'Minerals for Security’: The U.S. Re-engages Africa to Counter China - By Navya Syam

Article 17/25

As the global race for critical minerals intensifies, Africa has emerged as a key battleground in the strategic competition between China and the United States. These minerals, including cobalt, lithium, nickel, copper, and rare earth elements are crucial in clean energy technology, electric vehicles (EVs), digital networks, and modern defense systems. With estimates showing that the demand for some of these minerals will increase by more than 400% by the year 2040, having access to and control over their supply chains is now a fundamental issue of national security and economic resilience. Amid this backdrop, the 2025 U.S. push for a critical minerals pact with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, highlights a shift in Washington’s strategy toward a more assertive, security-driven approach in order to take on China in Africa’s critical mineral sector.

China’s Dominance on the Mineral’s Supply Chain

China plays an outsized role in the global critical mineral supply chains, with a particularly strong grip over the processing and refining stages. While countries like Australia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo dominate in mining certain critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt, respectively, China is the world’s leading processor. It purifies about 60% of world lithium, 65% of cobalt, and a whopping 90% of rare earths, which are critical materials used in clean energy technologies, advanced electronics, defense systems, and electric vehicles (EVs). This dominance provides Beijing tremendous bargaining power in global supply chains. The world's reliance on China in this domain is deep. Chinese firms have not only established huge domestic processing facilities but also invested significantly in foreign mining operations, especially in Africa, Latin America, and regions of Southeast Asia. These upstream and downstream connections, supported by robust state intervention and long-term industrial planning, position China at the center of the global critical minerals network. As a 2023 White House fact sheet reports, "no nation controls more of the global supply chain for critical minerals than China."

This reliance has emerged as a strategic weakness for the United States and its allies. China has shown a willingness to use its control as a geopolitical weapon and the export control measures export restrictions have been the central tool. Since 2023, China has been imposing export curbs on critical minerals. Especially Germanium and Gallium, two metals critical to semiconductors and military uses. In December 2024, China imposed a total ban on export of Germanium, Gallium and Antimony to the United States. This has been worrisome to the United States as they are heavily used in the defence industry such as jet engines, radars, avionics and other electronic systems. In April 2025, China imposed export restrictions to seven medium and heavy rare earth minerals to all the countries, enabling Beijing to limit shipments by reducing the number of export licenses it grants. These measures are implemented in retaliation for President Trump’s decision to raise tariffs on most Chinese goods, first to 54 percent, then later to 125 percent. The incident highlighted how readily Beijing can interrupt important supply chains, sending an unmistakable message about its ability to respond if there is an escalating tech or trade war. Therefore, the U.S. and other nations have been racing to diversify sources of essential minerals. Beijing's control of refining and willingness to weaponize commerce has reaffirmed U.S. strategic vulnerability concerns and driven a bipartisan effort to capture alternative supply chains. These choices by the Trump administration respond to the sense of urgency, with a goal of quick resource procurement and minimizing dependence on China.

Trump’s Policies to Reduce Reliance on China

Unlike the Biden administration's focus on multilateral systems and environmental protection, when Washington had introduced initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and other legislation in the U.S. to develop strong supply chains that lower dependency on China. The 2025 Trump's mineral strategy shifts to unilateralism, deregulation, and transactional diplomacy. Trump has emphasized deregulation and outright deal-making to immediately strengthen domestic and strategic mineral availability. His executive orders seek to hasten mine approvals by eliminating bureaucratic delays, giving agencies stringent deadlines and streamlining duplicative regulatory barriers and broadening the U.S. list of critical minerals to add copper, uranium, potash, and gold. In a contentious change, his administration also empowered the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to invest in domestic mining projects, outside its usual development-oriented mandate. While both governments have acknowledged copper's place in the energy transition, Trump's policy diverges from Biden's by seeking bilateral and transactional mineral deals overseas. A good case in point is Ukraine, where a draft agreement would grant the U.S. first refusal rights over all natural resource projects available to foreign investors, with project profits being channeled into a joint fund to pay for American military and financial assistance—raising legitimate questions about economic sovereignty. Parallel efforts were being made in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a major source of cobalt, where Trump's envoy had been in negotiations to negotiate a critical minerals agreement. In exchange, Kinshasa has asked for U.S. security support against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel movement. This initiative shows Trump's mineral diplomacy in the African continent and lays the groundwork for a heightened competition with China for strategic resources in Africa.

Power Game for African Minerals

Against the backdrop of rising global geopolitical tensions and the growing technological competition between China and the United States, Africa has emerged as a key battleground for strategic investment, especially in the area of critical minerals.The Chinese dominance has resulted in a structural imbalance in China-Africa relations. African nations ship enormous amounts of raw minerals to China but usually do not have the capacity or bargaining power to upgrade the value chain or diversify their markets of export. For instance, 72% of Africa's cobalt, 58% of its manganese, and 28% of its graphite exports go to China. So, while African states gain from Chinese investment in the short run, they are still greatly reliant on Beijing as a market as well as a processing center. Hence, it is also in the interests of the African nations to balance China with another global power and to benefit the people of the abundant resources in the continent.

The Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the US for ‘minerals for military help’ deal. The deal is between the U.S. DRC and Rwanda, who had been accused of supporting the M23 rebels in the Eastern DRC. the region is rich in minerals like tantalum, niobium, tin and tungsten and they are primarily found in the mining town of Rubaya, which is under the control of rebels. The U.S. will also be signing bilateral economic agreements with both countries. However, there are significant technical and strategic limitations to any potential U.S. deal in the region. While the DRC government is eager to counterbalance China’s dominance, most productive mining assets—especially in the southeastern copper and cobalt belt—are already under Chinese control. The U.S. is instead turning its attention to the conflict-affected east of the DRC and Rwanda, where Western-backed projects like Alphamin and Trinity Metals have begun formalizing artisanal mining. These ventures mark a modest re-entry into the region, but they remain limited compared to China’s entrenched presence. While the world continues to accelerate towards digitalization and energy transformation, the supply of such minerals is anticipated to grow by a substantial margin. The World Bank estimates that alone, clean energy technologies could generate a 500% rise in the production of major minerals such as graphite, cobalt, and lithium by 2050. China and the United States have both appreciated the centrality of these resources to their national and economic security agendas, yet their strategies to access them, especially in Africa, differ markedly in scale, strategy, and long-term perspective.

Chinese companies dominate mineral-rich African nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Mali, and Botswana. In 2023, Chinese investment in copper-related ventures in the DRC and Botswana each amounted to more than $2 billion. Large-scale lithium extraction ventures in Zimbabwe and Mali again demonstrate the increased footprint of Chinese state-owned firms. At the same time, Beijing's refining capabilities provide the city with an unmatched level of control over the global mineral value chain. China refines more than 85% of rare earth elements found globally and leads the world as a processor of cobalt, manganese, and graphite. In 2020, it imported almost 90% of its cobalt from the DRC and, by 2024, Côte d'Ivoire had emerged as one of its biggest suppliers of nickel ore.

The Chinese dominance has resulted in a structural imbalance in China-Africa relations. African nations ship enormous amounts of raw minerals to China but usually do not have the capacity or bargaining power to upgrade the value chain or diversify their markets of export. For instance, 72% of Africa's cobalt, 58% of its manganese, and 28% of its graphite exports go to China. So, while African states gain from Chinese investment in the short run, they are still greatly reliant on Beijing as a market as well as a processing center. Hence, it is also in the interests of the African nations to balance China with another global power and to benefit the people of the abundant resources in the continent.

Recognizing the strategic vulnerabilities inherent in its dependence on China for critical minerals, the United States has shifted its attention toward diversifying its supply sources, with Africa emerging as a central focus. In 2024, the U.S. Select Committee on China reported that over 50% of U.S. imports of 24 critical minerals, including more than 90% of rare earth elements, came from China. This dependence is increasingly viewed in Washington as a national security risk, particularly after China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium—key inputs for semiconductor and defense industries. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, these restrictions could inflict a $3.4 billion blow to U.S. GDP and exacerbate vulnerabilities in high-tech manufacturing.

To address this, the U.S. government has elevated critical mineral security to a strategic priority. The Select Committee on China established a dedicated policy working group in June 2024 to counter China’s dominance in the mineral supply chain. The overarching U.S. approach seeks not just to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains but to reshape the global mineral ecosystem in alignment with Western values, governance norms, and environmental standards.

The U.S. government’s critical mineral policy in Africa has been primarily institutionalized through initiatives such as the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The 2022 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa formally emphasized supporting African countries in responsibly leveraging their natural resources, and this objective has since translated into tangible political and financial engagement. In February 2023, the MSP convened a vice-ministerial meeting in Cape Town with participation from 14 partner countries, the EU, and eight African mineral-rich states, including Angola, Botswana, the DRC, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Most of these countries already have long standing mineral relationships with China, indicating that U.S. efforts face stiff competition but also that there is room for multipolar engagement.

U.S. financing agencies have actively stepped in to support these goals. The DFC, established in 2018, plays a pivotal role in offering alternative financing for mining and energy projects. With a mandate rooted in countering authoritarian influence—implicitly, China—the DFC has positioned itself as a transparent and sustainable development partner. Alongside the DFC, the U.S. Export-Import Bank loaned $1.6 billion to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2023, targeting sectors including mining and energy. The 2023 bilateral agreements further cement this engagement. The U.S. has signed Memoranda of Understanding with Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and the DRC—countries that hold strategic reserves of cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese. These MOUs aim to formalize collaboration on mineral extraction, governance, and trade facilitation while signaling long-term U.S. commitment to regional development and resilience.

In conclusion, the growing international competition for key minerals has turned Africa into a strategic focus for both the United States and China. China's deep-rooted dominance especially in refining and supply chain integration has instilled profound dependencies that the U.S. now considers a grave national security concern. Washington has readjusted its response in turn, mixing diplomatic efforts, institutional efforts such as the Mineral Security Partnership, and transactional activities like those by the Trump administration currently to reposition its presence in Africa's resource market. Though these initiatives mark a new American commitment to mineral diversification, there are still challenges. Trump may not be able to challenge China totally, as, first of all, there is a lack of clarity in Trump’s strategy towards Africa. While he is pursuing bilateral arrangements with the African states, his order for suspension of activities of United States Aid for International Development (USAID), has halted many humanitarian activities in the continent. Hence, so far, Trump’s policies have been largely focusing on what America has to gain from these engagements. In addition to this, China's first-mover disadvantage, long-standing partnerships, and enormous processing capacity will also prove to be a tough challenge as the future of this race will depend on African aspirations for sovereignty, sustainability and broad based growth.

(Ms. Navya Syam is the research officer at C3S. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views of C3S.)