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SenseFace Face Recognition Surveillance Platform



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How has China been using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to build a digital system of Social Control in East Turkistan (Xinjiang)?



Douglas Daniel D'sa

OCCASIONAL PAPER

How has China been using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to build a digital system of Social Control in East Turkistan (Xinjiang)?

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to depict how China has been using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to construct a ruthless-digital system to tyrannize and subjugate the Uyghur people in East Turkistan. Since the Chinese Communist Party controls all mass media, they determine the official-state narrative. Official reports could not be relied upon and, therefore, the gathering of truthful and reliable data was an arduous task. This was circumvented by relying on leaked governmental reports, reports from watchdog organizations, and by corroborating these findings by the conduction of an expert interview with an individual at the forefront of the East Turkistan-independence struggle.

Through the course of this paper findings reveal how China has perfected their system of control by pairing biometrics with surveillance and investing into technological start-ups which further led to the creation of the 'Integrated Joint Operations Platform', which is an AI that has been instrumental in increasing the state's capacity and efficiency to surveil. The state, furthermore, uses a combination of downstream and upstream surveillance- to monitor and regulate content on both social media and the internet thereby rendering the Uyghur people unable to organize themselves and retaliate. The Uyghurs thus experience a level of oppression that is insurmountable without external aid.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Methodological Framework
 - 2.1 Literature Review
 - 2.2 Expert Interview
 - 2.3 Problematic and mitigating factors
3. Theoretical Framework
 - 3.1 What is surveillance?
 - 3.2 Development of surveillance
 - 3.3 What is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?
 - 3.4 Classification of AI (Weak vs Strong)
 - 3.5 Use of AI in surveillance
4. Contextual Chapter
 - 4.1 Xinjiang- an autonomous region of China
 - 4.2 The Uyghur
 - 4.3 Good Muslim vs Bad Muslim
 - 4.4 What does the Islamic world have to say?
 - 4.5 Conclusion
5. Analysis
 - 5.1 Traditional tools of oppression
 - 5.1.1 “Reeducation camps”
 - 5.1.2 Residential Service at Designated Location (RSDL)
 - 5.1.3 The active suppression of language, religion, and shared history-cultural genocide?
 - 5.2 Surveillance- a means of digital control
 - 5.2.1 Biometrics and Surveillance
 - 5.2.2 Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)
 - 5.2.3 Digital dictatorship
 - 5.2.3.1 WeChat
 - 5.2.3.2 Zappya
 - 5.2.4 Classification of Chinese Surveillance
 - 5.2.5 The threat of the Splinternet
 - 5.2.6 Concluding remarks
6. Conclusion
 - 6.1 Has the Research Question been answered?

6.2 Future areas of research

6.3 Concluding Thoughts

7. Bibliography

List of Acronyms

Acronym	Full form
AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AI	Artificial Intelligence
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CETC	China Electronics Technology Group
DLT	Distributed Ledger Technology
DNS	Domain Name System
ETIM	East Turkistan Independence Movement
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFA	FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) Amendment Act of 2008
GCHQ	Global Communications Headquarters
HBFEC	Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Company
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IJOP	Integrated Joint Operations Platform
IP	Internet Protocol
ISP	Internet Service Provider
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
MII	Ministry of Information Industry
NSA	National Security Agency
RSDL	Residential Service at Designated Location
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UKUSA	United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Introduction

During the COVID pandemic outbreak in the final months of 2019 China quickly caught wind of the virus and successfully enforced a lockdown upon its entire population thus effectively curbing the spread of the virus.¹ Daunting a task this may seem, however, its plausibility inflates when you consider the degree of control that China exerts over its citizens. With the limitations of having an annual budget, and an ever-expanding population- the Chinese government- under the leadership of Xi Jinping- has increasingly resorted to adopting technology to monitor the behavior of its citizens more comprehensively and efficiently. Through the course of the lockdown, China was able to successfully monitor its entire population by utilizing a combination of CCTVs and drones coupled with facial-recognition software.² The effectiveness of the use of technology and artificial intelligence (AI) to surveil a population is unquestionable, however, it also means there existing a possibility for its exploitation, and the subject of that exploitation, among others, is the long-oppressed minority of Uyghurs.

China has long been accused of transferring Uyghur Muslims from East Turkistan (Xinjiang) into detention camps on grounds of “re-educating” them and other ethnic minorities.³ Recent reports have indicated that the collection of biometric data of the Uyghurs is underway, and that State authorities have contracted Chinese-technology firms to develop software that is capable of sifting through their chats, media gallery, and voice recordings.⁴ Their private data is monitored, information stored, and trustworthiness determined- and through the pairing of surveillance cameras with biometrics the Uyghur is identified and if suspicious behavior occurs then is detained and reformed in “reeducation camps.”⁵

Against this background, the themes I would like to explore through my research paper are the following: the Uyghurs and the reasons for their oppression, the methods of reformation, and the use of technology, the internet, and AI to control and reform the Uyghur. I believe all these themes of research could be surmised through the following research question: “*How has China been using Artificial Intelligence to build a digital system of social control in East Turkistan (Xinjiang)?*”

1. Kuo, *China bars 11m residents from leaving city*, 01

2. Kharpal, *Surveillance to fight Coronavirus*, 02

3. Ochab, *Fate of Uighur Muslims in China*, 04

4. Byler, *Internet freed then trapped Uighur Muslims*, 05

5. Byler, *China's hi-tech war*, 07

2. Methodological Framework

The oppression of the Uyghur is a subject that has been receiving greater attention as of late, yet the Chinese Communist Party officially maintains the record that the Uyghur live a free and prosperous life after they have been reeducated. What the news media is not talking about as much is the use of surveillance to harshly monitor and control the Uyghur population and the Uyghur people.

2.1 Literature review

This paper takes an analytical approach where the phenomena to be studied is *surveillance* and *artificial intelligence*, therefore, a literature review was conducted to review existing relevant literature. This literature was accessed online through multiple search engines- such as yahoo and google scholar using keywords such as ‘surveillance studies’, ‘privacy laws’, ‘cyber security’ and ‘artificial intelligence’. Additional literature was scoured through the bibliographies found in those books and journals. The author was also able to use ‘RemoteXs’ to peer through online journals such as- JSTOR, DOAJ, ACM Digital Library, ProQuest eBook, Sage eJournals, and Taylor & Francis e-Journals.

The works of great authors such as Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Michel Foucault were used to develop an understanding of how surveillance has been used to effectively monitor and control the masses. The effectiveness of modern surveillance has only been amplified by the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Since AI is a rapidly emerging field the author turned to the European Union since they have the most advanced laws, frameworks, and guidelines- when it comes to privacy laws and in making efforts to define AI and the legal framework surrounding it.

2.2 An Expert interview

An expert interview was conducted virtually with His Excellency Salih Hudayar-current Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government in Exile. His views as an individual at the forefront of the Uyghur struggle for independence are extremely valuable. With his permission direct quotations have been utilized intermittently throughout this paper to corroborate the author’s viewpoints.

2.3 Problematic and mitigating factors

Since the country of focus is China, it is imperative to note the lack of a free press- since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) owns all the media. Therefore, what is portrayed on Chinese media must be taken with a grain of salt, as the CCP dictates the narrative to be told to their citizens while simultaneously engaging in a disinformation campaign with the

international community.⁶ Furthermore, international agencies do not experience the same amount of liberty as experienced in other democratic nations- a prime instance being the heavy monitoring of the World Health Organization (WHO) team that was, after tremendous effort, allowed to enter China to investigate the COVID Virus's first emergence.⁷

To mitigate these shortfalls the research employed a mix of Open-Sourced Intelligence (OSINT) coupled with journalistic reports from reputable news agencies, reports from watchdogs, U.S. Congressional reports and leaked Chinese Government directives. The leaked documents which the researcher was able to access include:

- i) The Xinjiang Papers
- ii) The China Cables
- iii) The Karakax List
- iv) The Aksu List

The source and the reasons for this data leak must be scrutinized. The individuals responsible for this leak must have had a motive- be it to paint the Chinese Communist Party in a bad light or to promulgate greater international awareness. Attempts were made to trace the source of the information by reaching out to the authors of the New York Times and the International Consortium of Journalists, who were responsible for disseminating the leaks, to no avail. Therefore, the information received from these leaked data files have been interpreted objectively, with great due care, and utilized and quoted purposefully within my research.

“The leaked papers seem very genuine, with many of them having official stamps on the papers. Furthermore, the content in the documents is very similar to the statements made by Xi Jinping and other lower-level officials and corroborate with the accounts of Uyghurs in East Turkistan.” – PM Hidayar

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 What is surveillance?

The Oxford dictionary defines surveillance as “the act of carefully watching a person suspected of a crime or a place where a crime may be committed”, while David Lyon defines surveillance as the “focused systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence management, protection or direction”.⁸ Simply put, surveillance comprises the collection and storage of precise details of those surveilled in large computer databases owned

6. Twigg and Allen, *Disinformation Tactics used by China*, 01

7. The Wire, *WHO ceded control to China*, 03

8. Lyon, *Surveillance Studies: An Overview*, 14

both by government agencies and private corporations, which can then retrieve and utilize this data as per their own purposes.

The earliest acts of surveillance utilized a very rudimentary approach with tyrants utilizing spies and espionage to gather intel, crush dissent, and disseminate disinformation. The earliest surviving records revealing the Hittite King Muwatallis sending spies with false intel to Pharaoh Ramses of Egypt during the battle of Kadesh in 1274 BCE.⁹ During the 15th and 16th centuries, surveillance took a comparatively contemporary approach, with religious organizations maintaining records of their member's date of birth, baptism, marriage, and death in their parish registers.¹⁰ Religious surveillance constituted the careful watching of person's suspected of heresy and witchcraft and would usually result in their successful purging.¹¹

Our current understanding of systematic surveillance did not, however, emerge until modern times, and it accompanied democracy, for alongside democracy developed the capitalist mode of economy which rewarded labor with wages and eradicated the need for coercion. Karl Marx states that surveillance first emerged during this setting within the factory.¹² The official reason to gather all the workers into one room, alongside the requisite machinery may have been to maximize efficiency but Marx argued that a secondary reason was to ensure labor discipline through constant monitoring of their activities.

Marx, however, restricted his analysis of surveillance within the context of class relations and it was Max Weber who further extended this affiliation to all forms of bureaucracy, of which capitalist businesses were just a singular type.¹³ For Weber, bureaucracies were driven by a need to be organized and everything had to be written down and recorded to ensure technical efficiency. Rules and stipulations were laid down, work-related information was written and recorded, and administrative teams were set up to verify and process this information. While this did increase efficiency, it also had a dual purpose of monitoring and supervising the worker's activities, with the organization maintaining a documented record of their past work. Weber argues that while most members would come to accept these regulations as just: this bureaucratic social structure maximizes social control, acting as an impediment to personal freedom and he termed this as the '*iron cage*' of bureaucracy and rationality.¹⁴

9. Crowdy, *History of Spies, Spymasters and Espionage*, 28

10. Burn, *History of Parish Registers*, 40

11. Murray, *Medieval origins of the Witch Hunt*, 66

12. Lyon, *Rise of Surveillance Society*, 35

13. Lyon, 25

14. Weber, *Spirit of Capitalism*, xviii

Michel Foucault further placed surveillance beyond bureaucracy, into the broader context of discipline within society. Modern society to him was a ‘disciplinary society’, where power was exercised not outwardly through force but through surveillance and observing.¹⁵ This exercise of power was carried through institutions such as prisons, schools, hospitals, and military barracks. Citing Jeremy Bentham’s *Panopticon*, he further illustrated how by allowing for the possibility of a constant monitoring, the subject could never be certain if he was being watched or not and would thus regulate their own behavior.

It is through this concept that we arrive at our modern understanding of surveillance and how it has been used as an effective policy to control social-undesirable behavior, especially when used in conjunction with punishment and imprisonment. The next section will trace the development of technologies used within surveillance.

3.2 Development of surveillance

John Edgar Hoover was the first director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from 1924 to 1972, and he has been referred to as the “inventor of the modern American national security state.”¹⁶ Under his tutelage, the FBI began to collect and maintain DNA records, fingerprint files, biometric records of irises, government dossiers on persons of interest while also employing the use of wiretaps and police informers.¹⁷ The FBI was also known for having employed some of these tools illegally to spy on potential enemies. The illegal wiretapping of Martin Luther King Jr.’s New York hotel room provides a clear instance of the FBI’s law infringement, which US Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach considered the “worst possible invasion of privacy.”¹⁸

Article 12 of the *UN Declaration of Human Rights* states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” At present, however, the public finds this right of privacy extremely diminished. Spying on citizens has become an increasingly popular tool utilized across the globe. Most governments have an intelligence department who then cooperate with their intelligence counterparts from other nations. Formalized agreements such as the *United Kingdom- United States of America Agreement* (UKUSA)- between the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand- mean increased cooperation between these states to share *signal intelligence*- the collection and

15. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 382

16. Weinier, *History of the FBI*

17. Charns FBI Wiretaps, Bugs, Informers, 23

18. Medsger, *J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI*, 14

analysis of information from radar signals- with one another.¹⁹ This multilateral agreement was known as the *Five-Eyes* alliance, and the signing parties used a surveillance system termed ECHELON to intercept communications from the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War.²⁰ This gathering of mass intelligence data and sharing of intel between states has been gaining traction with more state parties attempting to join the UKUSA, although this may be seen as troubling by some.²¹ Either way, what is important to note is that this mass gathering of intelligence would be too cumbersome a task to be carried out manually and it is instead the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that has revolutionized intelligence-gathering capabilities.

AI has shown to be extremely adept at combing through large sets of data and identifying whatever target has been set by the programmer. This may range from image recognition to speech recognition, translation, making predictions based on open-sourced and copyrighted information, to geo-locating images despite a lack of metadata.²² AI is guaranteed to play a consequential role in the cyberspace domain, as many AI tools and algorithms are designed to detect anomalies and scan through the network for malicious code and can perform their task with more accuracy and ease than human intelligence.²³ AI will play a more prominent role as we steer further into the cyber era but what exactly is AI?

3.3 What is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

We find ourselves surrounded by AI whether we notice it or not. Some concrete examples of AI are Apple's *Siri*, Amazon's *Alexa*, or Google's *Google Assistant*, all virtual assistants that we are familiarized with through using their products. Despite their prevalence, there is still no generally accepted definition of Artificial Intelligence, but the European Commission's Communication provides us with a good starting point:

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and take actions- with some degree of autonomy- to achieve specific goals. AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face recognition

19. Mitchell, *Canada and the 'Five Eyes' Alliance*, 07

20. Couch, *Five Eyes*, 33

21. Citowcki, *New Zealand uncomfortable expanding Five-Eyes*, 01

22. Hoadley & Lucas, *Artificial Intelligence and National Security*, 09

23. Hoadley & Lucas, 10

systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things applications).²⁴

To summarize, Artificial Intelligence can be explained as the ability of a neural network (computer) to complete tasks requiring a finite amount of intelligence when performed by humans. The AI is programmed to interact with its environment by perceiving a stimulus through its *sensors*, this information will then be processed by an *information processing mechanism*, the AI system will then execute the resulting decision with the help of its *actuators*.




Figure 1: A schematic depiction of an AI system ²⁵

To further elucidate, *Siri* activates upon the click of a button which is her *sensor*, if the task at hand is to find the nearest restaurant, then that information is conveyed by the user and is processed by her *information processing mechanism*. After performing a quick search on the internet, she is then able to display said result on the screen via her *actuators*.

3.4 Classification of AI (Weak vs Strong)

AI can be programmed to perform a variety of tasks- ranging from simple activities such as categorizing information, to more complex tasks such as being programmed to analyze chess games and defeat grandmasters.²⁶ Despite the complexity, in each case, the neural

24. Commission, *Definition of AI*, 03

25. European Commission, *A Definition of AI: Main Capabilities and Disciplines*, Brussels, 2019, 04.

26. Weber, *Computer topples Kasparov*, 01

network has a singular focus on the task at hand and requires human oversight. These systems are referred to as *narrow AI*. In direct contrast, *general AI* are autonomous and use advanced learning algorithms to apply intelligence in a general manner, in a way that may rival or exceed human intelligence.²⁷ They can perform a multitude of tasks and don't require human supervision- this being the final goal of AI. While *deep learning* is a subfield of machine learning that does not require human intervention to classify data into subgroups- it will still take years before humans are able to create a completely autonomous AI.²⁸

3.5 Use of AI in surveillance

Despite lacking general intelligence, AI has proven its competence in carrying out tasks that it has been programmed to perform. The deployment of AI in the field of surveillance has had staggering results- with the public finding itself more susceptible to breaches in personal data of their phone calls, text messages and web searches. Edward Snowden's revelations through the infamous Wikileaks revealed the existence of surveillance operations run by the government, using AI, which can broadly be classified into two categories- *upstream* and *downstream*.²⁹

The National Security Agency (NSA) ran a highly classified program called PRISM, which collected private data of citizens from large corporations such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Apple and several others.³⁰ Similarly, documents obtained by 'The Guardian'³¹ revealed that the NSA obtained permission to collect *metadata* from millions of Verizon customers from 25th April to 19th July 2013.³² Metadata refers to the numbers and names of both users on a call, length and time of the call, location data, and other unique identifiers. This information was sought from calls both originating within the United States, and between the United States and abroad. We can infer from these two instances that *downstream* involves the collection of information from companies that specialize in communication, such as Facebook, Google, and Verizon.

27. European Commission, *A Definition of AI: Main Capabilities and Disciplines*, Brussels, 2019, 05.

28. Hoadley & Lucas, *Artificial Intelligence and National Security*, 02

29. Finn & Horwitz, *US Charges Snowden with Espionage*, 02

30. Sottek & Kopfstein, *PRISM*, 02

31. A British news media

32. Greenwald, *NSA collecting Phone Records*, 01

The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FFA) granted NSA the permission to install surveillance equipment with the help of telecommunications providers to examine the contents of all data that transpired through high-capacity cables, switches and routers, which have been dubbed as the “backbone” of the internet.³³ Similarly, the Global Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) ran a program titled *Tempora*, where large volumes of data were stored- including phone calls, contents of emails, data from different social media- from fiber-optic cables for the purpose of carrying out analysis.³⁴ *Upstream* surveillance is a form of mass surveillance where the government searches through the contents of everyone’s communication, by tapping into the cables of telecoms. Certain key words are further utilized to shortlist communicational data that the agency is tasked with finding.

Using a combination of downstream and upstream surveillance, AI has enhanced a state’s capabilities to surveil its citizens. The aim of this paper is to assess how China has been using these modes of surveillance to construct a digital system of social control but before heading there, one must first study out the region of Xinjiang and understand the “subjects” that the Chinese Communist Party seeks to ‘reform’.

4. Contextual Chapter

4.1 Xinjiang- an autonomous region of China

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) occupying an area of 1.6469 million sq km in the Northwestern corner of China, is one of the five autonomous regions designated for ethnic minorities.³⁵ China initially utilized a clever policy for expanding its territory- by offering better economic prospects to the ethnic minorities and by granting them the right to self-govern. The Inner Mongolia region was first conferred the status of autonomous region in 1947, Xinjiang in 1955, Guianxi and Ningxia in 1958, and finally Tibet in 1965.³⁶

These regions are all culturally distinct from mainland-China-with some regions harboring resentment for a cultural, economic, and political imposition from the Mainland.³⁷ This indignation was hoped to be placated by conferring upon them the right to self-govern.³⁸

33. Gorski & Toomey, *The NSA’s upstream surveillance*, 03

34. MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies & Ball, *GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables*, 02

35. Falkenheim & Hsieh, *Xinjiang*, 1.

36. Wu, *From Assimilation to Autonomy*, 57

37. Hillman & Tuttle, *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*, 1

38. Article 3 of the 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

However, they are autonomous in name only- as these regions, which were established to offer greater protection are instead known for their brutal repression.³⁹ It is also important to note that the name Xinjiang is used by the CCP to refer to this region, and that the Uyghur would instead prefer that the region be referred to as ‘East Turkestan’ or ‘East Turkistan’.⁴⁰ Using the correct nomenclature is important as referring to it by its colonial name perpetuates and legitimizes China’s claim over the region. This paper will hereby refer to Xinjiang as East Turkistan.

“They need to use the correct terminology if they are addressing the region. By using the term ‘Xinjiang’ you are legitimizing and advancing Chinese imperialism and narrative and their false claim over East Turkistan.” – PM Hudayar



The Economist

Figure 2: Autonomous regions of China (Source: *The Economist*)

East Turkistan is rich in natural resources- it is approximated to have 21 billion tons of oil reserves, 40% of China’s total coal reserves, while simultaneously having the country’s

39. *Economist*, How *China’s autonomous regions differ*, 3

40. Maizland, *China’s oppression of Uyghurs*, 02

largest gas reserves.⁴¹ East Turkistan is also home to one of China's six Uranium production centers-Yinning.⁴² Therefore, control over East Turkistan becomes crucial for China's Energy sector to grow.

Furthermore, East Turkistan provides China access to Central Asia, where attempts are being made to construct a network of pipelines and highways as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to gain easier access to the region's wealth of resources.⁴³ This is all part of President Xi Jinping's silk road initiative- a trillion-dollar project to create an expedited land route from China, through Central Asia, and Europe- transferring goods at a pace quicker than sea travel. And for this, control of East Turkistan and the principled city of Urumqi is essential.

4.2 The Uyghur

The predominant indigenous population of East Turkistan are Turkic Muslims, numbering in around 12 million- they are collectively referred to as the 'Uighur' or 'Uyghur'.⁴⁴ Religion plays a big role in the identity of the Uyghur with most of them being Sunni Muslims.⁴⁵ The Uyghur language is written in an Arabic-based script, with influences of Arabic and Persian in it.⁴⁶ The language closely resembles that of the Uzbeks and is used as an interlanguage for various ethnic groups west of the Gobi Desert. These include Tungusic Sibes, the Tajiks, the Mongolic Dagurs, and even Russians in East Turkistan.⁴⁷ We thus observe that their religion connects the Uyghurs with the Islamic communities and the Uyghur language's interchangeability grants them great influence. As Lingua Franca- Uyghur is not only utilized for official purposes in governments and in courts but also in a greater number of social domains than any other language in the area.⁴⁸ It therefore comes as no surprise that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wishes to reduce Uyghur influence, severing these affinities, all while maintaining an iron grip over resource-rich East Turkistan through the ensuing policies:

41. Wong, *Region rich in oil, coal and strife*, 02

42. Zhang & Bai, *China's access to Uranium Resources*, 23

43. Kinley, *Beijing's Long Struggle to Control Xinjiang's Mineral Wealth*, 01

44. Hunter, *Organized Cruelty*, 01

45. Shir, *Silence the sound of Uyghur*, 01

46. Shir, 01

47. Dwyer, *Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse*, 12

48. Dwyer, 26

Firstly, it seeks to marginalize the Uyghur language by revamping the educational system to change the medium of instruction from Uyghur to Mandarin.⁴⁹ This is in stark contrast to earlier laws and policies that supported minority languages- such as the Law of Regional Autonomy of 1984, which encouraged greater minority representation, and increased autonomy in education and culture.

Secondly, CCP aimed at strengthening their control over the territory by flooding East Turkistan with millions of Han-workers from the mainland, who come to compose the main ethnic group within China.⁵⁰ The Hans are viewed as the key to developing the region's economy. They tend to dwell in the Northern portion of Xinjiang and are mainly clustered around the capital- Urumqi.⁵¹ The Uyghur are outnumbered by the Hans who comprise 75% of Urumqi's population and dominate the economic sphere.⁵²

Thirdly, and most cruelly, reports from multiple news agencies, leaked party documents, and stories from the families of those incarcerated disclose the establishment of several internment or reeducation camps, where Uyghur men and women are detained and “re-educated” – a process through which the Uyghurs are stripped off their language, religion and thereby their culture.⁵³ The official excuse seems to be that these centers employ teaching methodologies to fight Islamic extremism.⁵⁴ By utilizing a scoring system those determined as reformed are eligible to leave these camps.⁵⁵ A campaign of rape and forceful sterilization are allegedly performed at these camps, with many comparing it to the Gulags.⁵⁶ This section will be extended upon greatly in the section 5.1.1.

At first glance it may seem like the most provocative element of the Uyghur is their religion, however, this is not the case as there exists another Muslim minority group in China but has faced little-to-no persecution from the CCP. This is appalling for it implies there being

49. Hoshur, *Uyghur Language Instruction Absent*, 01

50. Zang, *Uyghur-Han Earning Differentials*, 08

51. Economist, *Gulag for the Uighur*, 02

52. Economist, 04

53. Austin & Buckley, *China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims*, 22; Maizland, *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, 02; Soliev, *Uyghur Violence and Jihadism*, 02

54. Austin & Buckley, *China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims*, 26

55. Austin & Buckley, 28

56 Economist, *Gulag for the Uighur*, 04

another reason for the mistreatment of the Uyghurs other than their religion. This ethnic minority is referred to as the Huis.

4.3 Good-Muslim vs Bad-Muslim

The Huis are another Muslim minority living within China. This contradiction although hazy grows pellucid upon further examination of the differences between the Hui and the Uyghur. Unlike the Uyghur, who are concentrated within East Turkistan, the Hui are spread out throughout the country,⁵⁷ with communities existing in every major city, despite the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region being majorly dedicated to them.⁵⁸ The Hui, using their excellent skills in trading, proliferated, and spread their numbers in China. This makes it harder to take any concrete action against the group since the Hui have an affluent community in every city.⁵⁹

Another major difference between the two communities is one of language and culture. The Hui, unlike the Uyghur, don't have a distinct language but instead communicate primarily in Mandarin and then Arabic.⁶⁰ This makes it easier for them to intermingle with the dominant ethnic group- the Hans, further lending them an air of legitimacy. Similarly, the Hui have adapted their Islamic practices to better assimilate into Han culture, unlike the Uyghur who attach strong affinities to their cultural practices and who have no desire of assimilating into Han society.⁶¹

Furthermore, the Hui have done a better job integrating through intermarrying with the Hans. Physically, they are near indistinguishable from their Han counterparts, a point of distinction only being the wearing of their white prayer caps. The Uyghur, in direct contrast, have a distinct appearance from their Han counterparts, which contributes to the notion of 'othering'.⁶²

Finally, and perhaps most seriously, is the issue of territoriality. The Hui have almost never challenged the territorial authority of the Chinese Communist Party, nor do they seek to

57. Chuah, *Social and Economic situation of the Hui*, 156; Gustaffson & Sai, *Case of the Hui minority*, 03

58. Hannah, *Islam in China*, 03

59. Hannah, 04

60. Crane, *Tale of two Chinese Muslim Minorities*, 04

61. Crane, 03

62. Crane, 01

do so in the present future- instead being content with being granted the liberty to move around freely and practice their religion without state interference.⁶³ To juxtapose, the Uyghur have aimed to secede and carve out a Turkic State with their political movement being termed as the 'East Turkistan Independence Movement' (ETIM).⁶⁴ Uyghur separatists reject the term Xinjiang, seeking independence of the region from the rest of China- claiming greater social and cultural ties with the Turkic people outside China than Sinitic-Han roots.⁶⁵

The East Turkistan Independence Movement is not a unified separatist movement but consists of different Uyghur separatist groups.⁶⁶ Since the 1990s these groups have participated in anti-state ethno-political clashes such as the Baren township incident of 1990,⁶⁷ the Urumqi bus bombings of 1997,⁶⁸ the 2009 ethnic riots in Urumqi,⁶⁹ or the Kunming Knife attack of 2014.⁷⁰ It is important to demarcate that these violent demonstrations aren't conducted by the general Uyghur public but are the works of a daring few. These instances of "Islamic radicalism" are overexaggerated and used by the CCP as a justification for the harsh repressive measures used against the Uyghurs.⁷¹

To summarize, the key differences between the Hui and the Uyghur are of Language & Culture, of the difference in ability of both groups to integrate and the resulting physical differences, and of territoriality. These resulting differences have led to the employment of terms such as the good-Muslim for the Hui, who respect the sovereignty of the CCP, and the bad-Muslim for the Uyghurs who must be reeducated and saved from the clutches of Islamic-extremism.

4.4 What does the Islamic world have to say?

63. Crane, 04

64. Periere, *Rise of the ETIM*, 02

65. Bovingdon, *Uyghur resistance to Han rule*, 42; Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own lands*, 135

66. Shujie, *East Turkestan Independence Movement*, 11

67. Gardner, *Uyghur resistance to Han rule*, 63

68. Gardner, 64

69. Branigan, *China locks down Western province*, 01

70. Kaiman & Branigan, *Kunming knife attack: Chinese 9/11*, 02

71. Shichor, *Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism*, 125

In 2019, a group of 22 UN Western ambassadors wrote a letter condemning and deploring China's treatment of the Uyghurs to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).⁷² A competing letter was delivered to the UNHRC, four days after the first, signed by another group of 37 states, which included the ambassadors of Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan among others.⁷³ The letter claimed that "the fundamental rights of people of all ethnic groups there are safeguarded" despite concrete evidence pointing to the opposite.⁷⁴ The fact that the signatories mentioned above are all countries where Islam is the dominant religion indicates the Islamic world's unwillingness to call a spade when it concerns China. Leaders of the Islamic world such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei- Supreme Leader of Iran- and Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh- current Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia have largely remained silent on matters pertaining to the repression of the Uyghurs.⁷⁵ Egypt and Saudi Arabia have extradited Uyghurs back into China.⁷⁶ Turkey on the other hand, has gone so far as blocking media outlets that are anti-China and report on the Uyghur's plight.⁷⁷ A lot of the Arab states seem to consider the repression of Uyghurs a domestic policy of China and seek to refrain from interfering within China's internal matters.⁷⁸

Similarly, within Central Asia countries, the sympathy and support for the Uyghurs that existed in the early 1990s was effectively squashed during the mid 1990s and early 2000s, with the inauguration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).⁷⁹ Through emphasizing on the core values of stability, economic cooperation and non-interference within the SCO, China has forged closer ties with the countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and has even been able to extradite Uyghur extremists through individual bilateral agreements.⁸⁰

72. Westcott and Shelley, *22 countries sign letter calling on China*, 01

73. Yellinek and Chen, *The "22 vs 40" Diplomatic Split*, 23

74. Board, *Muslim Countries defend cultural genocide of Uighurs*, 01

75. Ramani, *Iran's careful approach*, 02

76. Ramani, 03

77. Ullah, *Turkey to block anti-China media*, 02

78. Sekin, *Arab states and the unrest in Xinjiang*, 127

79. Clarke, *'Palestinization' of Xinjiang*, 137

80. Clarke, 137

Currently, the Taliban are engaging in a political war with the Government of Afghanistan, after the pulling out of US troops.⁸¹ As government security forces accede more ground, Taliban spokespersons have expressed their interest at establishing friendly relations with China, welcoming Chinese investments for the reconstruction of a war-battered Afghanistan.⁸² Senior Taliban representatives further stated that they would not host extremist Uyghur militants from Xinjiang and that they would not “interfere in China’s internal affairs”.⁸³

A common theme that seems to be emerging is the refusal of each of these nations to interfere within China’s internal matters. For these nations to, not only, deny interfering but to publicly support China in claiming the opposite in direct contradiction to material evidence is an indication of China’s growing soft power. The reasons for their doing so may stem from a fear of reprisal, a fear of losing out on an economic power who is willing to make investments, or they may just be attempts to appease the new powerhouse in the region- with the US withdrawing from the middle East. Be it as it may- this unnerving silence from the Muslim world depletes an air of legitimacy from the struggle of the Uyghurs, who sharing the same cultural and religious beliefs should be owed.

4.5 Conclusion

When you combine the richness of Xinjiang, the risk of the Uyghurs seceding, the refusal of the Islamic world to recognize the atrocities and add a touch of Xenophobia into the mix- the CCP’s need to reform the Uyghur population becomes clear. To do so, China has come up with a very efficient way of monitoring and reforming the Uyghur- brought in great part due to the advancement of technology and Artificial Intelligence. The next section attempts to delve in great length to the use of Artificial Intelligence as a tool for socially controlling the Uyghur population.

5. Analysis

The following chapter has been divided into two sections- with section 5.1 detailing traditional methods of oppressing the Uyghurs- which highlight more traditional strategies devoid of the use of AI - and section 5.2 and its constituents dealing with how surveillance is being used to digitally control the Uyghurs. The second section will deal with modern strategies and the use of technologies to effectively curb an entire population.

5.1 Traditional tools of oppression

81. Stewart and Ali, *Taliban advances*, 01

82. Chew, *China a ‘welcome friend’ in Afghanistan*, 02

83. Trofimov and Deng, *Afghanistan’s Taliban reassure Beijing*, 01

The CCP's primarily seeks to transform the Xinjiang region and homogenize the Uyghur culture with the predominant Han culture. This process of Sinicization has been implemented by moving large swarms of Han people into the region (especially within Urumqi-the capital), detaining dissidents in reeducation camps, a prohibition on wearing veils, banning the growing of full-facial beards, criminalizing the teaching of Islam to children under the age of 18, and forbidding the use of Uyghur as a language of instruction in academia and university classrooms.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Han-Chinese officials have been reported to live in Uyghur households of those incarcerated to ensure subservience of the remaining Uyghur household members to the state.

“As part of the Big Brother program, in 2017, 1.3 million Chinese officials were invited to live in Uyghur households to ensure their loyalty to the Chinese state and the CCP.” – PM Hidayar

It was under Zhu Hailun, deputy chief of the Communist Party in Xinjiang, that detentions and reeducations camps were first established in East Turkistan.⁸⁵ However, policies against the Uyghur became even more draconian after the appointment of Chen Quanguo as Communist Party Secretary to Xinjiang in 2016, who imposed stricter surveillance and a heightening of securitization.⁸⁶ And in 2018 the ‘ten-household joint defense’ initiative was implemented in East Turkistan by the State Party to further extend their campaign of repression.⁸⁷ Han Chinese are forced to buy riot control equipment, surveillance cameras and alarm buttons with their own money.⁸⁸ The Hans are required to inform the authorities if they come across suspicious Uyghur individuals, must themselves participate in investigations of suspicious individuals, and are thus actively being pitted against the Uyghurs at their own personal expense.⁸⁹

The State party has used any and every resource at its disposal to fulfill its mission of suppressing the Uyghurs. It has further classified the refusal to watch state television, the refusal to eat pork, to abstain from tobacco and alcohol, and fasting during the month of

84. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Surveillance, Suppression and Mass Detention*, 45.

85. Chavkin, *Architect of mass detention*, 01

86. Senate, *Surveillance, Suppression and Mass Detention*, 52; Schaack and Wang, *China's Crimes against Humanity*, 10

87. Zaili, *Authorities force Han Chinese*, 02

88. Zaili, 03

89. Hailun, *China Cable: Bulletin 20*, 02; Hailun, *China Cable: Bulletin 14*, 02

Ramadan as indicators of an individual potentially holding extremist religious views. These views require purging, and it is for this reason that ‘troublemakers’ find themselves detained and forcefully partaking in a reformation program within reeducation camps.

5.1.1 “Reeducation camps”

Several reports indicate that the Uyghurs have been detained in large numbers in what have been branded as “Education Transformation Centers” by CCP officials.⁹⁰ In fact, the ‘Autonomous Region State Organ Telegram’-signed by Zhu Hailun is an instructions manual for the operation of these camps and was leaked as part of the *China Cables* to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.⁹¹ While the official motive may be the training of vocational skills to alleviate poverty and reeducation to tackle terrorism- what cannot be denied is the magnitude of the incarceration- with satellite images from coordinates provided by survivor accounts corroborating the building of over 350 internment camps.⁹² Furthermore, detainees are not permitted to communicate in any language other than Mandarin Chinese and are punished for doing so.⁹³

The exploiting of these inmates is a recurrent theme that emerges from survivor recounts and other reports, with mistreatments constituting - physical abuse, mental torture, sleep deprivation, medical neglect, and rape, with some of these abuses reportedly ending in death.⁹⁴

This isn’t 1940, there is ample evidence, there is satellite imagery, there are videos depicting our struggle, and you can see Chinese propaganda in their videos. These re-education camps are nothing but concentration camps!” – PM Hidayar

US Congressional Reports estimate that a few million Uyghur individuals, about 5-10% of the total Uyghur population, have been detained within these camps.⁹⁵ It is impossible, however, to get an accurate number of those incarcerated within these camps, which in turn makes it harder for the CCP to be held accountable. To counteract this, efforts have been taken

90. BBC, *China defends ‘Education’ Camps*, 01 also pg 53, USC

91. Wilson-Chapman, *China Cables*, 04

92. Graham-Harrison, *380 internment camps built in Xinjiang*, 02

93. Schaak and Wang, 25

94. Senate, *Surveillance, Suppression and Mass Detention*, 64

95. Senate, 45 49, 50,

by researchers and journalists to maintain a database of Uyghur victims interred within these camps- this project being titled the ‘Xinjiang Victims Database’.⁹⁶

The *Karakax* leak contains a list of over 3000 Uyghurs, who were detained for having relatives abroad and further assesses whether they can be released or must remain in detention. This list provides us with concrete evidence that the CCP is actively implementing a policy of persecution against the Uyghur. It lists details such as their name, their ID & group number, the reasons for their “re-education”, their ‘three circles’ status, and the township’s evaluation.

5	Re-education Center No.3	2018-2-25	Rozimemet [REDACTED]	653222197603 [REDACTED]	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yingxie Hai'er Community	Kumu Luke North Road, [REDACTED]	1. Illegally left the country or was repatriated after a failed attempt to leave the country. 2. Violated family planning policy: had children over the limit.
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Figure 3: Victim no. 5 on the translated and redacted version of the *Karakax* List
(Source: Uyghur Human Rights Project)

The three circles comprise of the individual’s family, his social circle, and his religious circle. The assessment aims to explore these the three circles that the individual spends his time with- scoping for dissidents and scouting whether there exists any potential threat of the individual relapsing once he rejoins these groups. Furthermore, it serves as a means to surveil an entire group of Uyghurs and it is through this monitoring that the CCP exerts control over them.

96. Rickleton, *Xinjiang Victims Database*, 01; Bunin, *Xinjiang Victims Database*, 01

Family circle: A collision analysis of three generations of relatives found a total of 10 members, with 1 detained, 1 in a re-education center, and 8 within this jurisdiction.

1. Mijit [REDACTED], male, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222195409 [REDACTED]. On August 28, 2015 he was sentenced to 3 years in prison for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order. In April of 2017 he was sentenced to an additional 10 years in prison for illegally proselytizing as a "wild Imam."
2. Wife: Enel [REDACTED], female, ID number: 653222198703 [REDACTED]. On November 6, 2018, Yingxie Hai'er community officials sent her to a re-education center due to her status as a post-80's generation untrustworthy individual.
3. Father: [REDACTED] Asim, male, ID number: 653222194204 [REDACTED], unemployed.
4. Mother: Bayime [REDACTED], female, ID number: 653222195903 [REDACTED], handicapped and unemployed.
5. Sister: Amine [REDACTED], female, ID number: 653222196610 [REDACTED], unemployed.
6. Eldest son: Ilyas [REDACTED], male, ID number: 653222200210 [REDACTED], studying at Qaraqash County No. 3 Middle School (8th grader).
7. Second son: Yaqub [REDACTED], male, ID number: 653222200609 [REDACTED], studying at Qaraqash No. 3 Elementary School (3rd grader).
8. Eldest daughter: Rah [REDACTED], male, ID number: 653222201212 [REDACTED], studying at Kuonaxia Hai'er Kindergarten (third-year student).
9. Second daughter: Muh [REDACTED], female, ID number: 653222201609 [REDACTED], homeschooled.
10. Mother-in-law: Rabiye [REDACTED], female, ID number: 653222195905 [REDACTED], farmer, currently resides in Yingye'er Township, Kumu Ailag Village.

Social circle:

- Neighbor: Memet [REDACTED], ID number: 653222193905 [REDACTED]. On June 1, 2018, he was sentenced to 6 years in prison for inciting terrorism.
- Neighbor: Göhemisa [REDACTED], female, Uyghur ethnicity, 653224197702 [REDACTED]. On February 1, 2018, she was sentenced to 14 years in prison for spreading extremist thoughts and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.
- Neighbor: Abdurahman [REDACTED], male, Uyghur, ID number: 653222196003 [REDACTED]. On July 29, 2017, he was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months in prison for endangering public safety.

Religious Circle:

Upon conducting a home interview and investigating those associated with him, including those within his "Three Circles and Six Diagrams," it was found this individual prays and participates in the "Four Activities" (praying, visiting the mosque on Fridays, celebrating the two holidays, attending naming ceremonies, circumcision ceremonies, wedding ceremonies, and funerals). These religious practices originated from his grandfather (Asimu, deceased 20 [REDACTED]).

1. Illegally left the country or was repatriated after a failed attempt to leave the country. (Detained for 9 months from October 2014 to August 2015 by Mengla County, Kunming City public security organ for attempting to leave the country. He was then transferred to Hotan County Public Security Bureau and detained an additional 3 months, after which he was released to his home. He currently poses a threat.

2. Has 2 children over the family planning legal limit (daughter: Rah [REDACTED] born December 2012, ID number: 653222201212 [REDACTED], daughter Muh [REDACTED], born in September 2016, ID number: 653222201609 [REDACTED]);

Three generations of this individual's relatives include 10 people with 1 detained and 1 in a re-education center. Many of his relatives are detained under the "Strike Hard" campaign. Currently this individual shows average progress in reforming his ideas and needs to more deeply recognize his mistakes. We recommend he continue his re-education.

Figure 4: The "three circles" status followed by the Township Authority's verdict.
(Source: Uyghur Human Rights Project)

We can thus observe that this particular individual's family and social circles consisted of individuals who were deemed as troublemakers and were detained. Additionally, he was evaluated as requiring more time for reform as he still "posed a threat". Through repeated lessons, punishment, and hopelessness the individual is eventually broken and when there exists no longer a remote shred of insurrection, he is released back into society reformed and reintegrated with Han thinking. One thing to keep in mind is the individuals who simply go missing, who cannot be accounted for, and who can therefore be presumed to be murdered and killed. Recent reports seem to indicate that Uyghurs from detention camps are being sent to work in factories throughout China as labor, this being viewed as part of the rehabilitation process after graduating from re-education camps.⁹⁷ This is known as 'Industrial Xinjiang Aid' where Uyghurs are provided the opportunity to alleviate their poverty and are transformed and Sinicized into ideal employees through a work ethic permeated by their Han employers.⁹⁸ The Xinjiang Papers- leaked by NY Times- consist of 24 documents and refers to the control of the Uyghur population in East Turkistan and further reports how plans to restrict Islam will be extended to other parts of China.⁹⁹ The CCP does not show its dark underbelly and instead uses its control over state media to paint an image of wealth and affluence of the successfully reintegrated individuals.


97. Xu et al., *Uyghur for sale*, 06

98. Xu et al, 12

99. Ramzy and Buckley, *Mass detention of Muslims*, 07

5.1.2 Residential Service at Designated Location (RSDL)

In addition to the promulgation of detention camps, revisions were made to the Criminal Procedural Law of the People's Republic of China (1979) in 2012. Article 73 granted agents of the PRC unrestrained capacity to surveil, investigate, interview, and detain the defendant at a secret and “designated place of residence” for a period up to 6 months.¹⁰⁰ The objective is to coerce a confession out of the individual, and all RSDL rooms have been built to achieve that.



1.	Anti-suicide walls
2.	Surveillance cameras
3.	Bed with thin blankets
4.	Basic bathroom- no mirror. Toiletries brought in by guard when required.
5.	Shower- rarely allowed
6.	Toilet and sink with anti-suicide padding
7.	Thick drapes kept closed
8.	Square drawn for movement allowed.
9.	Bright fluorescent lights, always turned on.
10.	Door locked with keys
11.	Digital clock & thermometer, taped over so prisoner cannot see the temperature
12.	Table and stool for prisoner
13.	Armchairs for guards while watching the prisoner

Figure 5: Rendering of a custom-built cell based on experiences of several victims (Source: Safeguard Defenders)

As of 2019 over 6000 people have been estimated to have gone missing according to a report published by the Safeguard Defenders.¹⁰¹ No court order is required before an arrest since the RSDL is an extra-judicial manner, something akin to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in India.¹⁰² Unlike AFSPA the RSDL does not require for an area to be declared “disturbed” to apprehend and take into custody a suspect of interest. However, like the AFSPA the individual is detained unknowingly and without cause, is privy to torture and mistreatment and may simply go missing. This type of treatment is known as ‘enforced disappearance of persons’ and falls under the *crime against humanity* pursuant to the Rome Statute.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, in direct opposition and with complete disregard, the RSDL has legalized the use of enforced disappearances by government authorities.

5.1.3 The active suppression of language, religion, and shared history-cultural genocide?

Under numerous pretexts the Chinese authorities have damaged or destroyed religious buildings and sacred sites. Using satellite imagery, it has been determined that over 16000 mosques have been damaged or destroyed (which amounts to 65% of the total) within Xinjiang.¹⁰⁴ The CCP has also enacted several policies that target Uyghur culture but most influential among them are the curb on religious practices and the discouragement of the use of the Uyghur language.

Unsanctioned religious practice constitutes the studying of religion, fasting, praying, wearing a veil, participating in religious rituals, or even being part of a household that has a dense religious atmosphere- all of which can result in the detainment of the Uyghur Muslims.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, the CCP has banned the teaching of Islamic practices to children- who are only granted the liberty to study Islam after turning eighteen.¹⁰⁶

Furthermore, the CCP has enacted a policy that aims to reduce the usage of Uyghur as a language of communication. Those interred within detention camps are prohibited from

101. Defenders, *Inside China’s secret RSDL jails*, 05

102. Ind. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, act. XXVIII

103. ICC. Rome Statute of 1998, Art. VII, § (i)

104. Ruser, Leibold, Munro and Hoja, *Destruction of Uyghur and Islamic Spaces*, 08

105. Schaack and Wang, *China’s Crimes against Humanity*, 14

106. Dearden, *China bans Parents from Luring Children into religion*, 01

speaking in Uyghur or in any other language and are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese.¹⁰⁷ The second is by discouraging the use of Uyghur as a means of communication with those speaking it being labelled as unpatriotic which could further lead to detention.¹⁰⁸ And finally, by seeking to supplant the use of Uyghur, as a medium of instruction, with Mandarin Chinese within the educational sphere.¹⁰⁹

Still the two-pronged attack on Uyghur culture does not stop there, with the CCP going as far as to destroy the graveyards of the Uyghur. The destruction of their burial grounds serves to sever ties between the current generation of Uyghurs from their ancestral history - the effect of which will be exacerbated on future generations who will no longer have a physical memorial tying them to their familial history.¹¹⁰ This is yet another attempt by the CCP to strip away the Uyghur ethnic identity.

“The destruction of cemeteries erases any evidence that shows that we existed as a separate people. They will revise and rewrite history.” – PM Salih Hudayar

By imposing limitations on the practice of their faith, by actively discouraging the use of the Uyghur language, and by destroying historical markers, the CCP is successfully suppressing the cultural concept that is Uyghur, which is tantamount to cultural genocide. The next generation may ethnically remain Uyghur but will lack the cultural component- effectively neutering dissent within a generation. This is the long-term objective of the CCP, but this would not be remotely as successful a strategy (a policy) if they were not able to constantly monitor the entire population. With the advent of technology and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) the CCP has been able to monitor, control, punish, suppress, and crush any dissent at the first sign of its emerging. This is a degree of control that has never been observed before.

5.2 Surveillance- a means of digital control

5.2.1 Biometrics and Surveillance

The evolution of technology has enhanced the surveillance capabilities of the state- with some Chinese cities having a ratio of 1 Closed-circuit television (CCTVs) for every 5.9 citizens.¹¹¹ In-fact according to an analysis conducted by Comparitech- nine of the ten most

107. Schaak and Wang, 25

108. Schaak and Wang, 27

109. Hoshur, *Uyghur Language instruction absent from schools*, 02

110. Schaack and Wang, *China's Crimes against Humanity*, 29

111. Campbell, *China's Surveillance*, 02

surveilled cities in the world lie within China.¹¹² Additionally, the government issues each one of its citizens a national identity card that must be availed to access both private and public services.¹¹³ This results in the collection of databases that can link the individual through CCTV footage to his identity, which was particularly effective in helping China to monitor its entire population during the course of the Covid-19 lockdown.¹¹⁴

In 2010, Chinese authorities installed over 40,000 surveillance cameras in the aftermath of the July 2009 riots as a means of keeping a check on religious extremism.¹¹⁵ This occurred over ten years ago before the appointment of Chen Quanguo in 2016, it therefore wouldn't be presumptuous to assume that the number of CCTVs has increased.

The collection of biometrics from ethnic minorities and other citizens is a policy implemented within East Turkistan since 2013.¹¹⁶ These includes the collection of fingerprints, iris scans and blood type from all individuals aged 12 to 65, under the guise of "health checks" which is indicative of a lack of informed consent.¹¹⁷ The surveillance from the CCTVs is used in conjunction with the biodata collected from medical check-ups to identify those within the videos. By having 10s of thousands of CCTVs placed all around Xinjiang the CCP is effectively able to monitor the entire population. It is within Xinjiang that Bentham's panopticon is fully realized as a penultimate disciplinary society where all the residents of Xinjiang reside not knowing whether they are actively being observed or not. Foucault wrote:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.¹¹⁸

The cameras function as a modern-day panopticon forcing all residents to regulate their own behavior out of fear of punishment. The CCP has set up cameras and random checkpoints across the district where the individual's face scan is verified against the already acquired

112. Bischoff, *Surveillance Camera Statistics*, 01

113. Wang, *China's Algorithm of Repression*, 12

114. Kharpal, *Use of Surveillance to fight Corona*, 02

115. Nan & Qiwei, *Urumqi 'Tense' around Anniversary*, 01

116. Dirks and Leibold, *Genome Surveillance*, 03

117. Schaack and Wang, *China's Crimes against Humanity*, 23

118. Foucault and Sheridan, *Discipline and Punish*, 333

biodata.¹¹⁹ Additionally, the Uyghurs are required to often hand over their phone to the police for checking for any material that could incriminate them- Islamic texts, extremist videos, text messages badmouthing the government etc.¹²⁰ This whole process of binding different sources of information into a singular system for streamlining is known as the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform.’

5.2.2 Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) is a system that can be interfaced with through an App and is utilized by the police and security forces to collect and store personal information, to monitor and report suspicious activities, and for recommending the investigation of people red-listed and deemed as problematic.¹²¹

The IJOP App was developed by a subsidiary company of the China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) known as the Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Company (HBFEC).¹²² Similarly Hikvision, another company controlled by CETC, won a contract to provide ‘Wi-Fi sniffers’ to the IJOP.¹²³ These devices collect, and capture data and the unique addresses of devices connected to Wi-Fi networks. These are a couple of instances showcasing how China, through state-owned military contractors such as the CETC invests funds into start-ups and private companies that work on critical and emerging technology and artificial intelligence to analyze big data systems, since the amount of footage acquired through digital surveillance is colossal and would be too arduous a task for human operators.¹²⁴

The IJOP uses multiple sources, ranging from CCTV footage, telephonic conversations, Wi-Fi sniffers, numerous police checkpoints- these sources acting as *sensors*, to gather information and keep track on the movement of the Uyghurs.¹²⁵ The IJOP App has multiple functions: it is used for the collection of data, for cataloguing incidents and reports, and is used to prompt investigations of suspicious individuals, sites, or events by the police.¹²⁶

119. Wang, *China’s Algorithm of Repression*, 16

120. Wang, 35

121. Wang, 02

122. Wang, 07, 59

123. Rollet, *Companies Cash in on Surveillance Programs*, 05

124. Wang, 12

125. Wang, 17

126. Wang, 21

Furthermore, the app can be used by officers to communicate one another, it also provides locational services, simultaneously tracks the officer's movements, has both a facial recognition and a search function to provide further assistance to police officers, and has the capability to collect intel on wireless networks sensed by the device.¹²⁷

Before delving deeper into the inner mechanisms of the IJOP it would be beneficial to classify which parts of IJOP correspond with the parts of an AI. Footage gathered from CCTVs, information gleaned from telephonic conversations, data collected from Wi-Fi sniffers, and biodata collected at checkpoints, in addition to data entered manually into the App all acts as 'sensors' within this framework. The Integrated Joint Operations Platform acts as the repository and 'information processor' for all the input and relays instructions to the concerned individual through the App. Therefore, the IJOP App acts as the 'actuator'. By looking at the flowchart below one can observe that the entirety of the IJOP is the AI and that interestingly the IJOP App acts both as a sensor, alongside other devices, and as an actuator.




Figure 6: Schematic depiction of the IJOP AI system

In 2018, Human Rights Watch (HRW) acquired a copy of the IJOP App and enlisted Cure53- a security company based in Berlin- to help disassemble and reverse engineer the App.¹²⁸ Through the ensuing investigation it became clear that government officials were encouraged to collect detailed information from Uyghurs- ranging from basic information such as their name, ethnicity, ID number, their address, education, to biodata such as type of blood, pictures and their height- even noting down details regarding their religious and political status.¹²⁹

Simultaneously, it was gleaned that government officials were instructed to keep an eye out for 36 types of people: those who were imprisoned, those returning from abroad, those

127. Wang, 22. The author would heavily recommend reading the Human Rights Watch's Report on 'China's Algorithms of Repression- Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App' to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the IJOP App functions.

128. Wang, 6

129. Wang, 24

collecting funds and materials for mosques, and those who registered to travel abroad to name a few.¹³⁰ The IJOP also utilizes data provided by meters to keep track of gasoline and electricity consumption- with high or unusual readings resulting in a visit from the police.¹³¹ Similarly, the IJOP keeps track on data usage on smart phones, and a reduction in its use or an Uyghur switching to simplistic analog phones is deemed as suspicious and warrants further investigation.¹³² Furthermore, a family member being categorized as displaying any one of these 36 ‘person types’ automatically relegates their family and relative’s status to requiring monitoring and results in them being added to the watchlist as well. The ‘Aksu list’ is another leaked file detailing a list of over 2000 people that were detained in the Aksu prefecture in 2018.¹³³ According to the list, the IJOP has been used to mark individuals, both at the prefectural and regional level as suspicious if they had exhibited traits similar to the 36 ‘person types’ reported in the HRW Report.¹³⁴

Furthermore, the Karakax list too draws reference to IJOP several times mentioning how the system was instrumental in identifying and marking the victim to be captured as detailed in figure 4.

<p>Post-80's generation untrustworthy individual</p>	<p>Family circle includes 13 people with 1 detained and 2 sent to re-education centers. Father-in-law: Memtimin [REDACTED], ID number: 653222195404 [REDACTED], detained in a prison in June 2017 (sentenced to six years) under the "Strike Hard" campaign for participation in an illegal Tablig activity. Husband: Memetjan [REDACTED], ID number: 653222198606 [REDACTED]. On May 21, 2017, he was sent to an reeducation camp by Purchaqchi Town authorities for applying for a passport. Second brother: Abdujelil [REDACTED], ID number: 653222199203 [REDACTED]. On May 4, 2017, he was sent to an reeducation camp following an IJOP push notification warning. (Mobile and internet services suspended on September 13, 2015 under the "Cutting Communication" campaign). Father: Ez [REDACTED], ID number: 65322195708 [REDACTED], retired Bureau of Water Resources official, good behavior. Mother: Dolettajihan [REDACTED], ID number: 653222195908 [REDACTED], farmer in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Eldest sister: [REDACTED] gül [REDACTED], ID number: 653222197511 [REDACTED], employee of a company in Sizi Community, good behavior. Second sister: Nur [REDACTED], ID number: 65322219780 [REDACTED], emergency room nurse at a county hospital, good behavior. Third sister: Hö [REDACTED], ID number: 653222198302 [REDACTED], tailor in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Brother: Abdu [REDACTED], ID number: 653222198908 [REDACTED], taxi driver in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Mother-in-law: Qemuberman [REDACTED], ID number: 653222196002 [REDACTED], home-based farmer, good behavior.</p> <p>Social circle status: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no one else detained or sent to a re-education center under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle status: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Rozi'eli [REDACTED]'s "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that before being sent to a re-education center, she performed Namaz every day and prayed after every meal. Every year she visited relatives' tombs and prayed during the two holidays. Her religious knowledge originated from her grandmother Mirem Khan [REDACTED] (deceased 2005).</p>
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**Figure 7: Victim no. 4 on the translated and redacted version of the Karakax List
(Source: Uyghur Human Rights Project)**

130. Wang, 25

131. Shih, *Police Cloud, tracks electricity*, 01

132. The 13th type of individual that requires attention. Wang, *China's Algorithm of Repression*, 26

133. Eckert, *Big Data Program Identifies Uyghurs*, 01

134. HRW, *Xinjinag's Muslims*, 05

What becomes extremely pellucid is the ruthlessness of the IJOP system and the tragedy of those interred due to its effectiveness.

5.2.3 Digital dictatorship

Since computers communicate through numbers and humans communicate through language- the Domain Name System (DNS) Server was developed to convert domain names into I.P. addresses- mitigating the effort required to gain access to a website.¹³⁵ The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a nonprofit organization that maintains and administers these unique identifiers and anyone using the internet refers to this registry to be directed to any website.¹³⁶ Since China does not yet have its own operational internet infrastructure it utilizes this existing framework. To retain control over cyber use within China to government has relied on prohibiting access to foreign websites, exerting stricter regulations on local Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and the labor-intensive and exhaustive surveillance of the contents of all social media users.

China does not grant its population to access popular websites such as Google, Wikipedia, Foreign News Websites, neither does it allow social medias such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, or its subsidiaries- Instagram and WhatsApp.¹³⁷ This stems from their inability to regulate foreign medias and websites, and is viewed as a threat for that would confer upon the population the ability to communicate freely and without restrictions, something completely unacceptable to the CCP.

“There is no freedom of press whatsoever. Everything is controlled by the CCP. Foreign journalists are able to get in, but they are not able to engage in actual journalistic activities, are not able to report on the state’s functioning and will ultimately recite whatever narrative the CCP wants.” – PM Huidayar

Alternate websites such as Baidu and Weibo offer the same functionality, however, they remain extremely censored with offensive and controversial material- pornographic materials, hate speech, extremist videos being taken down.¹³⁸ The *National Intelligence Law* (国家情报法) declares that organizations and citizens must both comply and cooperate in

135. Mao et al, *Local DNS servers*, 02

136. Klein, *ICANN & Internet Governance*, 193

137. Yuan, *A generation without Google*, 01

138. Yuan, 02

national intelligence work and that they will further be sheltered by the State.¹³⁹ Internet companies are held responsible for the content hosted on their platform and must follow the local rules and regulations.¹⁴⁰ Failure to do so results in severe fines or the risk of losing their license to continue operating.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the users involved in the generation and/or proliferation of propaganda, of spreading rumors, or controversial material, are marked by the App, have their access suspended, and are further marked as an individual who may require further enquiry.¹⁴²

5.2.3.1 WeChat

WeChat, is a social media app having elements of Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp integrated to form one singular super app. It can easily be argued as being China's most used app for communication- crossing over a billion active users in 2018.¹⁴³ WeChat utilizes a combination of image and keyword censors to scan the messages of accounts belonging to Mainland China users.¹⁴⁴ Censorship occurs if the contents of the messages- be it keywords or images, contains blacklisted words or code.¹⁴⁵ WeChat uses server-side censorship, which means the rules for performing and the operation itself are executed when the message leaves the individual's phone, and on a server managed by parent company Tencent.¹⁴⁶

139. Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China 2016, art. VII

140. Cadell, *State-Controlled data market*, 02. Hoffman and Kania, *Huawei and the ambiguity of Chinese intelligence*, 02

141. Kenyon, *Surveillance Explained*, 07

142. McDonell, *China Social Media*, 03

143. Yao, *WeChat 1 billion*, 01

144. Jay, *WeChat Censoring*, 02

145. Knockel et al, *We Chat They Watch*, 49

146. Kenyon, *Surveillance Explained*, 03




Figure 8: WeChat using Server-Side Censorship
(Source: Miles Kenyon, Citizen Lab)

Each outgoing message has a resulting digital fingerprint that establishes its uniqueness, this is known as the MD5 hash. When a file is determined to contain sensitive material, after comparing them against a database of blacklisted material, then that file is flagged as inappropriate, and the outgoing message is censored. And neither the sender nor the receiver is given a notification stating that the message was blocked.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the MD5 hash of that file is retained by WeChat who utilizes it to censor files more efficiently in the future, another prime instance of deep learning.¹⁴⁸

5.2.3.2 Zapya

Zapya, known as Kuai Ya in Chinese, is a file sharing application which endows its users with the ability to transfer files of any format without requiring the need of an internet connection.¹⁴⁹ The file-sharing app is viewed ominously by state authorities as a medium that allows for the transfer of questionable material easily without the need for internet.

According to Bulletin #20 of the leaked China Cables over 1.9 million individuals in East Turkistan utilize Zapya, out of whom 26602 were criminal detainees, while 4000 were unregistered imams, and 32 individuals joined terrorist organizations such as ETIM.¹⁵⁰ Within the same document preparations were made for the investigation and verification of these

147. Kenyon, *Surveillance Explained*, 03

148. Kenyon, 05

149. Teng and Wen, *file-sharing apps*, 316

150. Hailun, *Bulletin 20*, 01

individuals by law enforcement officers utilizing IJOP, by the ten-household joint defense initiative, and by other local stability maintenance forces.¹⁵¹

The Western world follows a model of “innocent until proven guilty”, however, in China and more relevantly within East Turkistan they emulate a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ policy and this extends to Zappya users. While the official reason is to prevent the transfer of violent and extremist material between the masses a more plausible explanation is that this is yet another attempt to police what can and can’t be circulated and is indicative of the party’s need to monitor the Uyghurs and prevent the promulgation of further discord.

5.2.4 Classification of Chinese Surveillance

To reiterate downstream surveillance consists of the collection of information from companies that specialize in communication, while upstream surveillance comprises of the filtering and searching of every individual’s communication through tapping into the source material- cables of telecom providers.

The telecommunications industry is dominated by three key players- China Mobile Limited, China Unicom and China Telecom Corp., and all three of them are state-owned and controlled, with the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) overseeing the entire industry.¹⁵² The state owns controlling stakes in all three industries and thereby also owns the infrastructure. Therefore, there is nothing stopping the state from simply tapping into the telecom cables and searching through everyone’s communications. By exercising this degree of control there exists an extremely high probability of the CCP utilizing upstream surveillance on its citizens.

Similarly, through the illustration of the State’s control over WeChat in the previous section it becomes painstakingly clear that Chinese authorities also utilize downstream surveillance. The state has complete authority over social media companies and internet companies, who are required to follow their instructions or forfeit their license to operate.

5.2.5 The threat of the Splinternet

The beauty of the internet has always been its permissionless nature and the anonymity it provides its users. The internet architecture was built in such a way that ISPs could not regulate, nor become aware of what their users were using their internet access for. China would seek to supplant this and assert greater control over cyberspace by building their own

151. Hailun, 02

152. Yu and Tan, *Evolution of China’s Telecommunication Industry*,

version of the internet.¹⁵³ By creating plans to develop their own infrastructure they are attempting to balkanize from the global internet, the resulting cyberspace created being termed as the ‘splinternet’.¹⁵⁴

On September 2019, half a dozen Chinese engineers approached the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)- a specialized subsidiary of the UN- with a proposal to create a new Internet Protocol (IP) that would effectively splinter the existing global internet.¹⁵⁵ This new IP network, proposed by Huawei, would utilize blockchain technology and involve the use of AI and Big Data analytics and other applications to promote the sharing of data between governments.¹⁵⁶

It may seem counterintuitive that blockchain, a type of distributed ledger technology (DLT) with a decentralized database, would be the medium for imposing authoritarian degrees of control.¹⁵⁷ This blockchain technology’s selling suit has always been its peer-to-peer system, which eliminates the need for an intermediary. However, within a Chinese model, the state would have ownership of the DLT and could therefore keep track of each and every interaction by assigning each user an ID, thus eliminating the very concept of anonymity.¹⁵⁸ It would confer upon internet service providers the ability to observe, monitor and control every single device connected to its network.¹⁵⁹ Most importantly it would result in a bifurcation of the internet with the splinternet existing independently of the World Wide Web.

This has been corroborated by many global field experts, one of whom is Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google and Alphabet Inc. “I think the most likely scenario now is not a splintering but rather a bifurcation into a Chinese-led internet and a non-Chinese internet led by America.”¹⁶⁰ This is a jarring notion but one that must be researched and scrutinized further as China continues to invest and develop infrastructure in Africa through the Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI).¹⁶¹ As part of the BRI package China is building telecommunications

153. Murgia and Gross, *China’s mission to reinvent the internet*, 03

154. Hoffman, Lazanski and Taylor, *Standardizing the Splinternet*, 239

155. Murgia and Gross, *China’s mission to reinvent the internet*, 01

156. Murgia and Gross, 04

157. Hoffman, Lazanski and Taylor, *Standardizing the Splinternet*, 250

158. Hoffman, Lazanski and Taylor, 250

159. Murgia and Gross, 05

160. Kolodny, *CEO predicts internet split*, 01

161. Lokanathan, *China’s Belt and Road Initiative*, 03

infrastructure, creating data centers, laying fiber optic cables, and exporting facial recognition technology and surveillance equipment.¹⁶² In short, most of the technological and communicational infrastructure of the nation's part of the BRI will be supplied by tech firms based in China, which is concerning. China's plan for dominance and to build a dependency is twofold: one, loan money to developing nations and take control over their territories and ports upon default of repayment. And two, to provide internet and the infrastructure sustaining it at a fraction of the price as this offer- that seems too good to be true- grants the CCP the influence and the capability to influence and control these nations.¹⁶³ This bifurcation may in time come to symbolize the battle for global supremacy between China and the US.

We can thus observe that China has already begun to engage in a technological war against the West for global cyber-supremacy. But the implications of implementing such a system domestically would have far-reaching implications, particularly for ethnic minorities such as the Uyghur. For the citizens it would mean an unimaginable degree of control with the state controlling every single aspect over the cyber domain. Users would have to secure permission from internet providers for any and every action and when coupled with the measures of control mentioned earlier on this chapter would ensure that the Uyghurs would never be able to collect themselves, organize and protest again.

5.2.6 Concluding remarks

The internet in China is monitored extremely heavily, with millions of individuals being hired to monitor social media and other microblogs.¹⁶⁴ Each user must exercise caution or risk detainment; and like the *Orwellian* novel '1984', where people had to be careful what they said in front of the TV, so too must the citizens of China regulate their behavior and curtail what they say on the internet.

It is important to note that unlike democracies China is a communist state owning a controlling stake in vital industries, and authoritarian- demanding the subservience of the private sector. Furthermore, it is important to note that China does not have the most liberal cybersecurity laws- as companies and individuals are forced to collaborate and comply on all matters concerning national intelligence.¹⁶⁵ It is for these reasons that China is able to exert

162. Triolo and Greene, *Digital Silk Road*, 06

163. Kenyon, *State controlled alternative cyberspace*, 02

164. BBC, *China employ two million microblog monitors*, 01

165. Hoffman and Kania, *Huawei and the ambiguity of Chinese intelligence*, 02

control to this extent over its cyber domain. China thus uses a combination of both upstream and downstream surveillance extremely effectively to exert control over its citizens. But if China can create its own version of the splinternet both downstream and upstream would become base components of an apparatus completely owned by the state and this is a frightening thought.

6. Conclusion

Through the course of this paper, the reasons for the Chinese Government's execration towards the Uyghurs became more pellucid, what was instead startling was the lack of objection coming from the Islamic world. In the absence of protest, not that its presence would result in any noticeable change, China has set the Uyghur against the Han. They have created a system for the rehabilitation of those who "need" reforming, they have adapted existing Criminal Procedural Law to better accommodate Human Rights infringements conducted by their security forces and have actively suppressed the cultural factors that define what is means to be Uyghur. The CCP enjoys absolute control over East Turkistan.

6.1 Has the Research Question been answered?

Through the internet people were once provided with limitless space to channel, develop, and express their thoughts, so it is ironic that it is through the same medium that the Chinese people are stalked, manipulated, and controlled. This paper set out to answer the following research question: "How has China been using Artificial Intelligence to build a digital system of social control in East Turkistan (Xinjiang)?"

The CCP regulates every single aspect of the cyber space by determining which websites and applications are accessible to the public, threaten local ISPs to comply with their regulations or face a suspension of licenses, and hire countless people to scour the web to report any sign of dissent. Through the course of this paper, it has become indisputably clear that Artificial Intelligence is being used adeptly and incessantly by the Chinese state. Unparalleled levels of repression have been achieved through the coupling of AI and biometrics with surveillance. Through investing in technological start-ups, the state through CETC was able to invent and mass produce technology such as WIFI sniffers and develop the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, which have been instrumental in the systematic oppression of the Uyghur.

6.2 Future areas of research

East Turkistan is one of the few autonomous regions in the People's Republic of China, whether similar forms of oppression are being carried out in other annexed regions such as Inner Mongolia and Tibet should be studied. It would be of great relevance to examine whether AI, and specifically the IJOP, is being utilized in these regions to oppress the Mongols and the Tibetans.

Another issue that should further be examined is the silence of the Muslim world. The silence of the Islamic nations has had a devastating impact on the Uyghurs who find themselves oppressed and alone. Belonging to the same brotherhood, the reasons for the silence of the Islamic countries must be scrutinized and questioned. Why have nations such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt chosen to keep silent? What is the nature of the relationship between these countries? Do these countries seek to refrain from making China an enemy? Is China the new bully on the block with the US withdrawing? Why does the Taliban refuse to interfere in China's internal matters? These are all questions that need answering and would make for riveting research questions.

6.3 Concluding thoughts

Downstream and Upstream surveillance is increasingly being used by governments to keep tabs on their citizens and this is often done without their knowledge and consent as is evident through NSA and PRISM leaks. However, in these cases private companies are required to cooperate with government agencies, often after gaining legal permission from the judicial authorities. In the case of China, the CCP owns the entire apparatus, and enforces severe consequences on private data and telecommunication companies that refuse to comply. It is for these reasons that the Chinese State is able to maximize its abuse of these networks to the farthest extent possible. A thought to ponder over is whether surveilled societies is the general direction that all nation states are heading towards? Do the people have a say in this? Is a digital panopticon truly inevitable?

Through AI China has gained full mastery over surveillance and has used every tool in its arsenal to exert disciplinary power upon the Uyghurs. The present state of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang heavily resembles those of the citizens of Oceania in George Orwell's '1984', who had to refrain from saying anything culpable in front of the Television Screens or risk committing a *Thoughtcrime* and face imprisonment. The Uyghurs find themselves living through a similar nightmare except much worse due to the advancement of AI and technology. They experience a constant torrent of surveillance, they are actively oppressed with no legal recourse or effective form of protest, they find themselves isolated and shunned from the rest of the Islamic world, and through a well-orchestrated attack aimed at their culture they find their sense of identity slowly dissipating. The Uyghur people, if nothing is done, will cease to exist as a people, completely assimilating into mainstream Han culture.

“In our opinion, the Western states and media are not taking this issue as seriously as the Syrian or the Palestine conflict while our people currently face a genocide right now! “Never again” [was] used after the holocaust [but they] are just empty words with no actions because “Never again” is going on right now in East Turkistan!” – PM Hidayar

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