Between Revolt and Repression- Why is China Silent?

By Annunthra Rangan, Senior Research Officer, C3S

Image courtesy: SpecialEurasia

Iran is witnessing a phase of unrest that increasingly resembles a revolutionary rupture rather than a cyclical episode of protest. Unlike earlier waves of dissent, the current movement shows little sign of retreat despite the intensity of state repression. Reports suggesting that the death toll crossed 12,000 within a matter of weeks underscore the extraordinary scale of violence and mark a grim departure from even the region’s troubled norms. What began as public anger over economic collapse has now evolved into a crisis with unmistakable international consequences, turning Iran’s internal turmoil into a geopolitical flashpoint.

The situation gained global visibility after drawing the attention of United States President Donald Trump, who once again adopted a confrontational posture and positioned himself as an assertive global actor. Yet this is no longer a bilateral standoff between Washington and Tehran. Regional actors and third countries have been pulled into the crisis, further destabilizing an already volatile strategic environment. For countries like India, which have long balanced relations between Iran and the United States, the crisis raises difficult questions about diplomatic alignment, energy security, and regional stability. These questions demand sober analysis rather than ideological posturing.

The meaning of the current movement has been continuously reshaped by competing narratives, political messaging, and external interference. International media attempts to frame the unrest within rigid ideological templates remain speculative, given the lack of verifiable information from the ground. What is beyond dispute, however, is that Iran’s unrest can no longer be described as a purely internal affair. Confrontations at the United Nations Security Council, explicit American threats of military action, and the evacuation of foreign nationals by countries such as Germany, Russia, and India all signal the crisis’s internationalization.

The immediate trigger for the protests lay in Iran’s bazaars. On December 27, 2025, shopkeepers attempted to shut down businesses after learning of yet another surge in prices. This act of economic defiance resonated widely. Demonstrations spread rapidly across Tehran and into provinces such as Mashhad, Kermanshah, and Isfahan, driven by anger over the rising cost of essential goods. The steady collapse of the toman, worsened by long-standing sanctions and trade barriers imposed primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom, deepened public despair and sharpened the sense of economic injustice.

Initially, the protests were largely peaceful and did not explicitly call for regime change. That character changed decisively after the state’s response. Alarmed by the possibility of losing control, the Islamic Republic deployed security forces against unarmed civilians. The use of lethal force escalated tensions dramatically and transformed scattered protests into a nationwide uprising that increasingly bears the hallmarks of a revolutionary movement.

The scale of arrests has been particularly disturbing. Reports indicate that more than 20,000 civilians have been detained, with many allegedly facing execution. Erfan Soltani was reportedly the first protester scheduled for execution on January 14, 2026, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to terrorize the population into submission. Following international pressure, particularly from the United States and human rights organizations, the execution was reportedly suspended. Activists across the world have since remained in contact with Soltani’s family to ensure his safety. As external involvement deepens, the protest movement itself has grown more assertive and confrontational.

The political narrative has been further complicated by the intervention of exiled royal figure Crown Prince Reza Shah Pahlavi, who has publicly endorsed the protests and urged demonstrators to persist. His statements have resonated with segments of the Iranian diaspora and protest networks. In a direct message to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Pahlavi held him personally responsible for the bloodshed, intensifying both domestic and international scrutiny of Iran’s leadership.

Claims that the protests are driven primarily by American and Israeli propaganda have circulated widely. While such assertions oversimplify a deeply rooted domestic crisis, it is also difficult to ignore the visible footprint of external actors. The reality is not one of pure foreign orchestration or entirely organic revolt, but of a domestic uprising unfolding within an internationalized political environment.

Regional dynamics have added further complexity. The refusal by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to open their airspace for any potential attack on Iran surprised many observers. This posture suggests that key West Asian states are unwilling to be drawn into a direct military escalation, even as they remain wary of Tehran. Iran, for the moment, appears to have secured a degree of regional insulation before the broader international community could react.

China’s role in this unfolding crisis has been particularly striking for its restraint. Given Beijing’s history of involvement in West Asian affairs and its desire to expand its regional footprint, its limited response has disappointed some observers. Official statements from Chinese leaders have been cautious. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning called on Iran’s government and people to overcome difficulties and maintain stability, while Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned American threats as a return to the law of the jungle and offered China as a constructive mediator. Beyond rhetoric, however, Beijing has taken no decisive action.

This restraint reflects China’s broader strategic calculus. Beijing’s economic and diplomatic investments in Gulf states far outweigh those in Iran. With relatively limited stakes and few viable tools to shape outcomes, a wait-and-see approach aligns with China’s interests. The current crisis is largely beyond Beijing’s control, and China’s global partners appear to recognize this.

China’s credibility as a responsible global actor has not been significantly damaged by its inaction. As analysts have noted, Beijing never positioned itself as Iran’s security guarantor or as an anti-Western crusader. Instead, it seeks to function as an alternative partner within a global system from which it also derives enormous benefit. Its diplomacy aims to expand influence while managing rivalry, not to overturn the existing order outright.

What has received less attention is the extent of China’s prior involvement in strengthening Iran’s surveillance and security apparatus. Chinese firms have supplied surveillance cameras, facial recognition technology, and training that have significantly enhanced Iran’s capacity to monitor and repress dissent. Chinese companies have also contributed to the development of Iran’s intranet, facilitating rapid internet shutdowns and information control. Chinese technology has reportedly played a key role in identifying protesters, tracking them after demonstrations, and even monitoring dissent from within private homes. Drones have been used both to control crowds and to identify individuals for later arrest.

China is not alone in this ecosystem. European and American firms also participate indirectly in global surveillance supply chains. The repression in Iran is thus enabled by a transnational network of technology providers. Iranian citizens find themselves trapped between the competing interests of Washington, Tehran, and Beijing, despite their own efforts to demand accountability and rights.

Economically, Iran occupies a middling position in China’s overseas portfolio. Projects such as the Qom Yiwu rail freight corridor have symbolic importance but do not place Iran among Beijing’s top development financing recipients. The two countries also maintain a security partnership that includes intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and coordination on counterterrorism. China has supplied Iran with various military and dual-use technologies in exchange for discounted energy, infrastructure access, and diplomatic alignment.

The limits of this partnership were evident in June 2025, when U.S. strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. China’s response was confined to diplomatic condemnation and calls for dialogue. No material support followed. This episode highlighted the fundamentally opportunistic nature of the relationship. China benefits from Iran’s isolation but is unwilling to incur serious costs on its behalf.

For Beijing, the current configuration of power in Tehran remains preferable. Chinese statements emphasize unity, stability, and resistance to foreign interference, effectively signaling political support for the existing regime. State media have echoed narratives framing the unrest as externally engineered. Yet Beijing’s ability to protect the Iranian government from domestic revolt is limited.

Should Iran’s political system collapse, China would adapt pragmatically. Its priorities would be safeguarding its citizens and investments, securing energy supplies, and cultivating ties with any successor government to prevent a strategic realignment toward Washington. China would also seek to ensure that events in Iran do not become a point of direct confrontation with the United States, especially as Beijing prioritizes stability in its own relations with Washington.

Even a disruption in Iranian oil exports would be manageable for China, which has ample reserves and alternative suppliers. The loss of a consistently anti-American partner would be inconvenient but not catastrophic. The deeper concern for Beijing would be symbolic. Images of mass protests toppling an entrenched regime could revive anxieties rooted in the color revolutions and the Arab Spring. A successful uprising would underscore the limits of repression as a long-term strategy.

While there are no signs of comparable unrest within China, its leaders are unlikely to take chances. Increased surveillance, tighter information controls, and a heightened security presence would be the predictable response. Iran is not existential for China. Domestic stability is.

(Annunthra Rangan is a Senior Research Officer at the Chennai Centre for China Studies. The views expressed here are that of the author's and do not reflect the views of C3S.)