financial instability, China emerged as a stabilizing force, particularly for the ASEAN countries, offering currency support and economic assistance. The US meanwhile was trying to save its own undercapitalized banks and financial institutions that were considered too big to fail.


Following its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China had accumulated a vast amount of foreign exchange reserves (more than $3 trillion) through aggressive and predatory mercantilist practices without opening its economy. These massive foreign exchange reserves soon became an important tool of foreign policy leverage. After 2009, Chinese rhetoric in international arena evolved from humility to assertiveness and dominance while increasingly portraying China as a wealthy and powerful state.


This shift was clear during the U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to China in November 2009. Diplomatic optics had changed markedly: Chinese officials adopted a more confident posture; restricted press access during joint briefings and avoided scrutiny over human rights. The treatment of President Obama by the Chinese press reflected an underlying sense of diminishing respect for U.S. authority. There were racist comments and cartoons on President Obama in the Chinese press. During this period, in other international meetings also, China displayed aggressive behavior towards President Obama and his entourage reflecting their contempt for the declining super-power US.


China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy in Action: 

With this economic leverage behind it, from 2010 onwards, China became more assertive in its foreign policy enunciations. In July 2010, Yang Jiechi, the former Chinese foreign minister and State councilor, at the ASEAN Ministers Conference in Hanoi, reportedly told Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact.” Xi Jinping’s assumption of the CCP 5th generation leadership brought the rhetoric of China Dream and its articulation of 21st Century as the Asian (euphemism for Chinese) Century. Simultaneously, the “One Belt One Road” scheme projecting Chinese economic power globally initiated the era of debt trap diplomacy for weaker countries.  This terminology encapsulates more than the present interests and proclivities in Chinese diplomacy. The 2015 Chinese film with the same title is often alluded to when talking about the diplomatic style Chinese officials currently challenge global foreign policy with.


Public Confrontation and Diplomatic Aggression:

Till 2020, and sometime after COVID, China was known to be a shadow player, preferring to share less about interests and aspirations and keeping a low profile when interacting with leaders from around the globe. Over the years, China had invested very heavily into reelection of WHO Chief Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Using this financial clout and leverage over Dr. Tedros, China was able to suppress and stonewall about the Chinese role in creation of the Wuhan virus and its subsequent spread globally. This adoption of coercive and assertive diplomacy started with Zhao Lijian’s claim that the COVID virus was leaked by the US military during the military games conducted in Wuhan, China in 2019. One gets the impression that China can go to any lengths to toss off the blame.  In more recent times, a more dominating, assertive and over the top diplomatic behavior can be seen, keeping China in the throes of very dominant foreign policy formulations that can be seen as a portmanteau of imperialist, expansionist and nationalistic interests for that country. News reports can be seen documenting behavior of Chinese diplomats as they walk out of halls, disrespect other leaders and even use gestures that demean the very essence of a stable foreign policy, driving mutual interests and bilateral ties globally.


A prominent example occurred in March 2021 during the U.S.–China bilateral strategic dialogue in Alaska. Yang Jiechi, the former Chinese foreign minister and State councilor, after 2-minute opening remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, responded with an unexpected 16-minute-long critical speech in presence of the media.  He denounced the United States for its poor human rights record. Yang Jiechi labeled the US as a global "champion of cyber-attacks” and declared that "many people within the United States actually have little confidence in the US democracy. This aggressive tone was followed by a similar monologue by other members of the Chinese delegation including Wang Yi. This exchange epitomized wolf warrior diplomacy in a full public view.


Explaining China’s Rise and Diplomatic Transformation:

Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of Taoguang Yanghui (keeping a low profile while building strength) facilitated China’s rapid modernization and integration into the global economy as a developing economy after Mao Zedong’s disruptive era of cultural revolution. It did not arouse consternation and international concern because of a camouflaged posture of humility. Economic resurgence coupled with a chokehold on the US treasury bonds allowed it to carve out a unique position of diplomatic strength for itself. Under Xi Jinping, a strict and nationalistic approach with focus on “China Dream” has helped deflect international scrutiny while consolidating domestic authority. Serial purges of rivals on corruption charges and tinkering with the post-Deng constitutional arrangements have bestowed enormous power in the hands of the paramount leader. 


One Belt-One Road (OBOR) became the cornerstone of China’s policy of exercising economic leverage in international arena. Smaller countries were trapped in debt cycles with one-sided long-term contracts forcing them to barter their national sovereignty in exchange for unpaid debts.  As policy experts called out this initiative and labeled it as One Debt-One Road (ODOR), China rechristened the name as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hoping to deflect critique and public lampooning. At the same time, in international fora, China claimed to profess solidarity with the Global South while in the bilateral context, China displayed its diplomatic fangs and economic muscle. Post-COVID criticism and global pushback, however, appear to have reinforced Beijing’s preference for an aggressive defensive posture. China assumes the self-proclaimed victimhood role for historical grievances whenever it is pushed too far internationally. This deliberate and carefully crafted dual approach allows China to frame its actions as defensive rather than expansionist, even as its belligerent conduct suggests otherwise. Control over domestic narratives, proprietary social media platforms, and algorithmic influence further strengthen China’s ability to project confidence and legitimacy internationally while keeping domestic criticism at bay.


Asia- A Case Study in Conflict:

It would be safe to say that the ‘wolf warriors’ diplomatic schema from China are activated only when the conversation is about topics that can invite severe international backlash and rebuttal, like Xinjiang, Taiwan and Hong Kong, places where a more humble policy style would only frame China as the culprit. China’s waixuan (external propaganda) and neixuan (domestic propaganda) combine to send out an expression that Beijing will fiercely fight for principles at the core of its collective national interest and that is precisely what is happening in Asia as well. Expansionist claims and regional hegemony is dressed as “consistent and principled stand guarding core Chinese interests”!


This fierce style of defending Chinese national interests isn’t just limited to diplomatic postures and exchanging dialogues during conferences.  It has slowly mushroomed all over Asia. Southeast Asia is considered as a very fruitful and rewarding arena for China.  It is also majorly affected by the Chinese expansionism and hegemony, both in terms of expanding economic grit and political clout. It has manifested itself in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, which are both ambitious and highly resourced by the Chinese government. China has deployed a clever mixture of maritime acquisitions in the South China Sea, institutional expansion and information penetration to increase its influence in the region. South China sea has become a de facto Chinese private lake infringing on the EEZ of other ASEAN countries. Over the last two decades, China has refused to negotiate a code of conduct (COC) for South China sea in the ASEAN-China framework while demanding concession in bilateral frameworks with individual countries. The BRI, under the garb of providing infrastructural benefit to countries like Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Malaysia and Nepal has created huge economic dependencies on China. China has also become a major arms supplier to India’s surrounding countries, heavily altering defense interests and gradually expanding its geopolitical footprint. 


Through CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and related investments, China has seemingly invested over US$60 billion in Pakistan over the past decade, across power plants, highways, railways, infrastructure and the development of strategic ports such as Gwadar have only led to an increase in statistics. It has led to immense resentment by the local Baloch population who consider these acts as neocolonialism and  exploitation of their natural resources.  Building about 68% of Sri Lanka’s expressways; like the 126-km Southern Expressway (Colombo ↔ Galle/Matara), China has increased debts to itself from these developing countries highly in need of economic protection and isolated them from the rest of the world. The Karnaphuli Tunnel in Bangladesh is a flagship example as South Asia’s first under-river road tunnel. In November 2024, China officially published a set of geographic coordinates defining 16 base points / baselines around Scarborough Shoal. This disputed maritime feature is claimed by the Philippines and is known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc.  It is a triangular chain of reefs about 125 nautical miles (232 kilometers) from Luzon, the main Philippines island. Disputed in a triangle conflict between the Philippines, China and Taiwan, it has been under Beijing’s de-facto maritime control since 2012. China uses its economic clout to keep other ASEAN nations quiet in its confrontation with the Philippines. The brazenness with which China disregarded the verdict of the International Arbitration Tribunal in the Hague is reflection of China’s wolf Warrior Diplomacy buttressed with its economic clout. Similarly, China encourages anti-India sentiment alive in India’s near abroad using its economic aid to countries on India’s periphery. 


Economic Expansion and Strategic Dependence in Asia:

High scale investments in Southeast Asia, manifesting as infrastructural projects, economic tight handling and power plants show that the wolf warrior diplomacy is not only expanding through verbal rhetoric, but is also creating small dependent and surveillance islands, targeted to achieve a strong presence across Asia. Examples are there in the form of China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), China’s investment in Kyaukphyu deep seaport in Myanmar and naval base in Cambodia. China is likely to be a major investor in the consortium financing Thailand’s Land Bridge project which will include four major components: deep-sea ports in Chumphon and Ranong, a dual-track railway, and a motorway running about 120 kilometers between the two ports. These projects come in the form of both strategic leverage and political clout for China, helping it go beyond the diplomatic rhetoric. Through port projects, China gains strategic access to key waterways and maritime chokepoints. In contested maritime zones (especially in the South China Sea), China is also using legal and bureaucratic tools such as land control and administrative baseline declarations to tighten grip over fruitful areas. It might as well be right to say that China is indulging in a ‘dual-track diplomacy’ outside the homeland, by initiating projects extended as helping hands, but are most definitely a coercive and smart way to increase dependence ratios across lands. This characterizes the strong wolf warrior approach that focuses on structural reorganization and economic reliance. 


Looking Forward: Strategic Costs and Adjustments:

This type of belligerent diplomacy has been spewing some confidence around the world for how China keeps its interests at the priority and how defensive their diplomats can be when it comes to protecting fantastic claims of Chinese sovereignty. Although this style of diplomacy has been grudgingly acknowledged around the world for its nationalistic approach, this will definitely hamper Chinese interests in the long run. More recently, Xi Jinping has also stressed the importance of foreign policy to be driven as soft, friendly and open to collaboration when interacting with geopolitical interests globally. China is also keen on developing a strong social media presence. The fact that Western media sources are globally trusted more all over the world lends credence to the fact that this aggressive style needs to be tweaked to the best of Chinese interests. The reset would be an exercise to achieve China’s long term aim of achieving global power while appearing as a diplomacy full of camaraderie and mutual trust. 


Conclusions:

While paying lip service to multipolarity, what China wants is a unipolar Asia and bipolar world till China rises to the level of the sole super-power displacing the US. Recent rhetoric of Chinese ambassador to Japan talking about cutting the “dirty neck” of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is a true reflection of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy. Asian nations including the Maldives and Malaysia are increasingly aware of the risks of overdependence on China and are actively diversifying their partnerships. Notable exceptions remain Pakistan and Bangladesh, whose strategic postures continue to align closely with Beijing while taking overtly anti-India postures. In future, this Wolf Warrior Diplomacy will become an albatross around China’s neck as most of the Asian countries slowly rise from their strategic slumber. To achieve its ambition of global leadership, Beijing may need to recalibrate its diplomatic tone toward greater openness and trust-building.



References:



(Dr. Adityanjee is the President of the Council for Strategic Affairs and is based in the US. Guncha Shandilya is an Honorary Research Fellow at the Council for Strategic Affairs and is based in New Delhi, India. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views of C3S.)



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