Sad Demise of the New START: How China Exploits the Legal Vacuum in Strategic Arms Reduction

By Harsh Sinha and Dr. Adityanjee

Image Courtesy: News X

Introduction

The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026 brought an end to the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. This change represents a fundamental shift from a regulated bipolar nuclear order that was carefully crafted during the post-cold war era to an uncertain, unpredictable and competitive multipolar nuclear order. The absence of formal strategic arms control agreements creates systemic risk but also creates strategic opportunity for China. This is because China, by remaining beyond the moral imperatives and bounds of any formal treaty obligations will use the ambiguity to its own strategic advantage. By capitalizing on the rivalry between the United States and the Russian Federation, China will gain a relative strategic advantage in the emerging permissive nuclear order.

Background

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in 2010 and renewed in 2021, formed the groundwork of strategic stability between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. The Treaty had imposed limits on the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads on 700 deployed nuclear delivery systems (airplanes, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles) and to 800 deployed and non-deployed nuclear launchers of those missiles and airplanes that could launch nuclear weapons. Since the treaty only applied to strategic and deployed nuclear weapons, both countries have larger nuclear arsenals, with Russia estimated to possess 5,459 nuclear warheads and the United States 5,177. The treaty included strict verification procedures such as on-site inspections and data exchange. The expiration of the New START on February 5, 2026, has resulted in the lifting of legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals; thus, ushering in an era marked by increased uncertainty and strategic competition. 

The tensions between the US and the Russian Federation started in 2023 following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The United States determined that Russia was in non-compliance with the treaty in February 2023, and several weeks later, Russian President Putin officially declared that Russia would suspend its compliance with the treaty, rejecting inspections and data exchange with the United States. The United States responded by deciding to no longer share new information with Russia required by New START.

As stated in the report issued by Nuclear Threat Initiative, the end of New START represents a shift from limits of nuclear weapons at the same time as the existence of nuclear threat and reflects the decades-old erosion of arms control architecture. Unfortunately, it was the US intransigence that led to the expiration of the treaty as the Russian Federation had expressed a keen interest in renegotiation of the treaty. Even a suggestion by the Russian Federation to extend the treaty by one year to allow more negotiations was vetoed by the Trump administration which has a gung-ho attitude towards the strategic arms control regime. At numerous occasions President Trump expressed his desire to start retesting and developing more advanced strategic weapons. All this while, the US was able to conduct cold tests to verify the reliability of its existing strategic weapons. Having extended the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely in 1995, the US by abandoning the new START has clearly violated Article VI of the NPT which states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Consequences of Mutual Arms Reduction Regime

In response to the demise of the New START, both the US and Russian Federation could increase their nuclear arsenals; however, there are also limits based on their historical rivalry and strategic doctrines. In contrast to the US and Russia, China is not bound by a treaty or moral obligations and will expand its nuclear capabilities faster and from a lower starting point. Therefore, this asymmetry makes China’s relative position stronger, especially in an evolving multipolar nuclear environment. Even while the New START was in place, in various international non-proliferation conferences, Chinese academics and policy analysts took the position that their nuclear arsenal was nowhere near the numbers for the US and the Russian Federation and they planned to increase their strategic assets till China achieves numerical parity with both US and the Russian Federation.

The verification and transparency provisions of New START were also critical and allowed for the US and Russia to gain insight into each other’s nuclear force levels; thus, reducing uncertainties and reducing the risk of miscalculation. With the expiration of New START, this has also removed many sources of verification regarding nuclear deployments. No comparable verification measures are in place with China; thus, it can take advantage of a higher degree of opacity and strategic ambiguity to enhance its deterrent credibility and complicate adversarial planning. 

Hence the expiration of the New START catalyzes the slow death of the NPT as the Nuclear States under the NPT have failed to keep their commitment for total nuclear disarmament.

Advantage China

With the expiration of New START, the US and Russia are left in a state of strategic asymmetry in favor of China. In this context, China will be the primary beneficiary. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China has remained outside of any formal arms control agreements, due to an inequality in size of both arsenals and since China ostensibly adheres to a doctrine of no-first use and minimum deterrence. Therefore, it is also worth noting that there are reports of a significant and rapid increase in the modernization of China’s nuclear capabilities, which are currently estimated at 600 warheads with potential to grow to 1,500 by 2030. In addition, China is developing additional missile silo fields, developing improved delivery systems and is now achieving a more credible nuclear triad. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear program is essentially an extension of the Chinese nuclear program.

From a geo-economic point of view, both the US and Russian Federation are declining economically while China still has foreign exchange reserves of $3.4 trillion and its trade balance continues to grow in a positive direction. While both the US and the Russian Federation may face budgetary constraints, China is not affected in that domain and can invest heavily into its strategic arsenal at a rapid pace. 

Finally, without New START, China is less likely to be included in future arms control negotiations. The treaty provided a previous structural framework for potential trilateral (US, Russia, China) arms control frameworks.

The collapse of arms control significantly restricts the diplomatic ability to obtain formal regional treaties with China, as noted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; without an existing bilateral regime, it will be more difficult to seek broader control of arms in a formal way. The failure of arms control also slows the rate of U.S.-Russian competition since they will both divert their sources and energy to retain parity with one another. By lowering the competition between the two nations, this creates additional time and resources for China to modernise its nuclear arsenal without the immediate pressures felt by the U.S. and Russia. Based on 2020–2026 US State Department allegations and subsequent intelligence releases, the US claims China conducted a low-yield, underground nuclear explosive test at its Lop Nur site on June 22, 2020. China has rejected these allegations as "completely groundless." The US accused China of using "decoupling" techniques—detonating devices in large underground cavities—to hide the true magnitude of the tests from monitoring systems. 

Hence, while China continues to modernise and expand its strategic arsenal, it will be able to position itself as a “responsible nuclear state” seeking stability internationally and thereby gain international recognition as a state contributing to stability, but without having to make binding commitments that create restrictions upon its modernisation of its nuclear arsenal.

Multipolar Nuclear Order

The erosion of the arms control removes any credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which increases the likelihood that nations in volatile areas will have increased proliferation of nuclear weapons. The transition from an established bipolar to a multipolar nuclear order provides an additional benefit to states such as China that historically have not had to comply with arms control treaty restrictions, since there are no longer any internationally recognized legal regimes in place to regulate the proliferation of nuclear arms. In addition, a state such as China, as a new and rapidly developing nuclear power, is particularly well positioned to take advantage of this transition from a bipolar order to a multipolar order since China will have an opportunity to shape the global nuclear order in a manner consistent with its national security interests.

These developments have considerable global security ramifications. The elimination of  treaties limiting U.S. & Russia's development of nuclear weapons, poses a potential nuclear arms race with both a quantitative increase in the number of nuclear weapons/warheads and a qualitative development in the sophistication of nuclear weapons systems. Plus, without verification and transparency mechanisms there will be a heightened risk of miscalculating, meaning crisis stability will be diminished. 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear (TPNW) is the stand-alone legal framework along with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These two treaties are the only globally applicable regulations in force that explicitly ban nuclear weapons activities, from nuclear use to nuclear testing to nuclear development. TPNW sends a strong message that a renewed arms race is not only morally unacceptable but illegal under international law in most of the world. Every country that is a party to TPNW sends a strong message to nuclear-armed states that they are on the wrong side of history. Joining the TPNW is an important step that all countries can take to press for disarmament in these dangerous times.

Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament:

There is an urgent need for new policy approaches to meet these nuclear proliferation challenges. There are instances in the past where countries have undertaken nuclear disarmament unilaterally. Besides Ukraine, in the past, unilateral nuclear disarmament was pursued for various reasons, including external pressure from the international community. South Africa, Libya, Iraq, Brazil and Argentina pursued unilateral disarmament. South Africa gave up its nuclear arsenal voluntarily before the dismantling of the apartheid regime on shrewd political calculations. The apartheid regime read the tea leaves and did not want a nuclear arsenal to fall into the hands of the African National Congress-led South African government. Countries like the UK that have the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence umbrella provided by the US need to seriously undertake unilateral nuclear disarmament as a moral imperative. In this regard, the UK must follow the Japanese example. Despite provocations from its two nuclear neighbors, Japan has explicitly ruled out the nuclear option because it enjoys the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella.

Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament:

Efforts should begin by developing plurilateral arms control discussions that will involve China along with the US and the Russian Federation; start with confidence-building measures, and work to develop full limitations. Additional interim verification mechanisms, data exchanges will help to offset the absence of treaty-based verification and develop enhanced communication channels. More so, the need to strike a proper balance between credible deterrents and restraint to avoid escalating destabilizing arms competitions are paramount. Finally, it is essential to revitalize multilateral structures to maintain the standards of non-proliferation globally and maintain strategic stability.

Conclusions

To sum up, the end of New START is a pivotal turning point in nuclear governance around the world. The end of the treaty will not only worsen the risks of arms races and increase the strategic uncertainty associated with using nuclear weapons, but it also creates an opportunity for China and its vassal state North Korea to increase their combined strategic arsenal. China will use its enhanced nuclear arsenal, its relative power and influence on the global stage to blackmail and intimidate its neighbors.  Operating under no formal legal or moral restrictions, China can use the strategic distractions of the two established nuclear superpowers to establish itself as a key player in shaping the future of global nuclear governance. If there are no concerted efforts made to develop new, inclusive mechanisms for arms control, the global community could enter a prolonged period of competition and instability in the international system.

References

[1] Nuclear Threat Initiative, The End of New START: From Limits to Looming Risks, 2026.

[2] Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, New START Expires: What Happens Next?, 2026.

[3] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition, 2026.

[4] RAND Corporation, New START’s Expiration Will Make the World Less Safe, 2026.

[5] The Diplomat, New START’s Expiration Is a Win for China, 2026.

[6] U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty Factsheet, 2021.

[7] Vrinda Rastogi and Dr. Adityanjee: Should the UK undertake unilateral nuclear disarmament?  https://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.org/csa-journal/vrinda-rastogi 

(Harsh Sinha is a training fellow in Strategic Studies at the Council for Strategic Affairs. Dr. Adityanjee is the President of the Council for Strategic Affairs. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of C3S.)