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C3S ISSUE BRIEF 47/26 - India Amidst the Nuclear Nations:The Current Strategy and the Way Ahead, By Commander YVV Prasad


Abstract


This paper examines India’s position among nuclear-armed states and assesses the continued adequacy of its strategic nuclear framework in an era of accelerated geopolitical and technological change. The paper will focus on twelve points in sequence.


(1) India’s place among nuclear-armed states: Current inventory size, deployment posture, and relative position versus China, Pakistan, and the established nuclear powers; (2) Declared doctrine and operational continuity: Credible minimum deterrence, No First Use (with the limited chemical/biological exception), massive retaliation, and civilian political control — the framework that has remained formally unchanged since 2003; (3) Capability developments under the existing framework: Progress on the nuclear triad, MIRV-capable systems, sea-based deterrence, and the gradual shift in targeting and force design toward the China challenge; (4) The China factor as the primary strategic driver: Quantitative expansion, qualitative modernisation, launch-on-warning posture, and the implications for India’s second-strike calculus and decision timelines; (5) Pakistan’s nuclear posture and the China-Pakistan convergence: Tactical nuclear weapons, full-spectrum deterrence, and the strategic linkage that complicates India’s traditional bilateral framing; (6) Emerging technologies and compressed decision space: Hypersonic delivery systems, AI and cyber vulnerabilities in nuclear command-and-control, space-based threats, and the resulting pressure on warning and response times; (7) Limits of the current strategic leadership model: Where the 2003 framework remains adequate and where it faces strain - particularly in flexible response options, multi-domain integration, and crisis management under multipolar nuclear conditions; (8) The case for redefinition rather than simple revision of NFU: Why the requirement is primarily for a strengthened and more adaptive strategic leadership architecture, not necessarily a formal abandonment of No First Use; (9) Elements of a redefined nuclear strategic leadership model: Hardened second-strike and command-and-control, proportionate response options below massive retaliation, tighter integration of conventional-space-cyber-nuclear domains, and clearer civil-military decision protocols for compressed timelines; (10) Capability and institutional foundations required: Industrial, technological, and human-capital prerequisites for sustaining the redefined model- linking to the broader India-China comparative lessons on long-term national capability building; (11) Strategic risks of inaction versus risks of formal doctrinal change: Consequences of remaining with an unchanged leadership model versus the signalling and stability risks of an overt revision of the declared posture; and (12) Way ahead: three priority lines of action: Concrete priorities for India over the next decade to redefine and operationalise nuclear strategic leadership without sacrificing the core advantages of the existing doctrine.



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(Commander YVV Prasad, IN (Retd.) is the Founder & Managing Director of Prasad Consulting Hyd (India) Pvt Ltd; and currently, the Chairman of Global Aerospace and Defence Council of TPCGSI. He is a well-acclaimed Principal Strategic Adviser in Defence, Aerospace, Homeland Security, Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Security. This paper is presented at the C3S panel discussion marking the 100th edition of China Watch, Stella Maris College, Chennai, second week of November 2026. The views expressed here are of the author's own and do not reflect the views of C3S.)

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