Dragon in the Space Realm: China’s Weaponisation of the Space: By Santhiya M

Guided by Subramanyam Sridharan, Distinguished Member of C3S

Image Courtesy: India Times

Article 22/2025

Introduction

Space is becoming an area of competition as countries launch and innovate space-based technology for various purposes like civil, commercial and defence purposes. But placing weapons and launching weapons to or from space is dangerous to humanity. This act of deploying weapons in orbit, using weapons to attack targets on space from earth and equipping weapons in space is known as Space Weaponisation. The launch of Sputnik 1 which is the world’s first artificial satellite by the erstwhile Soviet Union was the first awakening of the space race between the United States (US) and erstwhile Soviet Union. After 10 years of Sputnik 1 and space exploration came the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in 1967 to regulate and govern the activities of countries which explore outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies. China became a member of this treaty through the accession process as it ratified the treaty. Article IV of the treaty states that countries should not place any technology that contains nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It also prohibits establishment of any military-based stations or installations. The moon and other celestial bodies should only be used for peaceful purposes. But the treaty is being exploited as it does not explicitly mention the weapons from earth launched to attack on space like the Anti-Satellite weapons (ASATs). In 1979, the ‘Moon Treaty’ was adopted and Article IV of this treaty prohibits military activity in space including deployment of weapons of mass destruction and installation of military bases. This treaty was not ratified by China and is also not adopted by many other countries like the US and United Kingdom (UK). There were also other initiatives like the Artemis Accords by the US which emphasizes the peaceful purpose of outer space but this also not ratified this accords and only 55 countries have signed it till now.

Evolution of China’s Space Programme

The space programme of China started in the 1950s. The first director of the Ministry of National Defence’s Fifth Research Academy, which was created to develop ballistic missiles, was also in charge of the initial development of China’s space programme. The space programme later came under the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building in 1964 and again in 1983, the Seventh Ministry became the Ministry of Aerospace Industry. China included space as a part of its policy initiatives to develop China’s technological and research development. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, China made its space programme to be more structured and planned by situating it with the Project 863 which is China’s National high tech program that covered eight key technical fields. This program included Space as one of the key fields to develop new technologies and this also laid the base for Project 921 also known as the China Manned space program. In 1992, China announced the plan to send taikonauts and construct an orbital space station. In 1993, the Ministry of Aerospace Industry was divided in two, the Chinese Aerospace Corporation and the China National Space Administration (CNSA). The Chinese Aerospace Corporation looks over the manufacturing of space-equipment and CNSA is responsible for the space activities of the country. China developed Chang Zheng or Long March boosters like Long-March 1, and Long-March 2 Low Earth orbit satellite launch vehicles. These were modified versions of the ballistic missiles like the Dong Feng 3 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the Dong Feng 5 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).

Later in 2015, China established the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLA SSF), as an independent arm of the PLA, to look at space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities as a single unit. The PLA has four services namely, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force and also four arms which are the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force and Joint Logistic Support force. PLA SSF aimed at creating advanced warfighting capabilities and achieving China’s President Xi’s goals of modernisation, informatisation and making PLA the world-class army. This gave impetus to space warfare which China refers to as the ‘informatized’ wars of the future. But now, the PLA SSF is split into four divisions and they are the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force.

Military Capabilities of China in Space

In 2015, a White Paper on Military Strategy released by China stated that outer space and cyber space are new areas of strategic competition among countries. This depicted space as a war faring area in a formal statement by China. The PLA has this objective to obtain high-level technologies to increase space capabilities. China developed the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons to balance the high number of satellites that the US has deployed. The Direct Ascent ASAT (DA-ASAT) weapons are weapons that can be launched into space from the ground to destroy a satellite that is already placed in space. The DA-ASAT weapon is designed to target LEO satellites. The Dong Neng-1 (DN-1) was the first two tests in 2005 and 2006 launched by the launching vehicle called Kaituozhe-1 in Xichang satellite launch centre. This was said to be a missile test. The first known ASAT test was launched in 2007 to destroy a weather satellite of China, Feng Yun 1C, as it was becoming old. This was placed at an altitude of 865 km and created international concern as China has demonstrated a working ASAT weapon in space which caused thousands of pieces of debris. In 2014, three more DA-ASAT programs were conducted.

While ASAT is launched from the ground, there are weaponised satellites which can be placed in orbits which later can be enabled to damage the target. These satellites can be suicide satellites in which the satellite would crash directly into the targeted satellite. These satellites can also be an assassin satellite which would release a robotic arm to destroy or change the orbit of the targeted satellite by closing into it. These are known as the co-orbital ASAT weapons and are likely to be preferred by countries than ASATs as they leave minimum to no debris and can be launched as dual-use technology under the disguise of repairing satellites. It is suspected that China has tested various Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) in LEO and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) as a step to increase co-orbital ASAT capability. Although not officially announced by China’s authorities, certain space activities of China are extrapolated as testing co-orbital ASAT capabilities by other space-faring nations. A small satellite from Shenzhou 7 capsule navigated its way as close as 45 km to the International Space Station. Even though it is seen as a coincidence, it reflected the manoeuvrability of satellites that can be used as a capability for an attack. In 2010, SJ-12 satellite was found closer to SJ-06F satellite which was in orbit between 600 km and 570 km SSO. SJ-12 was found with no publication of work or research and it is assumed to be an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) satellite. SJ-12 bumped into the SJ-6F which affected its orbital regime. This incident led to assumptions of testing of co-orbital jamming to enhance co-orbital ASAT capability.

China’s testing of a co-orbital repair satellite with a robotic arm in 2013, was also assumed as a co-orbital ASAT operational test because the satellites reportedly tested the grabbing of another satellite with the robotic arm. This is seen as a test to improve capability as a similar method of operation can be used to attack another satellite. The unusual length of the robotic arm sparked concerns as it can catch and throw other satellites. Similar to this, the Aolong1 or Advanced Debris Removal Vehicle was launched in 2016 which aims to clean the space debris by using the robotic arm to grab inactive satellites and to throw them away in the lower orbits. This also raised concerns because it may grab active satellites and throw them into the lower orbits which will make them re-enter the atmosphere earlier and would also lose touch with ground stations. This is also known as the roaming dragon and is considered to be an attempt of testing the co-orbital ASAT capability. Also in 2016, BX-2 was launched to monitor the Tiangong space station with the attached 1.3 megapixel camera and is also a sentinel/watchdog that revolves around the Tiangong space station.

This is seen as another test of the capabilities of China in space. In the same year, SJ-17 was launched to observe space debris from high orbit. It was inactive for a year and made an unusual movement in 2019. It also went close to other satellites like Chinasat 6B, SJ-20 and GF-13, notably it went as close as 5 km to SJ-20. There were also other satellites launched in 2018 said to have conducted RPO manoeuvres. These satellites can use these capabilities for military use which increases concerns as these capabilities range from jamming a satellite’s communication by sending a radio frequency jammer near a satellite to destroying a satellite by colliding another satellite with the help of onboard tracking and guiding systems used for RPO.

There are also Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) which include lasers, High Power Microwaves (HPM) and particle beams. A laser can affect a satellite’s sensor by blinding it depending on its intensity as a high powered laser can even destroy the functioning of a satellite completely. A report claimed that China has developed a deuterium fluoride chemical laser which can damage sensors on a satellite in low earth orbit as early as December 1998. The US claimed that China used lasers to jam a US satellite in 2005. A similar incident again happened in 2006 where China lasered a US satellite and claimed that it only tested the range of the laser. This led to the conclusion that China can locate foreign satellites and can also laser them. The US said that the laser did not destroy the satellite’s capability to collect information.

Another kind of DEW is HPM weapons. There were allegations saying that a miniaturised HPM weapon had been developed by China. This can be placed on a ship or used for air and missile defence. Radio-frequency weapons can use HPMs to damage electronic parts by either over heating or short circuiting. These kinds of weapons can be placed on the ground, in space and also on missiles.

This also brings us to the possibility of Electronic Warfare (EW) as satellites are prone to uplink and downlink jamming. There can be capability to jam other satellite communications as it can also be claimed as an accidental intervention and not a deliberate measure. The efforts to this can be traced back to the 1990s when China obtained ground-based satellite jammers from Ukraine. Downlink jammers can affect GPS receivers and it also requires less power. China is accused of developing such technology on their own. This includes the issue in 2018 when China was accused of placing military jamming equipment on the disputed area of Mischief Reef in South China Sea. This showed that the mobile jamming trucks were designed to meddle with the Global Navigation Satellite Systems like the GPS. There are papers that propose plans and solutions addressing the challenges of jamming satellite communications like high power requirements. A technical paper also refers to plans to jam GPS signals so as to disrupt the functioning of the US drones like the RQ-4 Global Hawk that is placed over the disputed area of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. There are many incidents referring to the jamming and spoofing of GNSS near the Shanghai port that was identified by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. A space and counter space report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency came out in 2019 and has revealed that China has been developing jammers to target satellite communication. This targets a range of frequency bands which also includes some extremely high frequency communications.

Cyber space can also be used against an adversary's space systems to launch a cyber attack. These attacks could be against the satellite command system and data distribution networks. This would affect space systems, ground infrastructure and also the users of these segments. This suspicion grows over China after the release of their 2015 Military Strategy White Paper which states that domains of space and cyber are “commanding heights of warfare.” Cyber attacks on satellite ground control stations would violate the information system to access the computer codes which can be further manipulated to hinder the operations. This gives power to steal, change, or even delete the codes to cause destruction without the usage of ASAT missiles or any other space weapons. In 2007 and 2008, there were incidents that led to suspicion of cyber attacks from China where the hackers intervened in the operation of Landsat-8 of the US for 12 minutes or more. There are also similar incidents in 2008 where NASA’s Terra Earth Observation satellite was hacked and they reached a level to command the satellite but did not issue commands to the satellite. In 2014, the weather service systems of National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) which are used by the US military and others were hacked due to which the transmission of satellite images to National Weather Service was stopped for two days as it had to fix the intrusion. China was accused of launching such cyber attacks as they developed their technology rapidly. In 2020, Sweden Space Corporation (SSC) announced that it would not renew contracts with China. Previously, both countries had contracts which enabled China to access the antennas that Sweden operated in its home country, Chile and Australia but they were not renewed again. It also included access to the ground station. Sweden’s Defence Research Agency reported that the access to antennas at Sweden could be used for military purposes by China, which China denied.

The Position of India

India is also developing its space technology and capability. While space technology focuses on research and exploration, India also demonstrates RPO and launched ASAT tests. The strategic geopolitical position of India with China prompts India to develop counter-space technology for deterrence. In 2019, India conducted the ASAT test called the Mission Shakti which turned out to be successful. This test showed the country’s capability to develop significant space technology as it is an indigenous mission. This was launched to destroy an inoperative Indian satellite at the altitude of approximately 283 kilometres in LEO. This altitude was an effort to control debris as the debris would fall back to earth faster due to the short distance. In comparison, the first ASAT test of China in 2007 was launched to an altitude of approximately 865 kilometres.

Another achievement of India is the Space Docking Experiment (SpaDex) mission. This was a docking operation carried out in January 2025. This docking process started as the spacecraft manoeuvred to reach the same orbital path and started docking and coupling with the other satellite. After this, it was rigidised for stability before starting post-docking. This was an historic achievement in India for demonstrating RPO and docking. India also became the fourth country to execute a docking operation in space, along with the US, Russia and China.

Conclusion

Geopolitical implications follow the rise of China’s space technology. Countries including India are developing counter-space technology as a measure of deterrence to China’s massive space development and investment. Many other scientific developments of China like the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System , Yaogan satellite series, Chang’e mission, Tiangong Space Station, Tianwen mission, and other missions are perceived with caution as they could serve dual purposes. China’s growing influence in space technology combined with the Belt and Road Initiative provides soft power influence over other countries. This led to the jargon of “Space Silk Road.”

List of Acronyms

ASAT - Anti-SATellite

CNSA - China National Space Administration

DA-ASAT - Direct Ascent Anti-SATellite

DEW - Directed Energy Weapons

ELINT - Electronic Intelligence

EW - Electronic Warfare

GEO - Geostationary Earth Orbit

GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS - Global Positioning System

HPM - High Power Microwaves

ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile