Is a Modus Vivendi with China Possible?

BY SUBRAMANYAM SRIDHARAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBER, C3S

Let there be a relaxation of tension across the board, as it existed between 1988 and 2012 despite the presence of the Dalai Lama and his self-exiled Government here.

Image Courtsey: Newsonair

Modus vivendi requires the two parties to either openly agree to a common minimum program setting aside deeper conflicts for the time being or arrive at an informal understanding to do so. Modus vivendi would also require equitable treatment by each other. Neither of this is possible with China, for the reasons mentioned below. On the other hand, another instrument of managing bilateral relationship is détente which has a wider scope and terms of reference between the two conflicting parties as it attempts to relax tension across most facets of relationship. The parties agree on a much larger range of actions and agreements including binding treaties etc. Thus, modus vivendi is more tactical while détente is more strategic. Thus, modus vivendi only postpones the inevitability while détente has more significant purpose. Both modus vivendi and détente are possible between asymmetric powers. Though modus vivendi therefore is transactional in nature as opposed to the ‘potential’ transformational characteristic of détente, there is every possibility for them to succeed or fail in the long term.

Though there are many instances of détente, two recent examples stand out, both involving the US. In the first, it was the US-USSR détente that followed the nuclear brinkmanship that both came to in 1962 in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Eventually they agreed to far-reaching collaboration in limiting WMDs, missiles, proliferation etc. The other famous example is the thawing of the frozen relationship between the US and China in 1972. Though there was relaxation of tension between the US and the USSR as a result of the détente, the former was looking at ways to permanently dismantle the Soviet threat especially after the loss of South Vietnam to the Viet-Cong Communists. Similarly, China was also looking for a partner against the USSR after the ideological breakup in 1959 and the more serious Ussuri river armed clashes over border dispute in 1969. The détente worked well for over three decades.

Did India & China agree to a modus vivendi before? Yes. The first tentative steps in this direction were taken by India’s FM Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1979 when he visited China and met Deng Xiao Ping. China was just then launching the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ programme and timing seemed right, therefore. However, China launched a massive military attack on Vietnam while Vajpayee was still in Beijing and the Indian efforts fell apart. The Janata Government also got disbanded soon enough.

The most decisive attempt however, was a decade later in December 1988 when the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China and met Deng Xiao Ping once again. He was the first Indian PM to have visited China since c. 1954, after diplomatic ties were restored in c. 1976. The Rajiv Gandhi visit came soon after the resolution of the Sumdorong Chu incident in the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh, in which India resolutely beat back the Chinese intrusion. During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit the two sides announced the setting up of a joint task force to address the boundary dispute issue. The two countries decided to temporarily shelve the dispute and concentrate on improving relations in other areas. Therefore, the year 1988 was a watershed year in the India-China modern relationship when both the countries clearly understood that the border dispute would be settled by peaceful means and negotiations in the hands of wiser future generations. Both Deng Xiao

Ping & Jiang Zemin settled border disputes explicitly with most neighboring countries

including Russia, but did not choose to do so with India.

Hu Jintao also followed a similar policy towards India. But, utilizing the modus vivendi, China increased the trade volume manifold in its favour while ensuring Indian imports were blocked under some pretext or another despite repeated requests. Despite this, we believed that this was a fair form of modus vivendi because there was peace along the border, until Xi Jinping took over in 2013. Xi turned the modus vivendi model upside down, by giving it a sharp military edge, something similar to what Adm. Zheng He did during the early Ming dynasty, with inconvenient rulers along his maritime voyage route with his massive armada. Xi has given the concept of modus vivendi the ‘Chinese Characteristics’, which is ‘you kowtow to us’, the usual practice of Chinese dynastic emperors since at least the Song dynasty.

The very first visit that Xi made to India in September 2014 was amidst on-going twin military aggressions by the PLA at Chumar (south Ladakh) and Depsang (north Ladakh). This was clearly an intimidation tactics directed at the just assumed PMship of Modi, though a carefully planted story was circulated that PLA theatre commanders did the operation independently and without Xi’s knowledge ! This is most unconvincing for two reasons: one, he was already very powerful (holding apex posts in Presidency, CPC & CMC); two, he had developed deep roots into the PLA since the time he was Personal Secretary to the Chinese defence minister after he took party positions.

The 2014 ‘twin aggressions’ were followed by two more military aggressions with increasing sharpness, at three-year intervals in 2017 (Doklam, Bhutan) and 2020 (Eastern Ladakh). China has not withdrawn from Bhutan but has gone ahead to fortify itself there. Similarly too, in Ladakh & Tibet along the border after the 2020 episode. The skirmishes in 2017 & 2020 were never meant to be too serious by China, only shallow but still good enough to use them as a cover to further strengthen their positions incrementally. With the two axes, Bhutan & Ladakh in the north and centre respectively, having been fortified under this subterfuge, the third axis that will emanate in future would be Arunachal Pradesh, their most strategic one. This is likely to happen within the course of the next couple of years. There will thus be three axes of attacks in India’s North & East, when eventually a major war breaks out.

The direct and open military assistance provided to Pakistan through space-based ELINT & SIGINT assets is further proof that accommodation with China is impossible. It is one thing by China to supply JF-17s, J-10Cs, J-35s, PL-15s, HQ-9s & HQ-16s, Hangor AIP submarines, or Type-054 frigates, or build & launch a SAR satellite etc. for Pakistan, and even station its personnel at Pakistani bases for maintenance etc. but an entirely different level of animosity with India to equip Pakistan with nuclear weapons, missiles, and space-based intelligence assets. China denied us membership in UNSC, NSG, APEC. This intensity is even worse than China’s civilizational hatred for Japan, at a regional level. Pakistan and China have also reached complete accommodation over Shaksgam Valley, whose status China claimed for a long time would be determined by the settlement of the J&K dispute between India & Pakistan. No more such fig leaf.

India believes that modus vivendi would suit the India-China relationship at this point of time, but it has several drawbacks. One reason for modus vivendi could be that our objectives are limited, such as peace along the borders, increased exports from India, possible Chinese investments in high-technology areas, increased Indian ability to shape China-Pakistan relationship, cooperation against terrorism etc. However, history shows that none of this is possible. Can modus vivendi stop a coming war? What we should work towards is possibly a ‘détente’. Let there be a relaxation of tension across the board, as it existed between 1988 and 2012 despite the presence of the Dalai Lama and his self-exiled Government here.

In view of these, is a modus vivendi even possible or will it be just a one-sided love

affair? We are unsure if détente will work or not when irredentist claims are outstanding between neighbours. China may put excessive demands that strike at the very roots of India’s sovereignty and independent foreign policy and for that reason unrealistic. We can only surmise that the series of meetings between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in the initial years of their ascendancy to power was aimed at a modus vivendi which could not be achieved. But, it is quite obvious that modus vivendi will end-up as just another one-sided affair like last time.

(Mr. Subramnyam Sridharan is a Distinguished Member of C3S. The views expressed are those of the author and does not reflect the views of C3S)